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THREE ESSAYS ON PRICING AND VOLUME
DISTRIBUTIONS OF CROSS-LISTED STOCKS
JING WANG
ABSTRACT
This dissertation provides empirical evidences in global cross-listed stocks trading
volume and pricing. The first essay documents the global trading volume distribu-
tion of cross-listed stocks and examines factors that make a host market competitive
in attracting order flows from the counterpart domestic market. The results show
that host markets are more successful in attracting trading volume when they have
a higher information factor, have lower bid-ask spreads, provide better investor pro-
tection and information disclosure, share the common language or legal origin with
the counterpart home markets and locate closer to the home market. The second
essay investigates the market competitiveness among rival host markets based on a
unique sample of global firms simultaneously cross-listed in multiple foreign countries.
I present the global cross-listings and trading volume distributions cross host-home
markets as well as over time, and provide robust evidences that host markets are more
successful in attracting trading volume from other competing markets when they have
lower bid-ask spreads, better legal protection, more market liquidity, higher level of
financial development, and where the firms with longer listing history. Interesting,
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I consistently find that host countries with English common law origins are able to
attract trading volume while French civil law origin host countries attract less trading
activities. The third essay investigates the cross-listed stock price discovery process.
I use synchronous trading data and the error correction model to find that prices
on the home and the U.S. markets are co-integrated and mutually adjusting. The
price adjustment in response to price disparity happens in both the home market
and the U.S. (host) market. In most cases, domestic prices are dominant for the
price discovery. However, I also observe a statistically significant amount of feedback
from the U.S. markets. The greater the competition offered by the U.S. market, rep-
resented as larger U.S. proportion of trading volume, more informative U.S. share
price, more liquidity, better legal protection and closer to the home market, the more
price adjustment from domestic side toward the U.S. price.
vii
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
The dissertation provides empirical evidences in global cross-listed stocks trading
volume and pricing, from three perspectives. The first essay documents the global
trading volume distribution of cross-listed stocks and examines factors that make
a host market competitive in attracting order flows from the counterpart domestic
market. The results show that host markets are more successful in attracting trad-
ing volume when they have a higher information factor, have lower bid-ask spreads,
provide better investor protection and information disclosure, share the common lan-
guage or legal origin with the counterpart home markets and locate closer to the
home market. Additionally, small but mature high-tech firms with high growth rate,
volatile stock returns and high foreign sales are prone to execute more trading in host
markets.
The second essay investigates the market competitiveness of attracting order flows
among rival host markets based on a unique sample of firms simultaneously cross-
listed in multiple foreign countries. We present the global cross-listings and trading
volume distributions cross host-home markets as well as over time. We find that
the U.S. is not only the largest host market in attracting the foreign listings but
also the most competitive markets in attracting trading volume from other foreign
markets. The U.S. market kept leading all global markets during and after 2002
1
dot-com bubble crisis and 2008 financial crisis. Several host markets, like the U.K.
and Hong Kong, also developed to popular trading venues for foreign firms. We
find that host market/country characteristics are critical in determining the volume
distribution among competing foreign markets. We provide robust evidences that
host markets are more successful in attracting trading volume from other competing
markets when they have lower bid-ask spreads, better legal protection, more market
liquidity, higher level of financial development, and where the firms with longer listing
history. Interesting, we consistently find that host countries with English common law
origins are able to attract trading volume while French civil law origin host countries
attract less trading activities. Additionally, companies prefer to trade in the host
market which provides more stock price information, less stock price correlation with
its home market, locates closer to their home market in time zone, however, these
factors become secondary importance in determining the market competitiveness.
The third essay investigates the cross-listed stock price discovery process. We
find that prices on the home and the U.S. markets are co-integrated and mutually
adjusting. We construct the error correction model to document the quarterly “speed
of price discovery” for each cross-listed firm. Our findings includes that the price
adjustment in response to price disparity happens in both the home market and
the U.S. (host) market. In most cases, domestic prices are dominant for the price
discovery. However, we also observe a statistically significant amount of feedback from
the U.S. markets. The greater the competition offered by the U.S. market, which can
be represented as larger U.S. proportion of trading volume, more informative U.S.
share price, more liquidity, better legal protection and closer to the home market, the
greater the U.S. contribution to the price discovery, the more price adjustment from
domestic side toward the U.S. price. In addition, we also observe that larger firm
with longer U.S. market listing history from a lower economic growth home country
usually has higher domestic adjustment toward the U.S. price.
2
My dissertation will fill the gaps in previous literature by providing comprehensive
analysis on trading volume distribution based upon the global sample while previous
studies mainly investigated on U.S. sample only. Second, this dissertation is the first
to investigate the competitiveness among the rival host markets for multiple cross-
listed stocks. Third, this study is the first to use the long run mutiple countries
intra-day data to study the speed of price adjustment in a cointegrated time-series
system of paired cross-listed shares which share a common stochastic trend and to
successfully address the synchronous trading issue across global markets.
My dissertation not only contributes to the academic literatures but also provides
insightful results to practitioners. The results can guide investors construct their
global diversified portfolio in taking advantage of the arbitrage opportunity, place
orders at markets with lower liquidity cost, ensure the feasibility of investors trading
strategies. Regulators and policymakers may adjust policies and improve the market
soundness in order to make a country’s stock market more competitive and therefore
enhance the developments of domestic financial markets.
3
CHAPTER II
Essay I. The determinants of trading volume
distribution: Evidence from globally cross-listed
stocks
Using a sample of 642 cross-listed companies with 771 cross-listings from 39 home
(domestic) countries over the period of 1981 to 2010, we conduct a comprehensive
analysis of global trading volume distribution and factors that contribute to market
competitiveness in attracting order flows. To the best of our knowledge, this study is
the first to examine the global distribution of trading volume of globally cross-listed
firms as well as factors that contribute to a competitive host market.
Previous studies on trading volume distribution have restricted their samples to
firms that cross-list in the United States, although the U.S. accounts for less than 30
percent of the globally cross-listed firms and its importance has been dwindling (See,
for example, Baruch et al., 2007; Halling et al., 2008; Barclay et al., 2003; Sarkissian
and Schill , 2009; Kutan and Zhou, 2006). Over the last decade, we have observed
steady growth in global cross-listings, with the total number of depositary receipt
(DR) programs around the world increasing from 1, 534 to 3, 364 between 2000 and
2010.1 However, over the same period, the number of U.S.-listed DR programs has
1In addition to DR problems, firms may also directly list their shares on a foreign exchange. The
data on global DR problems are obtained from the BNY Mellon, DR Market Review, 2000 and 2010
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decreased from 608 to 410.2
Recent studies have revealed that the passage of SOX is one of the most common
reasons that foreign firms leave U.S. markets (See, for example, Fernandes et al., 2010;
Marosi and Massoud , 2008; Doidge et al., 2010; Bianconia et al., 2013). Small foreign
firms with low trading volume have been more likely to exit U.S. markets, because
the bonding costs of continued U.S. registration outweigh the benefits, especially
after the passage of SOX. Given the increasing importance of non-U.S. markets as a
destination of cross-listings, more studies are needed to bring non-U.S. markets into
consideration. However, earlier studies on trading volume distribution of cross-listings
have primarily used the sample of American depositary receipts (ADRs) or foreign
shares listed in U.S. markets only. The growth of non-U.S. host markets highlights
the need for a comprehensive study of globally cross-listed firms.
For this study, we hand-collect the global sample of cross-listings at the end of 2010
from 10 major host markets: Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, the U.K., and the U.S..3 We first report stylized
facts of the trading volume distribution between a host market and counterpart home
markets. In the competition of attracting trading activities, on average, host markets
win against counterpart home markets by a narrow margin. The overall trading
activities executed in all host markets is 1.154 times those in the counterpart home
markets. However, market competitiveness varies greatly across host countries.
We next examine factors that contribute to a competitive host market. The liter-
ature suggests a group of information- and non-information-based variables that may
help a host market attract order flows. Given that the U.S. equity market does not
always dominate in the price discovery of cross-listed stocks, it is important to ex-
editions.
2The data are obtained from the BNY Mellon, DR Market Review, 2000 and 2010 editions.
3In 2010, these 10 countries represented only 31.4 percent of the global market capitalization
but accounted for more than 60 percent of foreign-listed companies. Source: World Federation of
Exchanges, Annual Statistics, Domestic market capitalization, 2010; number of listed companies,
2010 (URL: http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/).
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amine the significance of information-based variables by including cross-listed stocks
in non-U.S. host markets (Eun and Sabherwal , 2003; Su and Chong , 2007). We find
robust evidence that information factor, common language or legal origin and time
zone play vital roles in attracting order flows to a host market. We also document the
importance of non-information-based variables. Host markets are better positioned
to attract order flows from their counterpart home markets when they have lower
bid-ask spreads and offer better investor protection and information disclosure. Ad-
ditionally, companies from less-developed economies with advanced financial markets
observe larger shares of their trading executed in host markets. In terms of firm char-
acteristics, we find that small and mature firms with high growth rate, more volatile
stock returns and more foreign sales will conduct more trading in host markets. We
also observe high-tech cross-listings execute more trading in their host markets.
Our contribution to the literature is three-fold. First, there is no agreement on a
theory of order flow distribution after companies cross-list their shares abroad. Thus,
empirical studies are needed to document the distribution of globally cross-listed
shares. One of the perceived benefits of cross-listing is increased trading volume and
liquidity for the cross-listed firms (Abdallah et al., 2011; King and Segal , 2009; ?).
Many financial theories argue against the development of an active foreign market
due to the tendency toward order agglomeration (Admati and Pfleiderer , 1988) and
the information disadvantage of foreign investors (Dvorˇa´k , 2005). However, some
studies have documented the evidence of order mitigation toward foreign markets
(Domowitz et al., 1998; Levine and Schmukler , 2007), which would be of great concern
to policymakers and investors in domestic emerging markets. We add strong evidence
to the literature by documenting the distribution of trading activities of globally cross-
listed shares. Our results show that, overall, host markets are slightly better than the
home markets in attracting trading volume, although market competitiveness varies
across host markets.
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Second, we extend previous studies such as Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al.
(2008) by deriving our results from a comprehensive sample of globally cross-listed
shares. The literature has mainly used samples of ADRs or cross-listed shares in the
United States only. For example, Baruch et al. (2007) develops a multimarket trading
model, predicting a higher share of trading volume for a host market where the cross-
listed stock returns have higher correlation with returns of other assets in the market.
Halling et al. (2008) uses U.S.-listed foreign shares and examines the magnitude of
firm and market characteristics to explain variations in the foreign share of trading
volume. However, a study that draws samples of cross-listed firms from a single host
market (in this case, the U.S.) is unable to evaluate those factors that are absent from
this particular host market. Karolyi (2006) points out that studies on multiple host
markets have uncovered the importance of culture, geographic proximity and investor
familiarity, which are not present in studies that focus only on the U.S. market as
a cross-listing destination (see also Pagano et al., 2001, 2002; Sarkissian and Schill ,
2004; ?). Moreover, foreign listings in the U.S. market constitute less than 30 percent
of globally cross-listed shares (Sarkissian and Schill , 2009). Thus, the results derived
from the U.S. samples may not be generalized to non-U.S. host markets. Given the
increasing importance of non-U.S. markets as a destination of cross-border listings,
more studies are needed to bring the non-U.S. markets into consideration. In this
study, we fill this gap by investigating the trading activities of 771 cross-listings from
39 home countries listed in 10 major stock markets. We extend the previous studies
of Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) to potentially identify factors that
are absent from the U.S. market. For example, we document that whether a host
market shares the same language or legal origin with the home market is important
in determining the trading volume share in the host market, thus identifying two
additional information-based variables.
Third, our sample includes 216 cross-listings (28 percent of overall sample) that
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simultaneously list on more than one foreign markets. This enables us to evaluate
the impact of multiple cross-listings and to correct the bias in measuring trading
volume and the information factor as a result of ignoring multiple cross-listings. In
our regression analysis, we observe that multiple cross-listings have a significantly
negative impact on the volume share of a host market. If the firm cross-lists on more
than one foreign market, the volume share of any of the host markets is significantly
lower. In order to take into consideration the impact from competing host markets,
we revise the measure of trading volume share and information factor used in the
literature (Halling et al., 2008; Baruch et al., 2007). The results reported in our
study are thus free from any bias caused by failing to incorporate the impact of
multiple cross-listings.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes the sam-
pling process and documents the distribution of cross-listings across home and host
markets. Section 3.1 details our main research questions and variables construction.
Sections 2.3 discusses our empirical findings. Section 4.6 presents results of robustness
checks. Section 3.5 concludes our study.
2.1 Sampling process and distribution of cross-listings
To construct our global cross-listing sample, we hand-collected lists of cross-listing
firms from the official stock exchange websites in 10 countries at the end of 2010. If
such a list was not available on the exchange website, we contacted the statistics
or research department of stock exchange via e-mail and/or phone. Following the
sample construction method of Sarkissian and Schill (2009), we excluded financial
firms, investment fund, or trusts from our sample. We also excluded firms from tax
havens, such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Jersey, or the Netherlands Antilles.
We further acquired the weekly stock price, trading volume and market index data
available from Datastream between January 1981 and December 2010. The final
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sample includes 642 companies with 771 cross-listings. The number of cross-listings
is significantly higher than that of firms due to multiple cross-listings by many firms.
In Table 2.1, we present the distribution of sample cross-listings grouped by home
and host markets. Sample cross-listings represent 39 home countries and 10 host
countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore,
South Africa, the U.K., and the U.S. (including NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX). Over-
all, host markets in developed countries attract the majority of cross-listings. In terms
of the number of cross-listings, the U.S. is the largest host market, with 330 cross-
listings from 29 domestic countries, while Portugal is the smallest host market, with
four cross-listings from two domestic countries. Among all the domestic markets,
Canada has the largest number of firms listed overseas, while 85 percent (= 127/150)
of those Canadian cross-listings choose the U.S. as their trading venue. The U.S. is
the second-largest domestic country with 111 cross-listings trading in eight foreign
countries. The most popular destinations of U.S.-originated cross-listings include
Japan (35), France (21), the U.K. (19), and Belgium (18).
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Table 2.1: Distribution of global cross-listings
In this table, we present the distribution of 642 firms with totally 771 cross-listings from 39 home markets in 10 major
financial markets. Panel A reports the distribution of all cross-listings by home and host markets. The discrepancy
between the number of firms and the number of cross-listings in some home countries is due to the presence of multiple
cross-listings for some global traded firms. Panel B reports distribution of 771 sample cross-listings by the number of
cross-listings per firm, grouped by home markets.
Panel A: Distribution of global cross-listings by host and home markets
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Argentina 10 10 10
Australia 37 40 3 6 4 22 5
Austria 1 1 1
Belgium 10 10 7 2 1
Brazil 19 19 19
Canada 141 150 5 3 4 2 7 2 127
China 12 13 1 1 11
Denmark 2 2 2
Finland 1 2 1 1
France 18 24 8 3 3 4 6
Germany 17 24 2 5 9 2 6
Greece 3 3 3
Hong Kong 13 13 1 1 9 2
India 9 9 9
Indonesia 1 1 1
Ireland 24 26 20 6
Israel 36 36 1 1 34
Italy 7 10 3 4 3
Japan 38 54 3 9 4 6 2 14 16
Jordan 1 1 1
South Korea 8 11 1 2 8
Luxembourg 11 11 6 2 2 1
Malaysia 1 1 1
Mexico 5 5 5
Morocco 2 2 2
The Netherlands 22 33 8 11 2 1 2 9
New Zealand 1 1 1
Norway 3 4 1 1 1 1
Philippines 1 1 1
Russia 5 5 5
South Africa 11 20 4 4 6 6
Spain 7 13 3 2 2 3 3
Swaziland 2 2 2
Sweden 6 7 2 2 1 2
Switzerland 10 10 1 1 1 1 2 4
Taiwan 6 6 6
Turkey 2 2 2
The United Kingdom 66 78 2 9 1 12 8 5 18 23
The United States 73 111 18 21 9 35 7 1 1 19
Total 642 771 57 81 26 77 35 4 25 31 105 330
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Table 2.1 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Number of global cross-listings by home markets
Number of a firm’s global cross-listings
Home market Total 1 2 3 4 5
Argentina 10 10
Australia 40 34 6
Austria 1 1
Belgium 10 10
Brazil 19 19
Canada 150 132 18
China 13 11 2
Denmark 2 2
Finland 2 2
France 24 15 2 3 4
Germany 24 14 2 3 5
Greece 3 3
Hong Kong 13 13
India 9 9
Indonesia 1 1
Ireland 26 22 4
Israel 36 36
Italy 10 4 6
Japan 54 26 16 12
Jordan 1 1
South Korea 11 6 2 3
Luxembourg 11 11
Malaysia 1 1
Mexico 5 5
Morocco 2 2
The Netherlands 33 16 4 9 4
New Zealand 1 1
Norway 4 2 2
Philippines 1 1
Russia 5 5
South Africa 20 6 4 6 4
Spain 13 4 2 3 4
Swaziland 2 2
Sweden 7 5 2
Switzerland 10 10
Taiwan 6 6
Turkey 2 2
The United Kingdom 78 58 12 8
The United States 111 49 28 21 8 5
Total 771 555 114 60 32 10
11
Panel B of Table 2.1 summarizes the number of cross-listings by home market.
Although the majority of cross-listed firms (555 out of 642) only list one foreign mar-
ket, 87 firms list shares on two or more foreign stock exchanges, totaling 216 multiple
cross-listings, about 28 percent (= 216/771) of our sample.4 More specifically, 14.7
percent, 7.8 percent, 4.2 percent and 1.3 percent of the sample firms cross-list on 2,
3, 4, and 5 foreign markets, respectively. The U.S. has the most firms (38) with 62
multiple cross-listings. Some home countries, like Finland (2), Italy (6), Japan (28),
the Netherlands (17), South Africa (14), Spain (9) and the U.S. (62) have more firms
with multiple cross-listings than single cross-listings.
2.2 Hypotheses and variable construction
The focus of our study lies in documenting the trading volume distribution be-
tween home and host markets and examining the market and firm characteristics in
explaining a host market’s competitiveness against counterpart home markets. We
first discuss our measurements of trading volume shares and then discuss various
market- and firm-level variables that may explain the variations in volume shares.
2.2.1 Trading volume shares
To study the trading volume distribution between a host market and its counter-
part home market, Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) calculate volume
share for each cross-listing as the ratio between the trading volume of the host mar-
ket i to the volume of the firm’s home market (VolHT,i/VolHM , where i = 1, ..., n;
n ≥ 1; n is the total number of firm’s host markets.). This measurement considers
only the trading volume of the foreign market and that of the domestic market, and
thus excludes the trading volume of other foreign host markets if the firm cross-lists
4As a comparison, about 25 percent of the sample firms in Sarkissian and Schill (2009) have at
least two cross-border listings.
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in multiple host markets simultaneously. In our sample, about 28 percent of firms
list on multiple host markets. Limiting to one host market and excluding the trading
volume of other competing host markets may skew the calculation of volume share
and generate biased results. To address this concern, we improve the traditional
method by calculating the volume share of the host market as the ratio of trading
volume in one host market i to the total global trading volume of each cross-listed
firm (VolHT,i/(
∑n
i=1 VolHT,i + VolHM); i = 1, ..., n; n ≥ 1; n is the total number of
host markets). As robustness checks, we also run all our regression models using the
volume share measure of Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008). As detailed
in Sections 2.3 and 3.4.1, the results are similar.
To construct trading volume shares, we first collect weekly turnover in volume,
i.e., number of shares traded, for all sample cross-listings in both their home and host
markets over the sample period between January 1981 and December 2010 (Source:
Datastream). For ADRs and GDRs, we also collect bundle ratios from Worldscope
and adjust the host market volume by multiplying the bundle ratios. For every sample
cross-listing, we first calculate weekly volume share, and then use the annual average
as our measure of volume share.
2.2.2 Information factor
Baruch et al. (2007) proposes a theoretical model to explain the variations in vol-
ume shares of cross-listed stocks (henceforth, the BKL information factor). The BKL
information factor is estimated as the correlation between cross-listed asset returns
and the returns of other assets traded on that market. It represents incremental in-
formation generated from the host market in addition to that from the counterpart
home market. Accordingly, the BKL model predicts that the share of trading volume
for the cross-listed stock in a market is positively associated with the respective infor-
mation factor. Using the U.S. sample, Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008)
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document evidence to support the BKL model prediction that proportionally more
volume takes place in the U.S. than in counterpart home markets if the cross-listed
asset has a higher information factor. In other words, the stock with the higher in-
formation factor, or higher correlation to other assets in the host market, is expected
to have a proportionally higher trading volume in that host market.
In this paper, we use the BKL information factor to measure the incremental
information provided by the host market in addition to that provided by the domestic
markets. For every cross-listed stock in our sample, we first regress weekly domestic
market returns of stock i on the weekly index return in the domestic market and
obtain the R-square, R2r , in the restricted model. We next estimate the unrestricted
model by adding weekly index returns of a host market as additional regressors, and
obtain the new R-square, R2ur, in the unrestricted model:
Ri,t = αi,t + β
′home
i,t R
home
m,t + i,t, (2.1)
where βhomei,t is a 3 × 1 vector of asset i’s loadings on index returns of the home
market, and Rhomem,t is a 3 × 1 vector of index returns (Rm) of the home market. We
estimate the equation at every week t within a three-week window, from the previous
week (t − 1) to the following week (t + 1); that is, β′homei,t =
(
βhomei,t−1 , β
home
i,t , β
home
i,t+1
) ′
and Rhomem,t =
(
Rhomem,t−1, R
home
m,t , R
home
m,t+1
) ′, to account for non-synchronous trading across
markets in different time zones.
Ri,t = αi,t + β
′home
i,t R
home
m,t + β
′host
i,t R
host
m,t + ξi,t, (2.2)
where βhosti,t is a 3× 1 vector of asset i’s loadings on index returns of the host market,
and Rhostm,t is a 3 × 1 vector of index returns of the host market from weeks t − 1 to
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t+ 1, with βhosti,t =
(
βhosti,t−1, β
host
i,t , β
host
i,t+1
) ′ and Rhostm,t = (Rhostm,t−1, Rhostm,t , Rhostm,t+1) ′.
From Datastream, we obtain the domestic market weekly stock prices for each
cross-listed share and weekly market index prices for both home and host markets. In
our main results, all data series are converted to the local currency of the respective
host market. As a robustness check, we also convert all data series into the U.S.
dollar as a common currency, and the results are similar. For each stock, we first
calculate weekly (Friday to Friday) stock returns and corresponding market index
returns. We use weekly returns to avoid problems caused by infrequent trading and
nonsynchronous trading around the world at higher frequencies.5 We run a pair of
time series regressions simultaneously for each cross-listing in every sample year based
on data from the past 48 months. If the available data is less than 36 months, we drop
that firm-year observation to avoid biased estimates. We calculate the incremental
information provided by the new market regarding the price of stock i in week t as
the following:
Information factori,t =
(
R2ur −R2r
)
/3(
1−R2ur
)
/
(
n− 6) , (2.3)
where n is the number of weekly returns used in both restricted and unrestricted
models.
2.2.3 Market characteristic determinants of trading volume
Certain market characteristics may better facilitate trading activities. For ex-
ample, Claessens et al. (2002) finds that countries with higher income per capita,
better macro policies, more efficient legal systems, better shareholder protection, and
more open financial markets tend to attract more trading activity.6 In this study, we
5It is conventional in international finance literature to use weekly or monthly stock or index
prices (See, for example, Bekaert et al., 2009; Baruch et al., 2007; Halling et al., 2008; Fernandes
and Ferreira, 2008; Hou et al., 2011; Eun et al., 2008; Zhou and Zhu, 2012).
6Using data for the world’s 45 largest stock exchanges, Lo (2013) analyzes the stock exchanges’
performance on listing and trading competition and designs a competition matrix to help the stock
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identify the following six groups of market characteristics.
(i) Trading cost: Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999)
suggest that relative trading cost of the host market in comparison to the domestic
market influences the division of trading volume share between the U.S. (host) and
its counterpart home market. Following Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Foerster and
Karolyi (1998)’s method, we define the bid-ask spread as the ratio of the bid-ask price
difference to the midpoint. We first calculate the annual average bid-ask spread for
each cross-listing in different markets and then calculate the trading cost ratio of the
bid-ask spread of a host market to that of the counterpart home market. We expect
that the volume share of a host market is inversely associated with the trading cost
ratio of the host market.
(ii) Time zone: The geographic proximity of a host market to its counterpart
home market may affect information flow between the markets and thus sway the
distribution of trading volume (Davis and Henderson, 2008; Pirinsky and Wang , 2006;
Sarkissian and Schill , 2004; Coval and Moskowitz , 2001; Pulatkonak and Sofianos ,
1999). We expect a higher volume share for a host market if it is located closer to the
home market. We obtain the time zone for each stock exchange from WorldClock’s
website7. For example, Frankfurt is located in time zone “UTC/GMT+1” and is
recorded as “+1”; New York is located in time zone “UTC/GMT−5” and is recorded
as “−5.” Then, we calculate the difference between the time zone of the host market
and its counterpart home market and define time zone difference as the integer portion
of the ratio of the difference over 3. In the above example, the time zone difference
is 2 (= (+1− (−5))/3).
(iii) Legal protection for shareholders: Previous studies have shown that trading
in the U.S. (host market) is higher due to the benefit of better legal protection for
shareholders. (Halling et al., 2008; Pulatkonak and Sofianos , 1999). This illustrates
exchanges to position themselves.
7The URL is www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/.
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that investors prefer to become shareholders of a company in a country where stronger
investor protection and more information disclosure is provided. Accordingly, we
expect that host markets with better legal protection are expected to have higher
trading volume shares than their counterpart home market, as well as rival host
markets. We proxy the legal protection for shareholders using four variables. The
first is insider trading law enforcement, which equals 1 in year t of country i if the
country passed insider trading laws before or in year t, and 0 otherwise. The data
concerning insider trading law enforcement is obtained from Bhattacharya and Daouk
(2002). Our second measure is antidirector rights index from La Porta et al. (1998),
which has been cited in numerous articles as a measure of shareholder protection.
The index is the sum of six antidirector rights scores ranging from 0 (e.g., Belgium in
our sample) to 5 (e.g. Canada and the U.S. in our sample). A higher index indicates
better legal protection for minority shareholders. Our third measure is the information
disclosure requirement of each financial market, disclosure index from La Porta et al.
(2006), which is estimated from the arithmetic mean of six variables of information
disclosure.8 The last measure is the legal protection of minority shareholders against
expropriation by corporate insiders, anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008),
which is the average of the ex ante and ex post control of self-dealing for each country.9
In our regression models, we use the difference of each proxy between a host market
and its counterpart home market. Overall, investors are supposed to place more orders
in the financial market with better legal protection. We expect a positive association
between the volume share of a host market and the aforementioned measures of legal
protection in that host market.
8Information disclosure index is measured from six perspectives: prospectus, compensation,
shareholders, inside ownership, contracts irregular and transactions for each country (La Porta
et al., 2006).
9The principal components of “control of self-dealing” measurement include (1) approval by
disinterested shareholders; (2) disclosures by buyer; (3) disclosures by Mr. James; (4) independent
review; (5) each of the elements in the index of disclosure in periodic filings; (6) standing to sue; (7)
rescission; (8) ease of holding Mr. James liable; (9) ease of holding the approving body liable; and
(10) access to evidence (Djankov et al., 2008).
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(iv) Language and legal origin barriers: Difference in language and legal origin
play important roles in firms’ choice of cross-listing destinations. Sarkissian and
Schill (2004), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), and Hau (2001) find that domestic
investors are more familiar with a firm’s operations, accounting practices, and capital
market environment. Such advantages make trading in the home market cheaper
and more efficient, especially when information is short-lived and execution speed is
critical during the trading. From this perspective, we expect that a domestic market
has more information-based trades if the host country differs in official languages or
legal origins. Thus, language or legal barriers will lead to more trading in the home
market (Halling et al., 2008). We create two dummy variables based on country
level language and legal origin. We collect the official languages for all countries in
our sample from the World Bank website and legal origin data from La Porta et al.
(1998). The language (or legal origin) difference dummy variable equals 1 if the host
and home market do not have common language (or legal origin) and 0 otherwise.
We expect a negative relationship between volume share of a host market and the
presence of difference in language or legal origin between the host market and its
counterpart home market.
(v) Domestic market development: Previous studies suggest that an advanced
financial market in the home country will help domestic investors to acquire foreign
assets and simultaneously facilitate foreign investors to acquire domestic assets (Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti , 2008; Martin and Rey , 2006). Thus, the domestic volume share
of a cross-listed firm is expected to be positively correlated to financial development
in the home market. For example, Halling et al. (2008) shows that the fraction of
trading in the U.S. (host market) is negatively related to financial development in the
counterpart home market. Accordingly, we measure domestic financial development
using the sum of stock market capitalization and private credit as a ratio of GDP.
The data is from Beck et al. (2009) which was updated in 2012 and is available on
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the World Bank website.
In addition, some studies (See, for example, Halling et al., 2008; Gagnon and
Karolyi , 2010; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti , 2008) find that emerging markets have more
regulatory constraints, like tighter capital control, that adversely impact the interna-
tional capital flow and prevent foreign investors from trading domestic stocks. There-
fore, we define economic development of the home market using country classifications
from World Bank. Domestic development equals 1 if the home country is a developing
economy and 0 otherwise. We expect higher trading volume share in a host market
if the counterpart home market is an emerging economy.
(vi) Region dummy: We construct five regional dummies (Europe and Israel;
Canada and the U.S.; South America and Mexico; Asia, Australia, and New Zealand)
for home markets in order to control for variation clustered by region.
2.2.4 Firm characteristic determinants of trading volume
Firm characteristics always play some role in cross-listing destination and impact
trading activities. Certain types of companies may tend to trade abroad (or locally).
To test firm characteristics’ impact, we build two groups of proxies and test their
impact on trading volume distribution between a host market and its counterpart
home market.
(i) Firm visibility: We use three variables to measure a firm’s visibility abroad.
First, we use firm size as a proxy (Kang and Stulz , 1997; Merton, 1987). Large market
capitalization may indicate that the firm is more visible in the host market, leading
to a higher volume share. Thus, firm size is expected to be positively related to
volume share in a host market. However, some empirical studies do not provide much
support for that argument. For example, Halling et al. (2008) finds that firm size is
negatively correlated to trading volume share in the host market. They attribute this
negative association to the fact that NASDAQ attracts mostly younger and smaller
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high-tech companies. We measure firm size using logged firm market capitalization
converted to U.S. dollars.10 Annual data on market capitalization is obtained from
the Worldscope database.
Our second proxy of firm’s visibility is firm age. Firms with longer presence in
a foreign market usually are better known to foreign investors and thus may attract
a higher volume share in a foreign host market. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) shows a
positive association between the years listed in the U.S. (the host) market and the
trading volume in the U.S. Although it is difficult to find an accurate measurement
for firm age on the host market, we use the number of years since each cross-listed
stock’s first trading data in the host market recorded in the Datastream as a proxy.
citeKang-Stulz:1997 suggests that export-oriented firms attract more foreign investors
because those firms are more visible and familiar to foreign investors.
Using fraction of foreign sales as a proxy, Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al.
(2008) find a positive correlation between foreign sales and volume share of a host
market. Similarly, we expect a positive association between the fraction of foreign
sales and volume share of a market. We obtain annual percentages of foreign sales
for each cross-listed firm from the Worldscope database.
(ii) Sensitivity to private information: Some types of firms are more sensitive to
private information, which may affect their information-based trading. If domestic
investors have relative advantages in obtaining private information, more shares will
be traded in the home market than in host markets. However, if there is little barrier
for information to be transmitted between host and home markets, we expect a higher
volume share in host markets. Halling et al. (2008) suggests that technology firms
are more sensitive to private information such as patents and innovation. As our first
proxy for sensitivity to private information, we construct a high-tech sector indicator
variable, which equals 1 if the firm is technology-oriented and 0 otherwise, based on
10Conversion of market capitalization to a common currency is necessary in order to rule out the
variation in market capitalization caused by different currencies.
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the SIC Code obtained from the Worldscope database.
Second, the value of a high-growth firm depends more on its future growth op-
portunities than its current performance; thus, information about the future growth
of this type of firm is more important to investors. The empirical evidence of such
impact is inconsistent among previous studies. For example, Halling et al. (2008)
argues that foreign trading activity is negatively related to the growth of a company.
However, Pagano et al. (2002) shows that European high-growth firms are more likely
to list abroad and have more trading activity in the U.S. (host market). In this paper,
we estimate asset growth based on the U.S. dollar-denominated total assets value in
the home market for each firm, collected from the Worldscope database.
Third, firms with higher stock return volatility are more opaque to investors, so
they are more sensitive to private information. Pagano et al. (2002) shows that
foreign trading volume is negatively related to volatility for companies from emerging
countries. Halling et al. (2008) finds that trading activities in the U.S. (host market)
are comparatively high for volatile companies from developed countries. Following
the Domowitz et al. (1998) method, we measure return volatility using the annual
standard deviation of weekly stock returns in the home market for each cross-listed
stock.
2.3 Trading volume distribution between home and host mar-
kets
We investigate the competitiveness of the host market compared to counterpart
home markets by documenting the distribution of trading volume first and then ex-
amining the determinants of such trading volume distribution between host and home
markets.
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2.3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2.2 reports the sample mean of all variables we discussed in Section 3.1,
grouped by host countries. Our first measurement of volume share is the ratio
of trading volume in host market i to the total global trading volume of a firm
(VolHTi/(
∑n
i=1 VolHTi + VolHM)), where the global trading volume is the sum of the
trading volume in a firm’s home market and those in all host markets if the firm
cross-lists on multiple foreign host markets. Table 2.2 shows that, on average, the
host market can attract 24.509 percent of a cross-listed firm’s total global trading vol-
ume. However, substantial variations exist across host markets. The United States
leads all host markets with 36.563 percent of global trading volume, followed by
Singapore (30.540 percent), Portugal (28.512 percent), the United Kingdom (25.931
percent) and the Netherlands (22.114 percent). Japan (4.863 percent) and Germany
(4.697 percent) trail all host markets by attracting lowest share of global trading
volume. Other host countries that account for less than 10 percent of global trading
volume include Belgium (7.430 percent) and France (6.060 percent).
Our second measurement of volume share is the ratio of the host market’s trading
volume divided by that of the home market (VolHT,i/VolHM)(Baruch et al., 2007;
Halling et al., 2008). This definition of volume share examines the competitiveness
between the host market of interest and the counterpart home market and ignores
the trading volume on other competing host markets if a firm cross-lists on multiple
foreign markets. Table 2.2 shows that, on average, trading volume of a host market is
1.154 times of that of its counterpart home market. Half of the sample host markets
are able to attract more trading volume than their counterpart home markets. Among
them, Singapore (2.477) leads all host markets in attracting global trading volume
from its counterpart home markets, followed by Portugal (2.366), the U.S. (1.649),
the U.K. (1.285) and the Netherlands (1.236). Japan attracts the lowest volume
share, holding about one-tenth (0.101) of the trading activity of its counterpart host
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countries, followed by Germany (0.170) and France (0.415). As a comparison, Halling
et al. (2008) reports a higher volume share for the U.S. (2.351). The lower volume
share reported in Table 2.2 is partly due to our inclusion of firms with multiple cross-
listings. If we limit our sample to firms with only one foreign cross-listing, as in the
case of Halling et al. (2008), the average volume share is 2.285 for the U.S.
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Table 2.2: Cross-listing sample summary statistics: firm- and market-level characteristics
This table reports summary statistics of all foreign cross-listings. We calculate the trading volume share in two ways. The first is the ratio of
trading volume in host market i to the global trading volume of the firm (VolHT,i/(
∑
VolHT + VolHM )). The second is the ratio between the
trading volume in host market i to that in the counterpart home market (VolHT,i/VolHM ). The information factor for firm i in year t equals[(
R2ur −R2r
)
/3
]
/
[(
1−R2ur
)
/
(
n− 6)], where n is the number of weekly returns used in both restricted and unrestricted models, and K is the number
of existing markets in the restricted model, R2ur is the R
2 from the unrestricted model: Ri,t = αi,t + β
′home
i,t R
home
m,t + β
′host
i,t R
host
m,t + ξi,t, and R
2
r is the
adjusted R2 from the restricted model: Ri,t = αi,t + β
′home
i,t R
home
m,t + i,t (Baruch et al., 2007). Trading cost difference is the bid-ask spread of the
host market divided by that of the home market, where the bid-ask spread is the ratio of the bid-ask price difference and the midpoint. Firm size
is the market capitalization of the cross-listed firm in the home market of a cross-listed firm. Firm age is the number of years since the firm first
appeared in the Datastream database. Asset growth is the difference of the U.S. dollar-dominated total assets in year t and in year t− 1, divided by
the value in year t− 1. Stock return volatility is the standard deviation of weekly stock returns in the home market. High-tech sector indicator equals
to 1 if the firm is technology-oriented and 0 otherwise, based on the SIC code obtained from the Worldscope database. Financial development
in the home market is the sum of stock market capitalization and private credit as a ratio of GDP (Beck et al., 2000). Domestic economy class
equals to 1 if the home country is a developing economy and 0 otherwise. Insider trading law enforcement difference is the relative value of insider
trading law enforcement in the host market to that of the home market, where insider trading law enforcement equals 1 in year t for country i if that
country passed insider trading law in year t or before, and 0 otherwise. Shareholder protection difference is the difference in the antidirector rights
index between a host market and the home market (La Porta et al., 1998). Anti-self-dealing difference is the difference in the anti-self-dealing index
between a host market and the home market. Disclosures difference is the difference in the disclosures index between a host market and the home
market. Time zone difference is the difference between the time zones in a host market and its counterpart home market, divided by 3. The language
(or legal origin) difference indicator equals 1 if the host market and the home market have no common official language (or legal origin), and 0 otherwise.
Panel A summarizes mean values for firm characteristics, grouped by host market. Panel B reports mean values for country characteristics,
grouped by host market. Mean values are calculated by averaging the variables over time for each cross-listing, and then by averaging cross-listing
means within each host country. Panel C presents the correlation coefficients of the variables.
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Panel A: Company characteristics
Firm characteristics in the home market
Host country
Number
of cross-
listings
Volume
ratio
(VolHT,i/
(
∑
VolHT + VolHM ))
Volume
share
(VolHT,i/
VolHM )
Information
factor
Trading
cost diff.
(HT/HM)
Firm
size
Foreign
sales
Firm
age
Asset
growth
Volatility
High-tech
sector
(%) (Bil. USD) (%) (year) (%) (%) (%)
Belgium 57 7.430 0.468 2.091 19.553 18.776 50.917 11.928 8.168 4.657 17.227
France 81 6.060 0.415 2.160 21.182 18.658 46.158 11.028 8.910 4.597 13.468
Germany 26 4.697 0.170 2.439 5.713 13.638 48.317 9.640 6.994 4.587 6.739
Japan 77 4.863 0.101 1.448 21.036 20.030 40.968 9.438 8.613 4.422 23.796
The Netherlands 35 22.114 1.236 2.053 17.195 15.267 47.476 7.255 8.497 5.246 26.923
Portugal 4 28.512 2.366 2.417 27.178 15.750 25.773 4.133 17.165 4.090 0.000
Singapore 25 30.540 2.477 1.965 14.122 3.425 62.155 11.645 14.320 6.752 4.865
South Africa 31 21.593 0.657 2.883 4.017 6.057 66.059 8.205 18.833 7.682 0.000
The United Kingdom 105 25.931 1.285 1.734 5.612 13.244 43.987 11.231 12.681 5.776 19.184
The United States 330 36.563 1.649 2.008 1.226 10.379 48.702 10.589 15.101 6.330 24.107
Total 771 24.509 1.154 1.945 8.657 13.844 46.864 10.458 12.021 5.594 20.436
Panel B: Country characteristics
Host country
Financial
development
Domestic
economy
class
Insider trading
law enforcement
difference
Shareholder
protection
difference
Anti-self-
dealing index
difference
Disclosures
index
difference
Time zone
difference
Legal origin
difference
Language
difference
(HM , % of GDP) (HM , %) (HT −HM) (HT −HM) (HT −HM) (HT −HM) (HT −HM) (%) (%)
Belgium 243.894 5.905 0.089 −4.018 0.019 −0.407 0.549 71.721 100.000
France 244.087 6.376 0.088 −0.711 −0.165 −0.005 0.157 73.713 100.000
Germany 225.801 0.000 −0.161 −2.839 −0.234 −0.370 0.100 70.084 95.816
Japan 205.447 4.678 −0.100 −0.292 −0.152 −0.102 3.104 86.924 100.000
The Netherlands 230.976 0.000 −0.147 −1.947 −0.390 −0.290 1.950 85.265 100.000
Portugal 222.763 0.000 −0.619 −1.000 0.150 −0.083 0.000 0.000 100.000
Singapore 282.108 4.639 0.046 −0.670 0.146 0.159 0.505 11.892 100.000
South Africa 265.123 0.000 −0.965 0.169 0.010 −0.014 0.233 0.000 100.000
The United Kingdom 210.213 11.079 0.324 0.887 0.303 0.057 −0.810 35.298 41.691
The United States 190.096 17.980 0.118 0.884 0.055 0.235 −1.303 34.828 45.673
Total 210.934 10.795 0.059 −0.099 0.004 0.036 −0.029 51.547 68.973
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Table 2.2 (Cont’d)
Panel C: Correlation coefficients of company and country characteristics
Variable
Volume
ratio
(VolHT,i/
(
∑
VolHT
+VolHM ))
Volume
share
(VolHT,i/
VolHM )
Info.
factor
Time
zone
diff.
Trading
cost
diff.
Insider
trading
law diff.
Shrd-
prot
diff.
Anti-
self-
dealing
diff.
Disclos.
diff.
Fin.
develp.
Domestic.
economy
class
Law
origin
diff.
Lan-
guage
diff.
Foreign
sales
Firm
Size
Firm
age
Asset
growth
Volti.
Volume share
(VolHT,i/VolHM ) 0.83
Information factor 0.09 0.06
Time zone diff −0.13 −0.07 −0.07
Trading cost diff −0.42 −0.26 −0.05 0.27
Insider trading law diff 0.07 0.08 −0.04−0.26 −0.07
Shareholder protection diff 0.30 0.19 −0.03−0.49 −0.31 0.23
Anti-self-dealing dif 0.19 0.14 −0.00−0.46 −0.11 0.23 0.64
Disclosures diff 0.34 0.22 −0.01−0.57 −0.33 0.28 0.88 0.58
Financial development −0.23 −0.14 0.11 0.08 0.15 −0.09 −0.37 −0.25 −0.39
Domestic economy Class 0.14 0.06 −0.04−0.19 −0.08 0.31 0.21 0.18 0.30 −0.30
Legal origin diff −0.33 −0.18 −0.03 0.17 0.20 −0.09 −0.16 −0.07 −0.17 0.07 0.13
Language diff −0.31 −0.14 0.02 0.08 0.30 −0.11 −0.10 −0.02 −0.11 0.05 0.23 0.70
Foreign sales 0.12 0.12 0.10 −0.05 −0.02 −0.00 0.04 −0.01 0.06 0.10 −0.20 −0.06−0.05
Firm size −0.32 −0.21 0.05 0.12 0.19 −0.07 −0.08 −0.01 −0.12 0.19 −0.10 0.28 0.21 0.04
Firm age −0.02 0.04 0.15 −0.06 0.07 0.04 −0.03 0.03 −0.02 0.24 −0.05 0.00 −0.00 0.10 0.22
Asset growth 0.14 0.09 −0.02−0.06 −0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.09 −0.08 0.06 −0.12−0.12 −0.02 −0.05−0.09
Volatility 0.33 0.21 0.01 −0.11 −0.17 −0.00 0.09 0.06 0.11 −0.01 0.12 −0.21−0.21 0.09 −0.27−0.11 0.03
High-tech sector 0.06 0.05 0.01 −0.04 −0.05 −0.03 0.08 0.05 0.05 −0.03 −0.00 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.01 −0.03 0.00
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Pane A of Table 2.2 reports the average information factor for each host market
as well as the whole sample. Overall, the sample mean of the information factor is
1.945. Among 10 host countries, South Africa (2.883) provides the most price-relevant
information for cross-listed firms while Japan (1.448) provides the least additional
price-relevant information. The average information factor for the U.S. is 2.008,
which is similar to the statistics reported in Baruch et al. (2007) (1.83 for firms from
developed countries and 2.02 for firms from developing countries) and in Halling et al.
(2008) (1.804). Untabulated results show that, on average, our sample host markets
provide more incremental information for cross-listed stocks from developing markets
than for those from developed markets: the sample average information factor for
cross-listed firms from developing markets is 2.190, slightly higher than the average
of 1.896 for cross-listed firms from developed markets.
We examine trading cost ratio between the bid-ask spread of a host and that of
the counterpart home market for each cross-listed stock. We report the market level
average of such ratio. A ratio higher than 1 means that the average trading cost
in that host market is higher than the home market for the sample cross-listings.
We observe that, in all 10 host markets, cross-listed firms have higher trading cost
than that in the home market. The sample average bid-ask spread for the host
markets is 8.657 times that of the counterpart home market. The U.S. has lowest
trading cost premium with the bid-ask spread 1.226 times that of counterpart home
markets. Germany (5.713), South Africa (4.017) and the U.K. (5.612) also have lower
trading cost premiums than the sample average, while the other six host markets
have relatively higher trading cost premiums. Portugal has the highest trading cost
premium at 27.178 times the trading cost in its counterpart home market.
For firm characteristics, great variations exist among the 10 host markets. We
winsorize all firm-level variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The sample aver-
age firm size in terms of market capitalization is $13.844 billion (U.S.). Typically,
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larger firms list in Japan (20.030 billion), France (18.658 billion) and Belgium (18.776
billion), while smaller firms list in Singapore (3.425 billion) and South Africa (6.057
billion). Firms listed in Japan are about six times larger than those listed in Portu-
gal. The sample mean of foreign sales is 46.864 percent, indicating that an average
cross-listed firm generates a significant portion of sales from abroad and thus has
great exposure among potential foreign investors. As a comparison, Halling et al.
(2008) finds that firms cross-listed in the U.S. generate 43 percent of their sales from
foreign markets. Most of the cross-listed stocks are mature, averaging 10.379 years
in the respective host markets. Among the 10 host markets, Portugal (4.133 years)
and the Netherlands (7.255 years) attract younger companies, while Belgium (11.928
years) and Singapore (11.645 years) attract more mature companies. The average
annual growth of our sample firms is 12.021 percent. High-growth firms are attracted
to listing in South Africa (on average, 18,833 percent), Portugal (17.165 percent) and
the U.S. (15.101 percent). Foreign firms listed in Germany have lowest assets growth
6.994 percent. Stock return volatility does not show much variation across the 10 host
countries with a sample average volatility of 5.594 percent, within the range of 4.090
percent (observed in Portugal) to 7.682 percent (in South Africa). Overall, 20.436
percent of the sample cross-listings belong to the high-tech sector. The Netherlands
(26.923 percent) leads all host markets in attracting technology-oriented companies,
followed by the U.S. (24.107 percent) and Japan (23.796 percent). At the other ex-
treme, South Africa and Portugal attract zero cross-listings from the high-tech sector.
Pane B of Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of market-level characteris-
tics, grouped by host market. The sample average of domestic financial development,
measured as the sum of private credit and stock market capitalization as a ratio of
GDP, is 210.934 percent, with little variation across the 10 host markets. Among
them, the U.S. (190.096 percent) attracts more cross-listed firms from less-developed
domestic financial markets, while South Africa (265.123 percent) has cross-listings
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from more-developed financial markets. The results on domestic economic develop-
ment are similar to those on financial development. On average, 10.795 percent of the
sample cross-listed firms are from developing economies, and the rest (89.205 percent)
are from developed economies. All cross-listed firms in Germany, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and South Africa are from developed countries. The U.S. (17.980 percent)
and the U.K. (11.079 percent) have the highest percentage of cross-listings from de-
veloping countries. Four proxies for the different legal protection between host and
home markets exhibit similar patterns. The U.S. and the U.K. lead the other host
markets by having consistently positive estimated coefficients on all four proxies of
legal protection, which means higher level of insider trading law enforcement, better
minority shareholder protection, more control in self-dealing and more information
disclosure requirements, relative to their respective home markets. More specifically,
the U.K. has the highest relative levels of insider trading law enforcement (0.324),
minority shareholder protection (0.887) and anti-self-dealing protection (0.303). The
U.S. leads the other host markets by having the highest relative disclosure index
(0.235). On the other hand, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands have negative
values across all four legal proxies, showing lower level legal protection in those host
countries than in their counterpart home markets. Specifically, Belgium has the lowest
relative minority shareholder protection index (-4.018) and disclosure index (-0.407);
Portugal has the lowest level of insider trading law enforcement (-0.619) and the
Netherlands has the lowest anti-self-dealing index (-0.390). The sample average time
zone difference is -0.029, indicating that host markets generally attract cross-listings
from neighboring time zones. Some host markets attract cross-listings from distant
time zones, such as Japan with an average time zone indicator of 3.104. Several
others mainly attract companies from the same or neighboring time zones, such as
Portugal with an average time zone difference of 0. On average, sample host markets
attract 51, 547 percent of cross-listings from countries with the same legal origin. As
29
usual, cross-country variations exist: all cross-listings in Portugal and South Africa
come from countries with the same legal origin, however, most foreign cross-listings
in Japan (87.924 percent) are from countries with different legal origins. Considering
language similarities between the host and the home markets, the U.S. and the U.K.
share the most language similarity with counterpart home countries of cross-listed
firms. For the U.S. and U.K., 45.673 percent and 41.691 percent of their cross-listings
are from domestic markets with different languages, respectively. More than half of
the foreign listings in the U.S. and the U.K. are from English-speaking countries.
Belgium, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore and South Africa all
have cross-listings from home countries with different official languages.
Panel C of Table 2.2 reports the correlation matrix of the aforementioned vari-
ables. The two measures of volume share are highly correlated with a correlation
coefficient of 0.83. The signs of correlation coefficients between volume share and all
explanatory variables are the same for the two measures of volume share, with the only
exception of firm age. Also, signs of the correlation between explanatory variables
and volume share proxies are consistent with our predictions outlined in Section 3.1,
except for firm size. The absolute values of correlation coefficients among explana-
tory variables are mostly below 0.5, with exceptions: the correlation coefficient among
shareholder protection index, anti-self-dealing index and disclosure index; and that
between language difference and legal origin difference. In the regression analysis, we
avoid including the highly correlated pairs in the same regression model to eliminate
multicollinearity issue.
2.3.2 Univariate regression analysis
To further examine the impact of each factor on trading volume distribution, we
run regression analysis of each explanatory variable against the logarithm of volume
share in two ways and report the results in Panels A and B of Table ??, respectively.
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The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for clustering
by firm and by year. We focus our discussion on the results based on the models using
log(VolHTi/(
∑n
i=1 VolHTi + VolHM)) as the dependent variable. The results based on
the log(VolHT,i/VolHM) as the dependent variable are similar. In line with our initial
predictions, results show that additional price relevant information contributed by
a host market, which is measured by the information factor, increases the share of
trading volume executed on that host market. Geographic proximity, measured by
host-home market time zone difference, and the culture similarity, measured by host-
home language and legal origin difference indicators, can influence information flow
between the host market and the home market, and thus impact the share of global
volume executed on the host market. As expected, we observe that farther distance
in time zone and the presence of different languages or different legal origins between
the host and the home market will reduce the volume share of the host market. A
host market with a higher relative trading cost is shown to significantly decrease its
proportion of global trading volume. Better legal protection for investors in a host
market relative to counterpart home markets increases the share of global trading vol-
ume on that host market, evident from the highly significant positive coefficients on
four proxies of legal protection (insider trading law enforcement, shareholder protec-
tion index, anti-self-dealing index and disclosure index). Firms from less-developed
domestic countries tend to execute more trading in the host market, evident from the
positive coefficients on developing economy dummy, and negative coefficients on the
financial development dummy.
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In terms of firm characteristics, we first document evidence from the impact of
firm visibility on the distribution of global trading volume. Investors trade more
shares of smaller firms with higher portion of foreign sales on a foreign host market.
Results based on firm age are inconclusive so far. Our results also provide evidence
that firms with higher sensitivity to private information execute a greater portion of
their trading on a foreign host market, evident from the significantly positive signs of
firm growth, return volatility and high-tech firm indicator. Domestic investors have
an information advantage over foreign investors on home markets, and thus foreign
investors shy away from trading on the home market of firms that are sensitive to
private information. We also include an indicator variable of multiple cross-listings
that equals 1 if a firm is cross-listed on more than one host market. Results show
that multiple cross-listings reduce the volume share in one host market by 3.276,
statistically significantly at the 1 percent level. Referring to the adjusted R2 for
each univariate regression model, disclosure index difference, shareholder protection
index difference, firm size and multiple cross-listing dummy are able to explain a high
portion (more than 20 percent) of variables in volume share individually.
2.3.3 Multivariate regression analysis
We next perform a series of panel regressions to evaluate the relative importance
of market and firm characteristics in determining the distribution of trading volume.
Table 2.3 shows the model exploration process and Table 2.4 presents our final sets
of multivariate models with different fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log
of trading volume share, which is calculated in two ways. Panel A reports the results
from regressions using the log of volume share as the ratio of trading volume in a host
market to the global trading volume of the firm log(VolHTi/(
∑n
i=1 VolHTi + VolHM)).
Panel B reports the results from regressions using the log of volume share as the
ratio between the trading volume in a host market to that in the counterpart home
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market (VolHT,i/VolHM). In all regression models, we apply the panel regression with
firm-year two-way clustering standard errors.11 We take one-year lags to the infor-
mation factor, firm size, growth, foreign sales, stock volatility and domestic financial
development variables, due to the potential high correlation between those variables
and volume shares in the same year (Baruch et al., 2007; Halling et al., 2008). The
number of observations in each model varies depending on data availability.
To avoid multicollinearity and to find the most stable models, we first group the
potential variables by definition and then incorporate independent variables gradually
by definition. Table 2.3 reports the results of multivariate regression from model
exploration. In both Panels A and B, we start with Model 1 as our basic specifications
by including information factor, time zone difference and trading cost difference.
Then we try to add more explanatory variables from different categories. Models
2–5 further include one of the legal protection proxies in each of the models. Models
6–7 separately test the two domestic development proxies. Models 8–9 separately
test the two culture difference proxies. Models 10–12 further include firm visibility
and Models 13–15 include the factors of sensitivity to private information and all of
the aforementioned variables. We try to keep at least one proxy from each category
in the final model. Ideally, we keep the variable that represents each category with
the highest significant explanatory power, the lowest correlation coefficient with other
independent variables and the lowest variance inflation factor. We avoid including the
highly correlated variables in the same models. Eventually, Models 14 and 15 become
our complete models with two combinations of variables that represent all categories
in explaining trading volume without causing any statistical issues. Given that the
results are similar for the two versions of volume ratio, our discussion will focus on the
results generated using log(VolHTi/(
∑n
i=1 VolHTi +VolHM)) as the dependent variable
11Clustering by firm accounts for the possible correlation between observations of same firm over
different years. Clustering by year accounts for the possible correlation between observations on
different firms in the same year.
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in Panel A.
In general, the results agree with our predictions and what we reported in Table ??.
First, the results prove that incremental stock price information provided by the host
market will help the host market to attract order flows. The estimated coefficients
of information factor are positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level in all
model specifications with the estimated coefficient ranging from 0.109 in Model 1 to
0.164 in Model 15, indicating that a one-unit increase in information factor results in
a 17.82 percent (= exp(.164)− 1) increase in global volume share of the host market
in Model 15.
Second, the friction of global trading will reduce the trading volume in foreign
markets. The estimated coefficients on time zone are negative and statistically signif-
icant at 5 percent in all specifications, indicating that the closer in time zone a host
market is located to its counterpart home market, the higher volume share is executed
in the host market. Using the estimated coefficient in Models 14 and 15 as an exam-
ple, if a cross-listed firm is from a home country that is one time zone category farther
away (equivalent to three-to-six hours difference in our definition), the global volume
share of the host market decreases by 28.25 percent (= exp(−.332)− 1) in Model 14
and 29.95 percent (= exp(−.356) − 1) in Model 15. The estimated coefficients on
trading cost are negative and statistically significant in all 15 models, indicating that
the investor will avoid costly trading. The higher relative trading cost between the
host and the home market, the lower trading volume share in that host market.
Third, our results suggest that stronger legal protection for investors in a host
relative to home market will lead to a higher volume share for the host market. Mod-
els 2–4 show that the estimated coefficients on shareholder protection (anti-director
trading) difference, insider trading law difference, anti-self-dealing index difference
and disclosure index difference are all positive and statistically significant at 1 per-
cent, implying that a stronger legal control in the host market on anti-director trading,
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insider trading, anti-self dealing and information disclosure will significantly increase
its global share of trading volume. Because these four proxies are highly correlated
with each other, we only include one of them as a representative in the final mod-
els. Model 14 includes shareholder protection difference and it shows that a one-unit
increase in the shareholder protection index difference in the host market relative
to the counterpart home market increases the host market’s trading share by 45.93
percent (= exp(.378) − 1). Model 15 includes the insider trading law enforcement
difference instead and show that if the host market enforces the insider trading law
while the home market does not, the host market will increase its volume share by
70.57 percent (= exp(.534)− 1).
Fourth, the positive significant coefficients of domestic economy class shows that
if the cross-listed firm originated from the developing economy, more trading will be
executed in the host market. Likewise, the coefficients on domestic financial devel-
opment have consistently negative signs in Models 7 and 15, which indicate that if
the cross-listing is from the better-developed domestic financial market, relatively less
trading will be executed in the host market. However, the size of the coefficient of
the domestic finance market is small, implying a limited impact of domestic financial
development on trading volume distribution.
Fifth, we confirm that culture similarity plays an important role in influencing
the destination of global trading. The negative estimated coefficients on both the
language and legal origin dummies imply a higher volume share for the host market
if the host market and its counterpart home market share one or more common
languages, or the same legal origin.
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Table 2.3: Determinants of global trading volume distribution – Multivariate regressions
This table reports the results from multivariate regressions. The dependent variable is the log of trading volume share, which is calculated in two
ways. Panel A reports the regression results where the log of volume share is calculated as the ratio of trading volume in a host market to the global
trading volume of the firm (VolHT,i/(
∑
VolHT + VolHM )). Panel B reports the regression resutls where the log of volume share is calculated as the
ratio between the trading volume in a host market to that in the counterpart home market (VolHT,i/VolHM ). The information factor and other
independent variables are defined in Table 2.2. We take one year lag for the information factor, firm size, asset growth, foreign sales, domestic financial
development, trading cost difference, and stock return volatility. Firm size are expressed in log terms. Each column reports panel regression results
with multiple listing fixed effect. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and by year. R2 is
adjusted for degrees of freedom. * denotes statistical significance level at 1% or lower, ** denotes statistical significance level between 1% and 5%,
and *** denotes statistical significance level between 5% and 10%.
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Panel A: Logged volume ratio of host market to the sum of home and host markets (log(VolHT,i/(
∑
VolHT + VolHM ))) as the dependent variable
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Information
Information factor 0.109∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(3.580) (3.877) (3.994) (3.651) (3.934) (3.997) (3.939) (5.056) (4.010) (3.846) (4.526) (3.765) (3.929) (4.037) (4.567)
Geographic proximity
Time zone dif. −0.452∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗−0.376∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗ −0.429∗∗∗−0.440∗∗∗−0.249∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗ −0.205∗∗ −0.172∗∗ −0.272∗∗∗−0.275∗∗∗−0.332∗∗∗−0.356∗∗∗
(−6.639) (−2.702) (−6.401) (−5.212) (−2.485) (−6.252) (−6.414) (−3.283) (−2.647) (−2.630) (−2.266) (−3.053) (−3.092) (−3.835) (−4.944)
Trading cost
Trading cost dif. −0.011∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.011∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗−0.019∗∗∗−0.019∗∗∗−0.024∗∗∗−0.022∗∗∗−0.022∗∗∗−0.018∗∗∗−0.026∗∗∗
(−2.097) (−3.762) (−2.145) (−2.081) (−3.697) (−2.159) (−2.172) (−3.534) (−3.741) (−3.750) (−5.149) (−4.971) (−4.745) (−4.655) (−5.051)
Legal protection
Shareholder Prot. dif 0.432∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(5.919) (5.733) (5.611) (5.609) (6.715) (5.679) (5.877) (5.579)
Insider trading law dif. 0.780∗∗ 0.534∗∗
(2.764) (2.297)
Anti-self-dealing dif. 1.532∗∗
(2.855)
Disclosures dif. 3.537∗∗∗
(7.493)
Domestic Development
Dome. Economy Class 0.878∗∗∗ 1.756∗∗∗ 1.716∗∗∗ 1.719∗∗∗ 1.559∗∗∗ 2.164∗∗∗ 2.049∗∗∗ 2.326∗∗∗
(3.015) (5.359) (4.509) (4.525) (5.135) (4.465) (4.322) (6.193)
Dome. fin. development −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(−2.657) (−4.374)
Culture
Language dif. −2.593∗∗∗ −2.740∗∗∗
(−12.238) (−11.331)
Legal origin dif. −1.824∗∗∗−1.830∗∗∗−1.347∗∗∗−1.683∗∗∗−1.670∗∗∗ −1.108∗∗∗
(−7.105) (−7.099) (−5.014) (−6.168) (−6.296) (−4.158)
Firm visibility
Firm age 0.006 0.025∗
(0.474) (1.778)
Firm size −0.318∗∗∗ −0.305∗∗∗
(−4.554) (−4.114)
Foreign sales 0.796∗ 0.849∗ 0.692∗
(1.903) (2.005) (2.012)
Sensitivity to private info.
Firm growth 0.901∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗
(2.528) (3.105)
High-tech sector 0.642∗∗
(2.233)
Volatility 10.953∗∗∗
(3.812)
Multi. cross-listings −3.621∗∗∗−2.936∗∗∗−3.626∗∗∗−3.542∗∗∗−2.934∗∗∗−3.607∗∗∗−3.552∗∗∗−2.348∗∗∗−2.512∗∗∗−2.527∗∗∗−1.782∗∗∗−2.443∗∗∗−2.412∗∗∗−2.112∗∗∗−2.361∗∗∗
(−12.155) (−9.549) (−12.660) (−11.538) (−9.654) (−12.453) (−11.626) (−8.662) (−7.876) (−7.745) (−5.969) (−6.962) (−6.829) (−7.169) (−7.611)
Constant −2.797∗∗∗−2.827∗∗∗−2.918∗∗∗−2.789∗∗∗−3.114∗∗∗−2.932∗∗∗−1.713∗∗∗−1.592∗∗∗−2.401∗∗∗−2.449∗∗∗ 1.894∗∗ −3.103∗∗∗−3.282∗∗∗−2.909∗∗∗ 2.731∗∗∗
(−12.050) (−11.691) (−10.958) (−12.429) (−13.233) (−11.671) (−3.847) (−10.256) (−9.586) (−9.395) (2.292) (−6.879) (−6.909) (−8.063) (3.353)
No of obs. 3,428 3,310 3,428 3,427 3,310 3,428 3,398 3,310 3,310 3,310 3,211 2,413 2,329 2,413 3,050
Adj. R-Sq (%) 38.06 46.05 38.97 39.26 47.37 38.79 39.04 57.20 52.20 52.21 56.79 54.64 55.44 62.14 52.43
37
Panel B: Logged volume ratio of host market to home market (log(VolHT,i/VolHM )) as the dependent variable
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Information
Information factor 0.141∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(3.723) (3.997) (4.278) (3.788) (4.088) (4.139) (4.273) (5.251) (4.152) (4.010) (5.021) (3.776) (3.951) (4.052) (5.302)
Geographic proximity
Time zone dif. −0.442∗∗∗ −0.199∗ −0.424∗∗∗−0.354∗∗∗ −0.153 −0.416∗∗∗−0.429∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗ −0.182∗ −0.175∗ −0.130 −0.257∗∗ −0.258∗∗ −0.325∗∗∗−0.331∗∗∗
(−5.590) (−2.083) (−5.301) (−4.292) (−1.677) (−5.218) (−5.365) (−2.678) (−2.019) (−1.946) (−1.522) (−2.581) (−2.603) (−3.456) (−4.165)
Trading cost
Trading cost dif. −0.013∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗−0.021∗∗∗−0.021∗∗∗−0.026∗∗∗−0.025∗∗∗−0.024∗∗∗−0.020∗∗∗−0.028∗∗∗
(−2.119) (−3.773) (−2.175) (−2.102) (−3.703) (−2.182) (−2.205) (−3.557) (−3.748) (−3.779) (−5.051) (−4.921) (−4.696) (−4.604) (−5.030)
Legal protection
Shareholder Prot. dif 0.477∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(5.290) (4.987) (4.937) (4.928) (6.371) (5.162) (5.270) (4.959)
Insider trading law dif. 1.011∗∗∗ 0.614∗
(2.898) (2.100)
Anti-self-dealing dif. 1.781∗∗
(2.713)
Disclosures dif. 4.105∗∗∗
(6.778)
Domestic Development
Dome. Economy Class 1.004∗∗ 2.101∗∗∗ 2.039∗∗∗ 2.052∗∗∗ 1.855∗∗∗ 2.727∗∗∗ 2.599∗∗∗ 2.894∗∗∗
(2.793) (5.259) (4.484) (4.522) (5.126) (4.758) (4.596) (6.429)
Dome. fin. development −0.006∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(−2.787) (−4.616)
Culture
Language dif. −2.938∗∗∗ −3.091∗∗∗
(−11.108) (−10.901)
Legal origin dif. −2.036∗∗∗−2.057∗∗∗−1.374∗∗∗−1.851∗∗∗−1.818∗∗∗ −1.067∗∗∗
(−6.392) (−6.470) (−4.242) (−5.473) (−5.540) (−3.402)
Firm visibility
Firm age 0.020 0.048∗∗
(1.247) (2.609)
Firm size −0.438∗∗∗ −0.444∗∗∗
(−5.572) (−5.253)
Foreign sales 1.200∗∗ 1.257∗∗ 1.040∗∗
(2.449) (2.574) (2.584)
Sensitivity to private info.
Firm growth 1.130∗∗ 1.355∗∗∗
(2.725) (3.863)
High-tech sector 0.857∗∗
(2.336)
Volatility 15.176∗∗∗
(4.220)
Multi. cross-listings −4.105∗∗∗−3.339∗∗∗−4.112∗∗∗−4.013∗∗∗−3.309∗∗∗−4.090∗∗∗−4.022∗∗∗−2.676∗∗∗−2.870∗∗∗−2.923∗∗∗−1.845∗∗∗−2.698∗∗∗−2.661∗∗∗−2.284∗∗∗−2.504∗∗∗
(−11.933) (−9.234) (−12.534) (−11.249) (−9.278) (−12.282) (−11.355) (−8.277) (−7.594) (−7.486) (−5.373) (−6.544) (−6.408) (−6.594) (−7.012)
Constant −2.080∗∗∗−2.121∗∗∗−2.236∗∗∗−2.072∗∗∗−2.460∗∗∗−2.234∗∗∗ −0.730 −0.736∗∗∗−1.660∗∗∗−1.833∗∗∗ 4.215∗∗∗ −2.725∗∗∗−2.951∗∗∗−2.654∗∗∗ 5.429∗∗∗
(−7.408) (−7.262) (−7.024) (−7.603) (−8.711) (−7.382) (−1.321) (−3.486) (−5.339) (−5.323) (4.315) (−5.191) (−5.394) (−6.258) (5.665)
No of obs. 3,428 3,310 3,428 3,427 3,310 3,428 3,398 3,310 3,310 3,310 3,211 2,413 2,329 2,413 3,050
Adj. R-Sq (%) 33.83 41.18 34.94 34.98 42.86 34.52 35.05 51.67 46.86 46.97 52.77 50.22 51.00 58.40 49.23
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Table 2.3 also reveals the relative importance of firm characteristics in determining
the volume share of a host market. First, our results provide mixed evidence in
support of the visibility argument. The estimated coefficients on firm age are positive
as we expected that a firm with a longer history on the market will have more trading
in the host market. However it is marginally significant at 10 percent in Model 15.
Foreign sales are positively significant at the 1 percent level in Models 12–14 which
is consistent with the argument that firms with more foreign sales are more visible
to foreign investors and results in higher trading volume on the foreign markets. The
estimated coefficients on firm size are negative and statistically significant in Models
11 and 15. The higher portion of trading share in host markets for small firms may
be due to the lure of some popular trading venue like NASDAQ. As a comparison,
Halling et al. (2008) documents a similar negative association between firm size and
trading share of the U.S. (host) market.
Second, we find strong evidence that trading volume distribution between a host
and its home markets is affected by its level of sensitivity to private information.
The estimated coefficients on asset growth, high-tech firm indicator and stock return
volatility are all positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, which
shows that opaque cross-listed firms, typically featured by high growth rate, from
the high-tech sector, and high stock return volatility, have more trading in the host
market relative to the home market. This may result from the fact that the most of
our sample host markets require more information disclosure when firms cross-list.
The investors in the host market have access to readily information so that they are
more comfortable with trading shares in the host markets. The multi-cross-listing
dummy accounts for the impact on host market volume share if firms cross-listed
on more than one host market simultaneously. Models 1–15 show that the multi-
cross-listing dummy coefficients are consistently negative and significant at 1 percent,
which agrees with our expectation. Multi-cross-listing behavior will reduce the firm’s
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trading volume share of one host market.
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Table 2.4: Multivariate regressions with fixed effects
The table reports the results from multivariate regressions with different fixed effects at home, host country, and regional level. Panel A reports
the results based on log(VolHTi/(
∑n
i=1 VolHTi + VolHM )) as dependent variable. Panel B reports the results based on the alternative measure
log(VolHT,i/VolHM ). Independent variables are measured as we defined in Table 2.2. * denotes statistical significance level at 1% or lower, **
denotes statistical significance level between 1% and 5%, and *** denotes statistical significance level between 5% and 10%.
Variable Panel A: log(VolHT,i/(
∑
VolHT + VolHM )) as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information factor 0.055∗ 0.048 0.050∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(2.114) (1.571) (1.827) (3.192) (2.705) (3.144)
Time zone difference −0.029 −1.275∗∗ −0.136 −0.017 −0.954∗∗ −0.217
(−0.360) (−2.506) (−0.647) (−0.329) (−2.383) (−1.428)
Trading cost difference −0.018∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(−4.770) (−4.251) (−4.669) (−4.723) (−4.537) (−4.704)
Shareholder protection difference 0.501∗∗∗ −1.568 0.467∗∗∗
(4.212) (−1.392) (3.294)
Insider trading law difference 0.686∗∗ −0.051 0.244
(2.624) (−0.112) (0.708)
Domestic financial development −0.004∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.003∗∗
(−3.193) (−0.561) (−2.382)
Domestic economy class 1.762∗∗∗ 1.574 2.389∗∗∗
(4.762) (0.625) (5.505)
Legal origin difference −0.666∗∗∗ −0.512∗∗ −0.627∗∗
(−3.319) (−2.338) (−2.869)
Language difference −2.008∗∗∗ −0.993 −1.721∗∗∗
(−6.797) (−1.745) (−5.488)
Foreign sales 0.161 −0.000 0.002
(0.632) (−0.001) (0.007)
Firm size −0.244∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗
(−4.789) (−4.454) (−4.599)
Firm age −0.003 0.025∗∗ 0.004
(−0.263) (2.396) (0.390)
Firm growth 0.546∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(6.589) (2.372) (4.708)
Return Volatility 7.328∗∗ 6.007∗∗ 7.243∗∗
(2.310) (2.583) (2.370)
High-tech sector 0.320 0.361 0.382
(1.280) (1.504) (1.524)
Multiple Cross-listings −1.461∗∗∗ −1.359∗∗∗ −1.573∗∗∗ −1.020∗∗∗ −0.974∗∗∗ −1.133∗∗∗
(−6.015) (−5.686) (−6.488) (−4.108) (−4.715) (−4.441)
Constant −1.710∗∗∗ −2.906∗∗ −3.423∗∗∗ 3.215∗∗∗ −0.536 3.104∗∗∗
(−4.965) (−2.569) (−4.832) (4.466) (−0.444) (4.668)
Host country fixed-effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home country fixed-effects? No Yes No No Yes No
Home region fixed-effects? No No Yes No No Yes
Number of company-years 2,413 2,413 2,413 3,050 3,050 3,050
Adj. R-square (%) 72.63 77.80 73.75 71.82 78.48 73.04
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Table 2.4 (Cont‘d)
Variable Panel B: log(VolHT,i/VolHM ) as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information factor 0.077∗∗ 0.075∗ 0.073∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(2.126) (1.867) (1.930) (4.071) (3.521) (3.979)
Time zone difference −0.009 −1.633∗∗ −0.122 0.039 −1.222∗∗ −0.177
(−0.087) (−2.649) (−0.505) (0.622) (−2.304) (−1.123)
Trading cost difference −0.019∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(−4.680) (−4.112) (−4.565) (−4.669) (−4.450) (−4.637)
Shareholder protection difference 0.543∗∗∗ −2.305 0.530∗∗∗
(4.228) (−1.695) (3.395)
Insider trading law difference 0.754∗∗ 0.111 0.293
(2.265) (0.234) (0.629)
Domestic financial development −0.005∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.005∗∗∗
(−3.821) (−0.861) (−3.051)
Domestic economy class 2.306∗∗∗ 3.612 2.781∗∗∗
(5.314) (1.176) (5.524)
Legal origin difference −0.598∗∗ −0.453∗ −0.575∗∗
(−2.649) (−1.870) (−2.349)
Language difference −2.414∗∗∗ −1.095∗ −2.084∗∗∗
(−6.753) (−1.762) (−5.348)
Foreign sales 0.484 0.366 0.339
(1.515) (1.132) (1.034)
Firm size −0.381∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗∗ −0.347∗∗∗
(−6.370) (−5.445) (−5.902)
Firm age 0.017 0.046∗∗ 0.025
(0.980) (2.842) (1.459)
Firm growth 0.834∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(6.280) (3.156) (4.225)
Return Volatility 11.198∗∗ 9.002∗∗∗ 10.602∗∗
(2.867) (3.039) (2.817)
High-tech sector 0.495 0.602 0.563
(1.407) (1.687) (1.613)
Multiple Cross-listings −1.581∗∗∗ −1.456∗∗∗ −1.701∗∗∗ −0.986∗∗∗ −0.966∗∗∗ −1.131∗∗∗
(−5.204) (−4.690) (−5.652) (−3.236) (−3.493) (−3.621)
Constant −1.293∗∗∗ −2.878∗∗ −2.901∗∗∗ 6.083∗∗∗ 0.603 5.867∗∗∗
(−3.057) (−2.293) (−3.577) (7.097) (0.419) (6.804)
Host country fixed-effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home country fixed-effects? No Yes No No Yes No
Home region fixed-effects? No No Yes No No Yes
Number of company-years 2,413 2,413 2,413 3,050 3,050 3,050
Adj. R-square (%) 67.71 73.19 68.56 67.25 74.06 68.50
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Table 2.4 reports the estimation results from six different models that adopt the
model specifications from Models 14 and 15 in Table 2.3 but with different fixed
effects. In both Panels A and B, Models 1–3 use the same model specification as Model
14 in Table 2.3. Models 4–6 are in line with Table 2.3 Model 15. The estimation results
are similar when we use different combinations of variables in two groups. Models
1 and 4 include the host country fixed effect to account for residuals correlation
across firms that share the same cross-listing destination; Models 2 and 5 add both
host and home country fixed effects; and Models 3 and 6 control for host country
fixed effect and home market regional effect measured by regional dummies. Again,
our discussion will using the result in Panel A as an example since the results in
two panels are similar. The coefficient estimates are consistent with the findings in
Table 2.3. After controlling for different fixed effects, both the economics significance
and statistics significance are reduced for some independent variables. For example,
information factor remains positively significant at conventional levels in all models
expect Model 2, even though the sizes of the coefficients are reduced by 50 percent
compared to those in Models 14 and 15 in Table 2.3. As expected, time zone and
trading cost differences show a negatively significant relationship with trading volume
share. Shareholder protection and insider trading law proxies are only statistically
significant in three out of six models. Domestic development and culture difference
proxies show expected sign and have consistently significant results. In terms of firm
level characteristics, firm size, asset growth, return volatility and multi-cross-listing
indicator show the same strongly significant results as what we find in Table 2.3. After
controlling for home and/or host fixed effects, foreign sales, firm age and high-tech
sectors no longer show the pronounced impacts as those in Table 2.3, although their
coefficients keep expected signs, confirming the relationship to trading volume share
as we discussed previously.
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2.4 Robustness checks
2.4.1 Alternative measures of volume share
As we mentioned in previous sections, we use volume share (VolHTi/(
∑n
i=1 VolHTi+
VolHM)) to document the trading volume distribution between host and home market
in our main analysis. The advantage of this method is that it takes into account those
cross-listed firms with multiple host markets. As a robustness check, we also conduct
the analysis using the traditional volume share approach (Baruch et al., 2007; Halling
et al., 2008) to calculate volume share of host market i to its counterpart home market
(VolHT,i/VolHM); i = 1, ..., n; n ≥ 1; n is the total number of firm’s host markets).
The results associated with the second trading volume measure are reported in Panel
B of Tables ??–2.4. The results are comparable with those associated with the first
measurement of volume share. Information factor, geographic proximity, trading
costs, legal protection proxies, domestic development, and cultural difference continue
to have significant impacts on trading volume share. Firm level characteristics are
still crucial in determining the trading volume distribution and multi-cross-listing
behavior will significantly reduce the volume share for one host market versus the
counterpart home market. All of these confirm what we found using our improved
version of volume share.
2.4.2 The U.S. dollar as a common currency
Regression results presented in Tables ??–2.4 are estimated using information
factors and some firm level characteristics such as asset growth and stock return
volatility, denominated in host markets’ currencies. As a robustness check of the
previously reported results, we convert all the values into the U.S. dollar as a com-
mon currency. We re-estimate all aforementioned models and report the regression
results in Table 2.5. We continue to measure trading volume share using two meth-
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ods and report estimation results in Panels A (VolHTi/(
∑n
i=1 VolHTi + VolHM)) and
B (VolHT,i/VolHM), respectively. Models 1 and 5 adopt the specification of Models
14 and 15 in Table 2.3. Models 2 and 6 include the host country fixed effect; Models
3 and 7 add both host and home country fixed effects; and Models 4 and 8 control
for host country fixed effect and home market regional effect measured by regional
dummies. The signs and levels of statistical significance of all independent variables
in both panels are similar to those reported in Table 2.4. The estimated coefficients
on the information factor, shareholder protection index difference, insider trading law
difference and domestic economy class dummies are all positive and statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels, confirming that these factors boost the volume share
of the host market. The estimated coefficients on time zone difference, trading cost
difference, domestic financial development, difference in legal origin, and difference in
language are all negative and statistically significant at least at 5 percent, confirming
that the above trading frictions reduce relative trading in the host market. Regarding
firm characteristic variables, we continue to observe a negative association between
volume share and firm size and a positive association between trading volume and
asset growth as well as return volatility. Estimated coefficients on high-tech indicator,
foreign sales and firm age do not offer conclusive results.
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Table 2.5: Determinants of global trading volume distribution – The U.S. dollar as a common currency
This table reports the results of multivariate models estimated by independent variables denominated in the U.S. dollar as a common currency. Panel
A reports the results based on log(VolHT,i/(
∑
VolHT + VolHM )) as dependent variable. Panel B reports the results based on the alternative measure
log(VolHT,i/VolHM ). * denotes statistical significance level at 1% or lower, ** denotes statistical significance level between 1% and 5%, and ***
denotes statistical significance level between 5% and 10%.
Variable Panel A: log(VolHT,i/(
∑
VolHT + VolHM )) as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Information factor 0.160∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.055∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(4.794) (2.464) (1.895) (2.343) (5.135) (4.393) (3.293) (4.298)
Time zone difference −0.332∗∗∗ −0.028 −1.246∗∗ −0.114 −0.356∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.904∗∗ −0.176
(−3.896) (−0.355) (−2.467) (−0.536) (−5.002) (−0.354) (−2.267) (−1.168)
Trading cost difference −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(−4.698) (−4.789) (−4.269) (−4.685) (−5.026) (−4.737) (−4.543) (−4.708)
Shareholder protection difference 0.375∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ −1.520 0.467∗∗∗
(5.536) (4.132) (−1.385) (3.292)
Insider trading law difference 0.571∗∗ 0.715∗∗ −0.016 0.253
(2.511) (2.735) (−0.037) (0.752)
Domestic financial development −0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.003∗∗
(−4.303) (−3.097) (−0.520) (−2.362)
Domestic economy class 2.348∗∗∗ 1.774∗∗∗ 1.536 2.398∗∗∗
(6.226) (4.792) (0.624) (5.476)
Legal origin difference −1.045∗∗∗ −0.606∗∗∗ −0.477∗∗ −0.577∗∗
(−3.817) (−2.970) (−2.133) (−2.607)
Language difference −2.713∗∗∗ −1.981∗∗∗ −0.944 −1.686∗∗∗
(−11.261) (−6.765) (−1.665) (−5.432)
Foreign sales 0.715∗∗ 0.176 0.007 0.017
(2.137) (0.704) (0.028) (0.066)
Firm size −0.321∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗
(−4.399) (−5.066) (−4.611) (−4.907)
Firm age 0.024 −0.003 0.025∗∗ 0.004
(1.742) (−0.301) (2.322) (0.327)
Firm growth 1.027∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(3.145) (6.559) (2.407) (4.656)
Return volatility 10.108∗∗∗ 6.305∗ 5.583∗∗ 6.165∗
(3.599) (2.071) (2.465) (2.091)
High-tech sector 0.646∗∗ 0.323 0.364 0.384
(2.310) (1.303) (1.530) (1.548)
Multiple cross-listings −2.105∗∗∗ −1.464∗∗∗ −1.359∗∗∗ −1.577∗∗∗ −2.311∗∗∗ −0.993∗∗∗ −0.956∗∗∗ −1.107∗∗∗
(−7.124) (−6.017) (−5.686) (−6.506) (−7.491) (−4.030) (−4.729) (−4.394)
Constant −2.965∗∗∗ −1.725∗∗∗ −2.945∗∗ −3.480∗∗∗ 2.819∗∗∗ 3.277∗∗∗ −0.354 3.160∗∗∗
(−8.599) (−5.055) (−2.749) (−4.947) (3.449) (4.511) (−0.295) (4.722)
Host country fixed-effects? No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Home country fixed-effects? No No Yes No No No Yes No
Home region fixed-effects? No No No Yes No No No Yes
Number of company-years 2,412 2,412 2,412 2,412 3,044 3,044 3,044 3,044
Adj. R-square (%) 62.15 72.63 77.82 73.74 52.64 72.05 78.55 73.20
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Table 2.5 (Cont’d)
Variable Panel B: log(VolHT,i/VolHM ) as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Information factor 0.202∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.097∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(4.610) (2.404) (2.072) (2.283) (5.784) (4.823) (3.621) (4.443)
Time zone difference −0.324∗∗∗ −0.008 −1.576∗∗ −0.086 −0.331∗∗∗ 0.038 −1.140∗∗ −0.118
(−3.498) (−0.083) (−2.591) (−0.353) (−4.218) (0.605) (−2.173) (−0.749)
Trading cost difference −0.020∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(−4.653) (−4.708) (−4.141) (−4.591) (−5.007) (−4.690) (−4.467) (−4.653)
Shareholder protection difference 0.404∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ −2.202 0.529∗∗∗
(4.915) (4.103) (−1.678) (3.382)
Insider trading law difference 0.661∗∗ 0.793∗∗ 0.168 0.302
(2.316) (2.389) (0.355) (0.662)
Domestic financial development −0.007∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.005∗∗∗
(−4.564) (−3.677) (−0.765) (−3.017)
Domestic economy class 2.927∗∗∗ 2.321∗∗∗ 3.500 2.794∗∗∗
(6.448) (5.325) (1.181) (5.597)
Legal origin difference −0.979∗∗∗ −0.511∗∗ −0.397 −0.502∗
(−3.053) (−2.219) (−1.595) (−2.029)
Language difference −3.061∗∗∗ −2.372∗∗∗ −1.004 −2.026∗∗∗
(−10.869) (−6.735) (−1.644) (−5.344)
Foreign sales 1.066∗∗ 0.504 0.376 0.359
(2.746) (1.614) (1.183) (1.111)
Firm size −0.465∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.364∗∗∗
(−5.589) (−6.677) (−5.645) (−6.254)
Firm age 0.047∗∗ 0.016 0.045∗∗ 0.024
(2.577) (0.947) (2.824) (1.414)
Firm growth 1.367∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗
(3.895) (6.023) (3.162) (4.136)
Return volatility 13.941∗∗∗ 9.849∗∗ 8.455∗∗ 9.240∗∗
(3.914) (2.584) (2.846) (2.491)
High-tech sector 0.864∗∗ 0.500 0.607 0.564
(2.416) (1.435) (1.716) (1.640)
Multiple cross-listings −2.273∗∗∗ −1.584∗∗∗ −1.456∗∗∗ −1.706∗∗∗ −2.441∗∗∗ −0.949∗∗∗ −0.936∗∗∗ −1.093∗∗∗
(−6.554) (−5.194) (−4.691) (−5.661) (−6.865) (−3.160) (−3.496) (−3.577)
Constant −2.738∗∗∗ −1.344∗∗∗ −2.988∗∗ −3.015∗∗∗ 5.551∗∗∗ 6.178∗∗∗ 0.896 5.972∗∗∗
(−6.598) (−3.074) (−2.535) (−3.769) (5.780) (7.143) (0.627) (6.843)
Host country fixed-effects? No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Home country fixed-effects? No No Yes No No No Yes No
Home region fixed-effects? No No No Yes No No No Yes
Number of company-years 2,412 2,412 2,412 2,412 3,044 3,044 3,044 3,044
Adj. R-square (%) 58.51 67.74 73.28 68.60 49.55 67.60 74.23 68.77
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2.4.3 Excluding cross-listed firms in the U.S.
Our overall sample contains 771 global cross-listings from 39 home markets on
10 major financial markets. Those cross-listed in the U.S. represent 42.80 percent
(=330/771) of our sample. One concern is that the results presented above are driven
by firms that cross-list in the U.S. To alleviate this concern, we re-estimate the re-
gression models used in Tables 2.4 by excluding firms that are cross-listed in the U.S.
The two panels in Table 2.6 report the re-estimated results regarding the impact of
firm and market characteristics on two measures of trading volume distribution. We
continue to observe a significant impact from most firm and market characteristics
on the volume share that a host market receives. Host markets with a higher infor-
mation factor, lower trading cost, and stronger legal protection receive a higher share
of trading volume. We continue to find that smaller firms from the high-tech sector
with higher asset growth rate observe a greater share of order flow executed in foreign
host markets rather than in their domestic home markets.
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Table 2.6: Determinants of global trading volume distribution – Excluding firms listed in the U.S.
This table reports the results of the re-estimation with the sample firms that cross-list outside of the U.S.. The dependent variable is log of volume
share, which is calculated in two ways. Panel A reports the results based on log(VolHT,i/(
∑
VolHT + VolHM )). Panel B reports the results based
on the alternative measure log(VolHT,i/VolHM ). * denotes statistical significance level at 1% or lower, ** denotes statistical significance level between
1% and 5%, and *** denotes statistical significance level between 5% and 10%.
Variable Panel A: log(VolHT,i/(
∑
VolHT + VolHM )) as the dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Information factor 0.205∗∗∗ 0.064 0.066 0.064 0.253∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(3.156) (1.282) (1.248) (1.285) (5.006) (3.467) (2.425) (3.120)
Time zone difference −0.212∗ 0.034 −1.170∗ 0.063 −0.084 −0.148 −1.463∗∗ −0.257
(−1.818) (0.278) (−1.793) (0.241) (−0.780) (−1.234) (−2.672) (−1.038)
Trading cost difference −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(−4.695) (−4.749) (−4.229) (−4.646) (−4.534) (−4.462) (−4.351) (−4.557)
Shareholder protection difference 0.248∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 2.451 0.460∗∗
(2.789) (4.804) (1.487) (2.882)
Insider trading law difference 0.677∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ −0.274 0.767
(2.239) (3.278) (−0.639) (1.137)
Domestic financial development −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.000 −0.004
(−2.198) (−2.567) (−0.052) (−1.448)
Domestic economy class 2.260∗∗∗ 2.949∗∗∗ −6.570∗ 2.656∗∗∗
(3.286) (5.294) (−1.976) (2.993)
Legal origin difference −0.954∗∗ −0.455 −0.124 −0.266
(−2.913) (−1.251) (−0.371) (−0.710)
Language difference −2.497∗∗∗ −2.206∗ −0.077 −1.479
(−5.357) (−2.011) (−0.054) (−1.315)
Foreign sales 1.129∗ 0.327 0.013 0.102
(1.877) (0.650) (0.027) (0.198)
Firm size −0.559∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗
(−6.757) (−4.890) (−3.889) (−4.074)
Firm age −0.055∗ −0.022 0.010 −0.005
(−2.123) (−0.999) (0.472) (−0.238)
Firm growth 0.761∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.204 0.245∗
(3.617) (4.001) (1.292) (1.932)
Return volatility 9.687 4.082 6.337 5.028
(1.711) (0.833) (1.574) (1.120)
High-tech sector 0.430 0.420 0.810 0.565
(0.731) (0.855) (1.740) (1.110)
Multiple cross-listings −2.466∗∗∗ −1.965∗∗∗ −1.828∗∗∗ −1.992∗∗∗ −1.347∗∗∗ −1.311∗∗∗ −1.340∗∗∗ −1.458∗∗∗
(−5.894) (−5.567) (−5.412) (−5.776) (−3.305) (−3.474) (−4.560) (−3.913)
Constant −3.673∗∗∗ −2.936∗∗∗ −7.719∗∗∗ −3.894∗∗∗ 5.654∗∗∗ 3.269∗∗∗ 0.163 1.702
(−6.771) (−5.624) (−3.223) (−5.061) (4.469) (2.991) (0.112) (1.183)
Host country fixed-effects? No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Home country fixed-effects? No No Yes No No No Yes No
Home region fixed-effects? No No No Yes No No No Yes
Number of company-years 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726
Adj. R-square (%) 46.80 60.67 67.98 62.80 53.50 61.25 70.70 63.58
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Table 2.6 (Cont’d)
Variable Panel B: log(VolHT,i/VolHM ) as the dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Information factor 0.237∗∗∗ 0.096 0.093 0.098 0.291∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(3.143) (1.493) (1.351) (1.525) (5.023) (3.664) (2.499) (3.196)
Time zone difference −0.239∗ −0.029 −1.115 0.057 −0.085 −0.206 −1.555∗∗ −0.245
(−1.776) (−0.184) (−1.425) (0.199) (−0.651) (−1.448) (−2.572) (−0.982)
Trading cost difference −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(−4.633) (−4.626) (−4.082) (−4.504) (−4.536) (−4.457) (−4.285) (−4.546)
Shareholder protection difference 0.259∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 2.512 0.456∗∗
(2.572) (4.023) (1.439) (2.425)
Insider trading law difference 0.738∗ 1.301∗∗∗ −0.175 0.852
(2.109) (3.069) (−0.354) (1.092)
Domestic financial development −0.006∗ −0.006∗∗ 0.000 −0.004
(−2.090) (−2.596) (0.215) (−1.390)
Domestic economy class 2.754∗∗∗ 3.427∗∗∗ −6.418∗ 2.747∗∗
(3.581) (5.682) (−1.836) (2.713)
Legal origin difference −0.882∗∗ −0.309 −0.033 −0.160
(−2.187) (−0.756) (−0.088) (−0.387)
Language difference −2.648∗∗∗ −2.637∗∗ −0.560 −1.769
(−4.849) (−2.133) (−0.344) (−1.415)
Foreign sales 1.490∗∗ 0.621 0.424 0.403
(2.185) (1.051) (0.705) (0.668)
Firm size −0.694∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ −0.402∗∗∗ −0.396∗∗∗
(−6.985) (−5.414) (−4.057) (−4.111)
Firm age −0.034 0.009 0.040 0.028
(−1.030) (0.288) (1.429) (0.939)
Firm growth 1.099∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗ 0.453∗∗
(4.952) (5.740) (2.178) (2.596)
Return volatility 12.406∗ 5.945 7.984 6.313
(1.877) (1.074) (1.637) (1.241)
High-tech sector 0.699 0.658 1.055 0.804
(0.949) (0.975) (1.565) (1.188)
Multiple cross-listings −2.598∗∗∗ −2.016∗∗∗ −1.925∗∗∗ −2.068∗∗∗ −1.332∗∗ −1.271∗∗ −1.338∗∗∗ −1.474∗∗∗
(−5.439) (−4.796) (−4.464) (−5.015) (−2.810) (−2.913) (−3.409) (−3.320)
Constant −3.598∗∗∗ −2.773∗∗∗ −7.781∗∗∗ −3.865∗∗∗ 7.805∗∗∗ 4.953∗∗∗ 1.280 2.601
(−5.901) (−4.760) (−3.083) (−4.664) (5.026) (3.743) (0.733) (1.570)
Host country fixed-effects? No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Home country fixed-effects? No No Yes No No No Yes No
Home region fixed-effects? No No No Yes No No No Yes
Number of company-years 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726
Adj. R-square (%) 42.95 55.19 61.48 57.21 49.13 56.91 65.43 59.44
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2.5 Conclusion
While both asset prices and trading volume are the fundamental building blocks
of all economic interactions in financial markets (Karpoff , 1986, 1987; Lo and Wang ,
2006), much of the literature has been devoted to the behavior of stock prices. Studies
of trading volume, especially of firms that cross-list their shares abroad, have been far
fewer. In the past few decades, we have witnessed rapid growth of global cross-listings
both in number of offerings and in number of origination (home) and destination
(host) markets. However, there is a lack of understanding on the global distribution,
and its determinants, of trading volume for globally cross-listed shares. Previous
studies have drawn conclusions using sample firms that cross-list in the U.S. It is
important to incorporate other important host markets into our study in order to
reflect the changing landscape of cross-listing markets.
In this study, we attempt to fill the aforementioned gaps. Using a hand-collected
sample of firms with foreign cross-listings on 10 major financial markets, we utilize
the improved methods to measure the trading volume and information factor of each
host market. Our methods are able to address the impacts from rival host markets
for firms that cross-list on multiple host market. We document that the U.S., on
average, attracts 36.563 percent of a firm’s global trading volume, surpassing other
host markets. Four countries (Belgium, France, Germany and Japan), on average, at-
tract less than 8 percent of a cross-listed firm’s global trading volume. The dispersion
of volume share among the 10 host markets illustrates the difficulty in generalizing
findings based on sample firms that cross-list shares only in the U.S.
We next systematically examine the impact of both information- and non-information-
based variables on volume share in a regression framework. Our findings support the
importance of information factor in attracting order flows in both U.S. and non-U.S.
host markets. In addition, for the first time, we document that whether a host market
shares the language or legal origin with the home markets plays an important role
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in attracting order flows. Moreover, our results suggest that host markets with the
following characteristics attract a greater portion of trading volume from the home
market: closer proximity to home market in time zone, lower trading cost and stronger
legal protection for inventors. Furthermore, small and mature high-tech firms from
less-developed domestic markets, with high asset growth, high return volatility and
more foreign sales observe a greater portion of their trading volume executed on
foreign host markets, rather than on their respective home markets.
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CHAPTER III
Essay II. Competition among trading venues:
Evidence from the trading volume distribution of
globally multiple cross-listed shares
Over the last few decades, there has been a substantial increase in the numbers
of global cross-listings as well as home and host markets. Many firms cross-list their
shares on multiple foreign markets in order to gain credibility and visibility and to
facilitate marketing (Doidge et al., 2009). Some firms have delisted their shares from
abroad (You et al., 2012). Previous studies (See, for example, Sarkissian and Schill ,
2009; Wang and Zhou, 2014) have excluded such delisted firms from their samples
largely due to the lack of a historical record of cross-listings. Our study fills the gap by
constructing a comprehensive dataset of firms that list their shares on both domestic
and foreign stock exchanges. Our sample is constructed directly from Datastream and
consists of 1, 118 cross-listings in 50 host countries over the period between 1990 and
2012. Among them, there are 340 cross-listings listed on two or more stock exchanges.
This subset of multiple cross-listings offers a unique opportunity to chronologize the
distribution of such listings and to examine the dynamics of market competitiveness
in attracting order flows among rival foreign markets, which has largely been ignored
by the literature.
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Specifically, we examine the importance of various market- and firm-level factors,
suggested by Baruch et al. (2007), Eun and Sabherwal (2003), Su and Chong (2007),
and Wang and Zhou (2014), in determining the distribution of trading volume among
rival host markets. We find robust evidence that trading cost, firm age, host market
legal protection, information disclosure, financial development, market liquidity, and
legal origin consistently play a vital role for a host market to attract order flows from
rival host markets. More specifically, host markets are better positioned to attract
order flows from rival host markets when they have lower trading cost, foreign firms
with a longer listing history, better legal protection and information disclosure, higher
market liquidity and more advanced financial market. Interestingly, we consistently
find that host countries with English common law origin are able to attract more
trading volume while host countries with French civil-law origin attract significantly
lower trading volume. Moreover, we find minimal evidence that information-based
variables have a significant impact on the distribution of order flows.
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we construct a com-
prehensive dataset of global cross-listings directly from Datastream. With few ex-
ceptions, previous studies have largely examined firms that cross-list in one market
only (See, for example, Baruch et al., 2007). Studies that have constructed a dataset
of global cross-listings mostly collected the listings from stock exchanges (See, for
example, Sarkissian and Schill , 2009; Wang and Zhou, 2014). One limitation of such
an approach is that most stock exchanges do not provide a complete list of historical
listings but a snapshot of listings at a particular point of time, such as the end of
calendar year 2012. Thus, datasets used in previous studies usually do not include
delisted, merged or other firms that no longer actively listed on a market at the time
when the dataset is constructed. Moreover, most stock exchanges only provide lim-
ited information about a firm, such as company name and stock ticker. Many firms
change name or registration location during the listing’s duration. The incomplete
54
information provided by stock exchanges makes it difficult to match with firms in re-
search databases such as Datastream. We employ an innovative approach to identify
cross-listings directly from Datastream; thus, our dataset is comprehensive and free
from potential biases caused by the above mentioned limitations.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine trading volume
distribution among rival host markets. Our main analysis focuses on firms with mul-
tiple cross-listings, which allows us to examine competition among host markets and
to identify factors that influence the competitiveness of the host market in attracting
order flows from rival host markets. We conduct a comprehensive analysis and present
robust results on the relative importance of firm- and market-level characteristics in
determining market competitiveness. Our results are robust to different regression
methods, variable measurements and subsamples.
Third, our findings have both important academic and practical implications. In-
vestors may find our results useful in guiding them to place orders at markets with
the most market liquidity, lower transaction cost and better shareholder protection,
and therefore lower the liquidity and trading cost, reduce the global trading risk,
ensure the feasibility of investors’ trading strategies, and help them construct glob-
ally diversified portfolios (See, for example, Baruch et al., 2007). Regulators and
policymakers may adjust policies and improve market soundness in order to make a
country’s stock market more competitive in attracting order flows and foreign cross-
listings and therefore enhance the development of domestic financial markets (See,
for example, Hargis and Ramanlal , 1998; Halling et al., 2008).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.1 details variable con-
struction. Section 3.2 describes the hypotheses and sampling process and documents
the distribution of foreign cross-listings across home and host markets. Sections 3.3
discusses our empirical findings. Section 4.6 presents results on robustness checks.
Section 3.5 concludes our study.
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3.1 Variable construction
In this section, we discuss various firm and market characteristics and their ex-
pected impact on volume share distribution among rival host markets.
3.1.1 Trading volume ratio
Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) calculate the trading volume ratio for
cross-listing i in a host market as the ratio of the trading volume in the host market to
that in the firm’s home market, VolHT,i/VolHM , where i represents an individual cross-
listing. This definition provides information about the volume distribution between a
host market and its counterpart home market. Wang and Zhou (2014) calculates the
volume ratio of the host market as the ratio of trading volume in one host market i
to the total global trading volume of each cross-listed firm, VolHT,i/
∑n
k=1 (VolHT,k +
VolHM), and studies the trading volume distribution between a host market and its
counterpart home market.
To examine the distribution of foreign trading volume among multiple rival host
markets, we measure the trading volume ratio of a host market as the proportion
of trading volume in host market i over the total foreign trading volume of each
cross-listed firm,
VolHT,i
n∑
k=1
VolHT,k
, (3.1)
where n is the total number of host markets for each sample cross-listed firm. We
first obtain trading volume of each cross-listed share in each stock market as listed on
Datastream. We download the American Depository Receipt (ADR) exchange ratio
from the Worldsope database. To further verify the ADR bundle ratio, we collect
ADR bundle ratios from Citi bank, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank and Bank of New York.
We then adjust the number of shares trading volume in the host market by multiplying
the bundle ratio for those ADRs in our sample. For robustness purpose, we measure
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trading volume in two ways, number of shares traded and U.S. dollar denominated
value traded, and thus have two measures of trading volume ratio — share volume
ratio and dollar volume ratio, repectively.
3.1.2 Information factor
Baruch et al. (2007) proposes a theoretical model to explain the variations in
volume ratio of internationally cross-listed stocks (henceforth, the BKL information
factor). The BKL information factor is estimated as the correlation coefficient be-
tween cross-listed asset returns and the returns of other assets traded on that market.
It represents the incremental information generated from the host market in addition
to that from its counterpart home market. The BKL model predicts that trading
volume ratio for the cross-listed stock is positively associated with the respective in-
formation factor. Using the sample of foreign firms that cross-list in U.S. markets,
Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) document evidence to support the BKL
model’s prediction that proportionally more volume takes place in the U.S. than in
its counterpart home market if the cross-listed asset has a higher information factor.
Wang and Zhou (2014) find a positive relationship between a revised version of the
BKL information factor and trading volume ratio of globally cross-listed stocks. Fol-
lowing Wang and Zhou (2014), we adopt the BKL information factor to measure the
incremental information provided by one host market in addition to that provided by
its domestic home market. For every cross-listed stock in our sample, we first regress
daily domestic market returns of stock i on the daily index return in the domestic
market and obtain the R-square, R2r , in the restricted model:
Ri,t = αi,t + β
′home
i,t R
home
m,t + i,t, (3.2)
where βhomei,t is a 3 × 1 vector of asset i’s loadings on index returns of the home
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market, and Rhomem,t is a 3 × 1 vector of index returns (Rm) of the home market. We
estimate the equation at every day t within a three-day window, from the previous day
(t− 1) to the next day (t+ 1); that is, β′homei,t =
(
βhomei,t−1 , β
home
i,t , β
home
i,t+1
) ′ and Rhomem,t =(
Rhomem,t−1, R
home
m,t , R
home
m,t+1
) ′, to account for non-synchronous trading across markets in
different time zones.
We next estimate the unrestricted model by adding daily index returns of a host
market as additional regressors and obtain the new R-square, R2ur, in the unrestricted
model:
Ri,t = αi,t + β
′home
i,t R
home
m,t + β
′host
i,t R
host
m,t + ξi,t, (3.3)
where βhosti,t is a 3× 1 vector of asset i’s loadings on index returns of the host market,
and Rhostm,t is a 3 × 1 vector of index returns of the host market from t − 1 to t + 1,
with βhosti,t =
(
βhosti,t−1, β
host
i,t , β
host
i,t+1
) ′ and Rhostm,t = (Rhostm,t−1, Rhostm,t , Rhostm,t+1) ′.
We calculate the incremental information provided by the host market j regarding
the price of stock i in Year T as the following:
Information factori,j,T =
(
R2ur −R2r
)
/3(
1−R2ur
)
/
(
n− 6) (3.4)
where n is the number of daily returns used in both restricted and unrestricted models.
We calculate the difference in information factor as the difference between the
information factor of a host market and the average information factor of all host mar-
kets. That is, for each cross-listed firm i in host market j and year T , (Information factori,j,T )−
(X¯), where X¯= Average of Information factori,HTnj ,T , for cross-listed firm i listing its
shares in host market j, where j = 1, 2, ..., n. We expect that a host market attracts
more trading from rival host markets if it provides more incremental information to
the stock price than the rival host markets.
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To construct the information factor, we first obtain from Datastream the domestic
market daily stock prices for each cross-listed share and daily market index for both
home and host markets. All data series are converted to the U.S. dollar as a common
currency. We adjust the host market share price by dividing the ADR bundle ratio.
For each stock, we first calculate daily stock returns and corresponding market index
returns, and then we run a pair of time series regressions for each cross-listing in every
sample year based on data from the past 48 months. If the available data is less than
36 months, we exclude the firm-year observation from our sample to prevent biased
estimates.
3.1.3 Trading cost
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999) suggest that rela-
tive trading cost of the host market, compared to the domestic market, influences the
distribution of trading volume between the U.S. (host) and its domestic market. We
expect that the volume ratio of a host market is inversely associated with the relative
bid-ask spread of that host market compared to its rival host markets. Following Eun
and Sabherwal (2003) and Foerster and Karolyi (1998), we define trading cost as the
ratio of bid-ask spread to bid-ask midpoint. We first calculate the market-level aver-
age trading cost for all cross-listings in a host market. In our regression analysis, we
include the difference in trading cost, which is calculated as the difference in average
market-level trading cost between a host market and its rival host market(s).
3.1.4 Firm age
Usually, firms with longer presence in a foreign market are better known to foreign
investors and thus may attract a higher volume ratio in a foreign host market. Eun
and Sabherwal (2003) shows a positive association between the years listed in the
U.S. (the host) market and the trading volume in the host market. As a proxy for
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firm age, we use the number of years since each cross-listed stock’s first trading data
in the host market was recorded on Datastream. We further calculate the difference
in firm age by subtracting the average firm age in all host markets from the firm age
in a host market.
3.1.5 Time zone
The geographic proximity of a host market to its counterpart home market may
affect information flow between the markets and thus sway the distribution of trading
volume (Davis and Henderson, 2008; Pirinsky and Wang , 2006; Sarkissian and Schill ,
2004; Coval and Moskowitz , 2001; Pulatkonak and Sofianos , 1999). When a host
market is located further away from its counterpart home market, as measured by
time zone difference, information flow is hindered. We expect to see a decreasing
volume ratio for a host market when it is located further away in time zone from the
cross-listing’s home market, relative to rival host markets. Investors in host markets
far away are at an information disadvantage and thus shy away from trading based
on stale information.
We obtain the standard time zone for each stock exchange from WorldClock’s
website.1 For example, Frankfurt is located in time zone “UTC/GMT+1” and is
recorded as “+1”; New York is located in time zone “UTC/GMT−5” and is recorded
as “−5”. We then calculate the difference between the time zone of the host market
and its counterpart home market and define time zone difference as the integer portion
of the ratio of the difference over 3. In the above example, the time zone difference
is 2 (= (+1− (−5))/3). To examine the competitiveness between rival host markets,
we further calculate the difference in time zone by subtracting the average time zone
difference of its rival host market(s) from the time zone difference of a host market.
1The URL is www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/.
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3.1.6 Legal protection for shareholders
Previous studies have shown that the fraction of trading in the U.S. (host market)
is higher due to the benefit of better legal protection for shareholders (Halling et al.,
2008; Pulatkonak and Sofianos , 1999). Investors prefer to become company share-
holders in a country that provides stronger legal protection. Accordingly, we expect
that host markets with better legal protection have higher trading volume ratio than
rival host markets.
Our first measure of legal protection for shareholders is the anti-director rights
index from La Porta et al. (1998), which has been used in numerous articles. The
index is the sum of six anti-director rights scores ranging from 0 for Belgium to 5
for Canada and the U.S. A higher index value indicates better legal protection for
minority shareholders. Our second measure is the information disclosure requirement
of each financial market, the disclosure index from La Porta et al. (2006), which
is estimated from the average of six variables of information disclosure.2 The last
measure is the legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by
corporate insiders, the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008), which is the
average of the ex ante and ex post controls of self-dealing for each country.3 In our
regression models, we use the difference in the above-mentioned indicators between a
host market and the average level of all host markets. We expect a positive association
between the volume ratio of a host market and its aforementioned three measures of
legal protection for shareholders.
2The disclosure index, ranging from 0 to 1, is constructed from six factors: prospectus, com-
pensation of directors and key officers, ownership structure, inside ownership, contracts outside the
ordinary course of business, and transitions between he issuer and its directors, officers, and/or large
shareholders. A higher index value indicates a more extensive disclosure requirement (La Porta et al.,
2006).
3The anti-self-dealing index is constructed based on laws and regulations applicable to publicly
traded firms in May 2003, and summarizes the protection of minority shareholders in the corporate
decision-making process (Djankov et al., 2008).
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3.1.7 Country/market development
Previous studies suggest that an advanced financial market in the home country
will help domestic investors to acquire foreign assets and simultaneously facilitate
foreign investors to acquire domestic assets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti , 2008; Martin
and Rey , 2006). Halling et al. (2008) shows that the fraction of trading in the U.S.
(host market) is negatively related to financial development in the counterpart home
market. We measure financial development as the ratio of the sum of stock mar-
ket capitalization and private credit to GDP (Beck et al., 2000). We expect that
one country’s volume ratio of a cross-listed firm is positively correlated to financial
development in that market. In the regression analysis, we employ the difference in
financial development between a host market and the average level of all host markets.
Some studies find different trading patterns for stock markets from developing and
developed countries (See, for example, Halling et al., 2008; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti ,
2008). It is expected that a developed country will extract more foreign trading if the
competing host markets are developing markets. Certain market characteristics may
better facilitate trading activities. For example, Claessens et al. (2002) finds that
developed countries with higher per capita income, better macroeconomic policies,
better legal protection and more advanced financial markets tend to attract more
trading activity. Therefore, we control for economic development of the host market
using country classifications from World Bank. Development indicator equals 1 if the
host country is a developing economy and 0 otherwise.
3.1.8 Market liquidity
Previous research demonstrates that illiquidity is a source of risk that is priced
by the market (Amihud , 2002; Pa´stor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen,
2005). Roll et al. (2007) finds that liquidity facilitates trading and arbitrage oppor-
tunities. We expect that the host market with a higher level of market depth and
62
breadth will attract more foreign trading. We measure stock market liquidity using
stock market turnover and the ratio of stock market value (calculated as total shares
traded on the stock market exchange to GDP). The data are obtained from Beck
et al. (2009), which was updated in 2012 and is available on the World Bank website.
3.1.9 Market correlation
Foreign markets with low correlation with the cross-listed firm’s domestic mar-
ket appeal to arbitrageurs due to the benefit of greater diversification. Berger et al.
(2011) studies frontier markets (small, illiquid, developing markets) and find that
frontier markets have low integration with the world market and thereby offer sig-
nificant diversification benefits. This implies that, other things being equal, foreign
trading volume should be higher in the market with a lower correlation to its domestic
market. For each sample cross-listed share, we construct the market correlation as
the correlation coefficient between a home market’s daily market index returns and
those of its counterpart host market.
3.1.10 Legal origin
La Porta et al. (1998) documents the influence of a country’s legal origin on many
aspects of economic development through financial development, government regula-
tion and property rights, and contract enforcement, among others. Firms in common
law countries typically have better minority shareholder protection. La Porta et al.
(2008) summarizes that legal origin influences different aspects of investor protection
such as ownership dispersion, dividend payout, and creditor rights. The results are
largely in favor of a common law system, since it is associated with better investor
protection and a more developed financial market. Djankov et al. (2008) shows that a
common law system is associated with more efficient debt enforcement in insolvency
cases. We create a set of indicator variables based on a country’s legal origin from one
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of the four main legal families – English common law, German law, French civil-law
or Scandinavian law. The legal origin data is available from La Porta et al. (1998).
3.2 Sample construction and data description
3.2.1 Initial sample construction
To construct our dataset of cross-listings with multiple host markets, we begin by
compiling a complete list of global cross-listings on Datastream at any time between
January 1, 1990, and December 31, 2012. Our dataset of cross-listings only includes
firms that list both on its domestic and at least one foreign stock exchange, subject
to the following filtering process:
1. We exclude firms that only list aboard but not in their domestic country;
2. We limit sample listings to ordinary shares and depositary receipts and exclude
preferred shares, warrants, derivatives, and indices.
3. We exclude financial services (SIC 4000-4999) and utilities (SIC 6000-6999)
firms from our sample (Sarkissian and Schill , 2009).
4. We exclude firms originating from tax havens, such as Bermuda, the Cayman
Islands, Jersey, or the Netherlands Antilles because those firms do not have
operations in those registered “domestic” locations.
5. We exclude stocks listed on over-the-counter (OTC) markets from our analysis.
6. Germany is excluded from our sample because we are unable to separate shares
traded in Germany’s regulated stock exchange from over 5,000 open market
shares. Palestine is excluded from the sample due to missing country level data
from external sources.
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7. If cross-listed firms trade on more than one exchange within a country, volumes
and prices are taken from the country’s primary exchange.
8. We require non-zero daily stock price and available trading volume data on both
the home and host markets.
After the filtering process, our initial sample includes 934 cross-listed companies
with 1, 118 foreign listings.
Because our sample is constructed directly from Datastream and includes all his-
torical listings, such as delisted firms, it provides a complete chronology of cross-
listings on major stock exchanges. Our sample is also free from the potential biases
caused by sampling or identification difficulties encountered in previous studies. For
example, Sarkissian and Schill (2009) and Wang and Zhou (2014) both construct
their datasets of foreign equity listings by soliciting from every stock exchange for
all foreign shares listed on their exchange as of December 1998 and December 2010,
respectively. Both lists are comprehensive and extend previous literature to include
foreign shares listed on all major stock exchanges. However, a major drawback of
their approaches is that the constructed datasets are static and do not capture the
complete picture of historical listings, such as delisted or merged foreign stocks. Be-
sides, previous studies started the process by collecting a list of company names and
listing dates, which is inaccurate in many cases and is difficult to match with major
databases, such as CRSP and Datastream. Our dataset is free from such difficulties
because our dataset is constructed directly from Datastream.
3.2.2 Distribution of the initial sample of global cross-listings
In Panel A of Table 3.1, we present the distribution of a number of cross-listings
grouped by home and host markets. Sample cross-listings represent 61 home mar-
kets and 50 host markets. Among them, there are 31 developed countries and 19
developing countries. Overall, most companies cross-list their shares in developed
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markets. Out of 1,118 foreign cross-listings, 987 (88% of the sample) cross-listings
are listed in developed host markets while 131 cross-listings (12%) favor developing
host markets. In particular, the U.S. is the largest host country with 302 (27.01% of
the sample) foreign cross-listings, followed by the U.K. with 229 cross-listings (20.48%
of the sample). Hong Kong and Canada develop into popular foreign listing venues
and attract 79 (7.07%) and 70 (6.26%) cross-listings, respectively. However, both
markets are less diversified in terms of originating home markets. Sixty-four out of
79 cross-listings in Hong Kong’ are originated from Mainland China, and half of the
cross-listings in Canada are originated from Australia. The domestic markets from
which most cross-listings originate are Canada (171), the U.S. (155), Australia (110),
China (82) and the U.K. (81).
Panel B of Table 3.1 summarizes the number of cross-listings grouped by home
markets. In our sample, 72.81% (= 814/1, 118) of cross-listings list only on one
host market and 27.19% (304) of the sample have multiple cross-listing destinations.
Among multiple cross-listings, 10.38% (= 166/1, 118), 6.44% (= 72/1, 118), 1.79%
(= 20/1, 118), 2.24% (= 25/1, 118), 1.07% (= 12/1, 118) and 0.81% (= 9/1, 118) of
the sample cross-list on 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 foreign markets, respectively.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of global cross-listings
Panel A: Distribution of cross-listings by host and home markets
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Argentina 5 6 1 5
Australia 99 110 3 34 1 4 14 1 6 1 37 9
Austria 4 4 2 1 1
Bahrain 1 1 1
Belgium 2 2 1 1
Brazil 22 29 2 2 4 21
Bulgaria 1 1 1
Canada 162 171 2 3 3 1 1 1 2 10 6 3 1 24 114
Chile 5 5 1 4
China 67 82 64 9 2 7
Colombia 1 2 1 1
Croatia 1 1 1
Czech 1 1 1
Denmark 3 3 1 2
Egypt 1 1 1
Estonia 1 1 1
Finland 5 6 1 3 2
France 18 26 1 1 11 1 2 3 2 5
Hong Kong 31 33 1 1 1 1 1 13 10 1 4
Hungary 1 2 1 1
Iceland 1 1 1
India 19 20 1 14 5
Indonesia 2 2 1 1
Ireland 37 40 36 4
Israel 28 28 2 26
Italy 6 8 1 3 1 1 2
Japan 14 19 1 2 1 1 3 11
Kenya 4 5 3 1 1
South Korea 7 9 1 2 2 4
Kuwait 1 1 1
Lithuania 1 1 1
Luxembourg 2 2 2
Malaysia 4 4 1 2 1
Mexico 27 37 8 8 21
Morocco 1 1 1
Netherlands 13 15 3 1 1 2 1 7
New Zealand 17 17 16 1
Nigeria 1 1 1
Norway 25 28 1 1 22 3 1
Oman 1 1 1
Peru 2 2 1 1
Philippines 1 2 2
Poland 3 3 3
Qatar 1 2 1 1
Russia 23 28 25 3
Singapore 9 9 3 6
Slovakia 1 1 1
Slovenia 1 1 1
South Africa 22 35 4 1 2 2 6 1 1 11 5 1 1
Spain 8 17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 4
Sweden 11 13 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 2
Switzerland 9 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Taiwan 17 20 1 14 5
Thailand 3 3 3
Tunisia 1 1 1
Turkey 3 3 2 1
UAE 3 3 3
United Kingdom 71 81 1 1 1 3 14 1 5 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 1 12 3 1 22
United States 100 155 1 8 17 9 6 4 8 7 1 2 1 13 21 7 3 28 19
Zambia 1 1 1
Zimbabwe 2 2 2
Total 934 1, 118 18 2 1 19 10 1 70 9 1 9 3 1 1 14 3 79 4 1 5 9 17 4 1 4 1 1 4 1 11 22 16 9 34 10 2 11 33 28 14 34 40 21 3 1 1 2 229 302 1 1
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Table 3.1 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Number of foreign cross-listings by home markets
Number of a firm’s foreign cross-listings
Home market Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 9
Argentina 6 4 2
Australia 110 88 22
Austria 4 4
Bahrain 1 1
Belgium 2 2
Brazil 29 19 2 3 5
Bulgaria 1 1
Canada 171 153 18
Chile 5 5
China 82 57 10 15
Colombia 2 2
Croatia 1 1
Czech 1 1
Denmark 3 3
Egypt 1 1
Estonia 1 1
Finland 6 4 2
France 26 12 8 6
Hong Kong 33 29 4
Hungary 2 2
Iceland 1 1
India 20 18 2
Indonesia 2 2
Ireland 40 35 2 3
Israel 28 28
Italy 8 4 4
Japan 19 10 6 3
Kenya 5 3 2
South Korea 9 6 3
Kuwait 1 1
Lithuania 1 1
Luxembourg 2 2
Malaysia 4 4
Mexico 37 21 6 6 4
Morocco 1 1
Netherlands 15 11 4
New Zealand 17 17
Nigeria 1 1
Norway 28 23 2 3
Oman 1 1
Peru 2 2
Philippines 2 2
Poland 3 3
Qatar 2 2
Russia 28 19 6 3
Singapore 9 9
Slovakia 1 1
Slovenia 1 1
South Africa 35 16 6 3 4 6
Spain 17 6 2 9
Sweden 13 10 3
Switzerland 9 9
Taiwan 20 14 6
Thailand 3 3
Tunisia 1 1
Turkey 3 3
UAE 3 3
United Kingdom 81 63 12 6
United States 155 72 30 15 12 20 6
Zambia 1 1
Zimbabwe 2 2
Total 1, 118 814 166 72 20 25 12 9
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Table 3.1 (Cont’d)
Panel C: Time-series summary of cross-listings by host markets
Host Market
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1990 48 10 1 2 3 1 31
1991 68 2 10 2 1 8 2 3 1 1 2 36
1992 104 1 10 2 1 8 2 3 1 1 2 32 41
1993 114 1 10 1 1 8 3 2 3 1 1 2 32 49
1994 129 1 14 1 1 8 6 2 3 1 1 2 32 57
1995 160 1 14 1 8 11 2 3 1 3 2 32 20 62
1996 184 2 14 2 1 10 13 2 6 1 1 5 2 1 32 19 73
1997 197 3 15 2 1 10 16 2 12 2 5 3 1 32 2 91
1998 220 3 15 2 1 10 17 2 12 2 1 5 4 1 3 32 3 107
1999 258 5 17 4 1 10 18 2 15 2 1 8 9 5 1 5 32 3 120
2000 323 7 18 6 1 10 25 2 1 2 2 14 2 1 13 10 5 2 5 32 15 150
2001 395 11 19 6 1 11 29 3 1 2 1 4 15 2 2 14 12 5 4 5 32 1 47 168
2002 432 12 19 5 1 1 11 31 2 1 1 2 4 13 4 2 17 13 5 7 5 34 1 53 188
2003 473 12 19 7 1 1 11 33 1 1 1 2 1 4 9 4 2 21 13 5 9 7 35 3 1 61 209
2004 507 12 19 8 2 1 11 34 1 2 2 2 2 4 9 7 2 20 1 1 13 6 10 7 35 3 1 73 219
2005 561 12 1 19 1 15 2 1 11 1 34 1 2 2 3 4 5 12 8 4 18 2 1 12 7 11 7 36 3 2 90 234
2006 642 12 1 1 18 4 22 2 1 11 2 36 1 1 4 9 4 4 1 4 14 11 4 18 3 1 13 11 11 8 36 3 2 123 246
2007 729 13 1 1 18 5 1 31 2 1 12 1 45 1 2 4 17 4 4 1 4 15 10 4 20 4 2 16 15 13 8 37 3 2 155 257
2008 747 13 1 18 5 1 37 2 1 1 13 3 49 1 2 4 17 4 1 4 1 2 4 14 10 4 12 5 2 15 19 13 10 38 3 2 153 263
2009 803 14 1 1 18 5 1 40 1 3 1 1 13 2 54 1 2 5 17 4 1 4 1 3 9 12 11 7 14 5 2 13 25 13 27 36 8 1 2 154 270 1
2010 829 14 1 18 6 1 46 3 3 1 12 3 61 1 2 7 17 4 1 4 1 3 1 9 11 11 7 18 4 2 24 24 13 31 32 14 1 1 2 141 273 1
2011 854 15 2 18 8 1 53 8 3 1 7 3 65 2 1 2 7 17 4 1 4 1 4 1 10 10 13 7 19 6 27 25 11 31 28 20 3 1 2 138 273 1 1
2012 872 17 2 17 10 50 9 1 6 3 1 4 2 76 4 1 3 7 17 3 1 4 1 4 1 9 12 13 4 15 9 1 11 26 24 11 32 23 20 1 1 1 2 138 273 1 1
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Panel C of Table 3.1 reports the evolution of cross-listing programs over the sample
period. Consistent with findings in previous studies (See, for example, Halling et al.,
2008), the number of cross-listings increased from 48 global cross-listings in 1990 to
872 in 2012. However, the growth rate of cross-listings fluctuates over time. It peaked
during earlier years 1991-1992 (41.67% in 1991 and 52.94% in 1992) and stayed at a
low ebb in recent years, e.g. 2008 (2.47%) and 2010-2012 (around 3%). The growth
of foreign listings in the U.K. and the U.S. have stagnated since 2010.
Panel C also demonstrates the completeness of our dataset. At the end of 2012,
there were 872 global cross-listings. However, our dataset includes a total of 1, 118
cross-listings, including 246 cross-listings that no longer actively traded. In other
words, if one contacted stock exchanges to obtain a list of foreign shares as of the end
of 2012, these 246 cross-listings wouldn’t be included.
Our sample also confirms the declining importance of the U.S. in attracting foreign
cross-listings (See, for example, Wang and Zhou, 2014; Sarkissian and Schill , 2009).
In 1990, cross-listings in the U.S. accounted for 65% of global cross-listings. Although
the U.S. continues to lead all countries in the number of cross-listings, its weight
has gradually declined, from 65% in 1990 to 38% in 1995, 46% in 2000, 42% in
2005, 33% in 2010, and 31% in 2012. The literature has contributed such decline to
both the emergence of other cross-listing destinations (e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore
and Canada) and the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX) (See, for example,
Fernandes et al., 2010; Marosi and Massoud , 2008; Doidge et al., 2010).
3.2.3 Sample of cross-listings with multiple host markets and distribution
of trading volume
When we examine the research question that the distribution of trading volume
across multiple competing host markets, we use our multi-cross-listing subsample,
which includes 120 companies with 304 home-host paired cross-listings. The unique-
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ness of this sub-dataset is that every sample firm cross-lists in two or more foreign
markets simultaneously, which offers a unique opportunity to analyze the distribution
of trading volume and competition for order flows among host markets.
We first calculate the trading volume ratio in every host market and document
the distribution of order flows among foreign markets. For each cross-listed firm, we
calculate volume ratio as the proportion of host market i’s trading volume over the
total trading volume in all host markets:
VolHT,i
n∑
k=1
VolHT
, (3.5)
where i = 1, 2, ..., n, and n is the total number of host markets for each cross-listed
firm.
To check robustness, we use two different measures of trading volume to calculate
volume ratio. First, we measure trading volume as the total number of shares traded,
that is, the share trading volume. We collect the daily number of shares traded for all
sample firms in both home and host markets from Datastream for the sample period
January 1990 to December 2012.4 We also collect the bundle ratios from Worldscope
and ADR lists from Bank of New York, Citi Bank, and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank. We
adjust the trading volume by dividing by the bundle ratios.5
Second, We measure trading volume as the total value of traded shares, calculated
as the daily number of shares traded in every foreign market times the closing price
of that stock in the respective foreign market, converted to U.S. dollars. As pointed
out in Halling et al. (2011), the benefit of converting all currencies to the U.S. dollar
4We use datatype “VO” in Datastream which shows the number of shares traded for a stock on
a particular time frequency. The figure is expressed in thousands. Daily figures are adjusted for
capital changes. For stocks that are traded on more than one exchange within a country, default
volumes are taken from the primary exchange of that country.
5ADR Exchange Ratio represents the relationship between the American Depositary Receipt and
the common share represented by the ADR. For example, an ADR ratio of 1:5 (or 0.2) represents
that one ADR is equivalent to five outstanding shares.
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is that it automatically adjusts for any ADR ratio.6 For brevity purpose, we report
only the results based on the dollar volume ratio. The results from the share volume
ratio are quantitatively similar. Table 3.2 reports the trading volume distribution of
firms with multiple cross-listings.
6We cross check with data type “VA” in Datastream which shows the value of all trades for a
stock on a particular day. The figure is expressed in thousands, except for Korean and Indonesian
securities where the value is expressed in millions. Daily figures are adjusted for capital changes.
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Table 3.2: Trading volume distribution of global cross-listings with multiple host markets.
This table presents summary statistics on trading volume ratio across home and host pairs as well as over time. The sample is restricted to 120 companies that lists on multiple
host markets, including a total of 304 pairs of home-host cross-listings. Panel A reports the average trading volume ratio grouped by home and host markets and Panel B
presents time-series summary of trading volume ratio grouped by host market.
Panel A: Average trading volume ratios grouped by home and host markets
Host Market
Home Country B
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Argentina 4.20 95.80
Australia 16.31 19.83 22.84 11.75 9.93 83.42 91.38
Brazil 0.48 0.30 99.81
Canada 1.68 0.03 55.26 31.30 53.45 83.68
China 80.82 0.89 2.02 19.42
Colombia 0.24 99.76
France 22.09 15.40 30.32 81.16 99.22
Hong Kong 0.35 99.65
Hungary 26.06 73.94
India 2.86 97.14
Ireland 59.63 40.37
Italy 1.00 99.00
Japan 0.09 1.54 30.65 74.61
South Korea 1.52 0.21 98.49
Mexico 0.22 7.23 99.26
Netherlands 0.17 99.83
Norway 21.11 26.31 78.89 73.69
Qatar 28.75 71.25
Russian Federation 3.44 96.56
South Africa 10.35 11.00 0.08 63.13 7.08 0.62 84.95 36.87
Spain 0.19 0.02 0.87 13.04 1.30 1.34 17.60 87.33
Sweden 0.02 0.01 99.98
Taiwan 8.23 91.77
United Kingdom 3.20 19.79 40.76 7.43 0.22 50.65 76.42 57.88 65.23
United States 33.13 23.48 20.96 35.93 10.05 33.99 57.12 21.73 22.12 42.78 38.04 66.87 19.15
Sample average 19.05 17.86 0.19 23.34 23.48 20.96 0.02 15.23 0.07 74.95 6.26 0.22 8.37 15.79 57.12 32.92 12.97 20.21 26.06 42.78 0.76 43.11 0.27 46.41 49.96 28.75 46.12 70.48 36.87
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Panel B: Time-series summary of trading volume ratio by host market
Host Market
Year B
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1990 42.57 87.16 38.37 63.99
1991 39.65 0.31 32.56 56.49 34.19 57.86
1992 33.04 0.19 22.27 53.01 28.94 51.93 67.73
1993 32.54 0.65 18.50 80.94 47.22 22.97 50.87 73.76
1994 32.87 0.78 14.89 68.00 51.62 16.46 48.15 71.38
1995 30.66 18.77 66.16 6.33 21.94 57.21 44.51 68.52
1996 25.03 19.32 79.24 7.54 23.35 61.05 53.51 67.04
1997 24.50 27.16 84.11 5.62 15.09 99.46 60.90 77.46 66.55
1998 22.61 27.27 55.21 6.37 17.10 97.19 59.73 69.23
1999 20.42 0.06 18.25 79.17 6.23 17.59 1.31 98.92 83.94 60.44 62.29
2000 19.83 0.04 11.79 78.73 0.28 4.22 9.65 6.09 96.58 76.75 62.38 97.54 63.69
2001 17.11 0.04 13.17 68.62 0.16 5.06 11.19 7.91 98.66 0.19 67.47 55.82 40.70 68.47
2002 12.52 0.07 0.00 10.43 75.27 0.17 10.29 2.69 15.43 99.07 0.66 58.20 54.75 31.08 72.51
2003 11.13 0.04 0.02 9.39 76.33 6.22 2.68 12.20 98.80 0.64 49.19 51.15 28.56 71.78
2004 11.52 0.97 0.02 11.87 80.60 6.39 8.79 9.83 38.89 95.58 0.36 45.60 46.31 25.05 72.89
2005 12.87 30.79 1.76 0.02 9.39 0.00 82.99 13.50 10.50 2.67 8.65 59.19 0.23 50.98 45.67 36.33 72.76
2006 13.55 32.10 25.01 0.03 8.64 0.01 83.29 7.80 4.01 8.44 1.99 16.89 50.53 0.15 51.93 45.26 89.17 38.13 75.04
2007 12.95 21.76 0.37 36.28 0.03 9.56 0.00 74.57 14.94 2.19 5.14 1.11 35.86 38.95 0.07 52.01 40.51 39.08 76.88
2008 7.90 23.19 0.18 26.55 0.02 7.80 0.00 68.06 15.18 2.65 2.18 5.35 51.96 30.62 0.04 47.58 33.15 16.64 48.78 75.45
2009 8.48 14.99 0.17 28.89 0.02 9.87 0.68 77.44 10.63 16.60 52.83 38.79 1.02 7.99 46.75 31.55 0.04 37.81 30.05 54.08 71.44
2010 10.08 6.76 0.17 17.36 0.01 14.47 0.02 78.14 1.84 5.05 62.06 16.61 3.56 38.03 56.11 1.66 28.45 0.03 34.83 39.61 1.76 64.12 68.45
2011 9.55 7.49 0.06 25.95 20.71 0.02 10.80 0.00 71.22 41.40 3.06 9.95 85.94 30.79 2.60 42.19 39.63 0.56 32.71 0.36 34.06 35.58 0.98 58.97 67.79 43.20
2012 12.28 4.82 26.26 23.48 21.94 0.01 46.33 0.00 72.86 0.98 3.01 7.45 62.37 2.03 39.04 67.85 42.78 0.19 44.61 0.54 35.77 35.37 50.53 64.44 5.19
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Panel A of Table 3.2 summarizes the cross-sectional distribution of the volume
ratio grouped by home and host markets. Overall, the U.S. leads other host markets
in attracting foreign order flows. On average, the U.S. accounts for 70.48% of total
trading volume of a cross-listed firm while its rival host markets account for 29.52% of
the total trading volume. The U.S. attracts cross-listings from 22 countries. Of those,
firms from 15 countries observe over 90% of their total foreign trading is executed in
the U.S. Trailing the U.S., most competitive host markets are Switzerland (49.96%),
Sweden (46.41%), the U.K. (46.12%), South Africa (43.11%) and Romania (42.78%).
We note that Switzerland, Sweden and South Africa only attract foreign firms from
three home countries. At the other end of the spectrum, some host markets are
uncompetitive in attracting foreign trading. They include Finland (0.02%), Ghana
(0.07%), Brazil (0.19%), Italy (0.22%) and Spain (0.27%).
The 20-year time span in our dataset enables us to examine the trading volume
ratio over time in each host market. Panel B of Table 3.2 provides information on
the average volume ratio by host country for each calendar year. It reveals that
market competitiveness evolves over time. Some host markets, such as Hong Kong,
the U.S., the U.K., South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland, maintain high levels of
foreign trading volume ratio over time. Hong Kong attracts a significant proportion
of a firm’s foreign trading, ranging from 55.21% in 1998 to 83.29% in 2006. The
U.S. attracts a large proportion as well, ranging from 57.86% in 1991 to 76.88%
in 2007. At the other extreme, countries such as Spain, Ireland, Ghana, Finland,
and Brazil account for less than 1% of the foreign trading of cross-listed firms. The
market competitiveness of countries such as Japan, Netherland and Belgium have
declined over time. For example, the Netherlands attracted 38.37% of foreign trading
in 1990 and its share dropped to about 2% in 2012. On the other hand, Canada has
become a more popular trading venue in recent years. It attracted less than 1% of
foreign trading before 2005, but its market share increased to more than 25% after
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2006. Likewise, Peru’s proportion of foreign trading increased from less than 10%
before 2001 to between 38% and 42.19% in recent years. The findings on this table
are consistent with the one from Panel C of Table 3.1 in that the U.S. leads other
countries as one of the most popular and most competitive host markets. The decline
in the U.S. from 76.88% in 2007 to 64.44% in 2012 coincides with the passage of the
SOX in 2007.
3.2.4 Summary statistics of cross-listings with multiple host markets
Our main empirical analysis examines the impacts of firm- and market-level vari-
ables on the trading volume ratio of multiple cross-listed firms. Our sample in this
part of the study consists of 304 cross-listings with multiple host markets. Panel A of
Table 3.3 summarizes the mean values of firm- and market-level variables grouped by
host markets. Mean values are calculated first by averaging the variables over time
for each cross-listing and then averaging within each host market. We report the
summary statistics for 29 host markets. We first report the average trading volume
ratio calculated based on both value traded and the number of shares. The statistics
are very close. The average volume ratio across all host markets is 43.37% for dollar
volume ratio and 43.34% for share volume ratio.7 There is a substantial variation in
volume ratio across host markets.
We also observe substantial variations across 18 host markets in the information
factors estimated from Equation 4.10, which measures the incremental information
contribution of a host market in addition to that of the home market.8 The cross-
sectional average of all host markets is 4.50. South Africa and Brazil provide the
most incremental information in price discovery of cross-listed stocks, by having the
highest information factor, 33.89 and 11.49, respectively. Canada (5.67), the U.K.
7The ratio is below 50% because our sample includes firms with more than 1 foreign cross-listing.
8We only calculated the information factor for 18 markets because insufficient data limits our
ability to estimate the information factor for other markets.
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(5.51), the United State (4.52) and Italy (4.53) also provide relatively high level of
information in price discovery. Hong Kong (1.42) ranks the last in information factor.
The average trading cost is 0.04 scross all sample markets. The U.S. has the lowest
average trading cost, which is rounded to 0. Hong Kong, Singapore and Sweden also
have low trading cost at 0.01. On the other hand, Finland (0.13), Hungary (0.16),
Netherland (0.11), Romania (0.14), United Arab Emirates (0.10) and Zambia (0.10)
have relatively higher trading cost in our sample. We observe a negative correlation
between trading cost and volume ratio, that is, countries with high trading cost tend
to have low volume ratios. On average, our sample firms have listed in a host market
for 10.51 years at the end of 2012 or when the cross-listed shares were delisted. Cross-
listings on the exchanges of developing host markets on average have a shorter listing
history than those listed on exchanges of developed host markets. For example, the
average listing history of foreign shares cross-listed in Chile, Colombia, Hungary,
Romania, Singapore and Zambia is less than a year. On the other hand, developed
countries, such as the U.S. (14.35 years), Switzerland (12.60 years), Ireland (13.00
years), France (12.15 years) and Belgium (14.64 years) have foreign firms listed longer
than the average of the overall sample.
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Table 3.3: Summary of firm and market characteristics.
This table reports summary statistics of firm and market characteristics for the sample of 304 cross-listings with multiple host markets in 29 host markets. Panel A reports the
averages of firm and market characteristics in each host market. Panel B presents the correlation coefficients of the mean-differenced series of all characteristic variables. We
generate the mean-differenced series as the difference between the value of each host market to the average value of its rival host markets, which is Xi − X¯, where Xi is the
market factor for host country i, and X¯ is the mean value of X across all rival host markets.
Panel A: Firm and market characteristics (average at host market level)
Firm characteristics Market characteristics
Host country
Dollar vol
ratio (%)
Share vol
ratio (%)
Info factor
(Eqn. 4.10)
Trading
cost
Firm
age
Stk mkt
turnover
Stk mkt
value
Fin
devlp
Econ
devlp
Anti-dir
-rights
Anti-self
-dealing
Disclosure
index
Time zone
distance
Market
correlation
Legal
origin
Belgium 23.22 21.64 3.03 0.05 14.64 32.32 20.16 132.90 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.42 1.26 0.46 French/Civil
Botswana 19.03 18.71 3.42 0.10 2.82 3.48 0.80 52.55 1.00 −1.09 −0.06 English/Common
Brazil 0.19 0.06 11.49 0.06 2.00 76.92 38.03 113.92 1.00 3.00 0.29 0.25 −1.00 0.70 French/Civil
Canada 28.07 28.06 5.67 0.06 4.93 73.69 78.74 238.11 0.00 4.00 0.65 0.92 −3.33 0.55 English/Common
Chile 32.00 31.97 0.00 1.00 3.00 0.63 0.58 0.00 0.24 French/Civil
Colombia 22.73 22.47 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.58 0.42 0.00 −1.00 French/Civil
Finland 0.02 0.00 3.93 0.13 5.00 124.48 126.89 171.84 0.00 2.00 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.85 Scand./Civil
France 19.87 15.30 3.47 0.03 12.15 76.48 55.11 156.18 0.00 2.00 0.38 0.75 0.68 0.62 French/Civil
Ghana 0.06 0.18 0.02 3.31 5.18 0.36 24.22 1.00 0.73 0.18 English/Common
Hong Kong 66.66 75.75 1.42 0.01 7.76 88.46 335.30 556.90 0.00 4.00 0.96 0.92 1.06 0.38 English/Common
Hungary 15.65 15.66 0.16 0.33 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.75 German/Civil
Ireland 0.20 0.04 13.00 28.68 23.51 167.91 0.00 3.00 0.79 0.67 0.00 0.59 English/Common
Italy 15.59 15.28 4.53 0.04 2.85 153.02 55.20 136.68 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.67 0.00 0.93 French/Civil
Japan 19.55 16.09 2.09 0.04 9.85 81.68 66.05 269.55 0.00 3.00 0.48 0.75 2.54 0.36 German/Civil
Mexico 66.94 66.76 1.00 33.85 9.31 57.25 1.00 0.00 0.18 0.58 0.00 0.86 French/Civil
Namibia 32.31 31.63 2.36 3.11 0.21 53.41 1.00 −2.45 0.94 English/Common
Netherlands 20.16 19.66 3.45 0.11 10.08 114.89 121.56 241.47 0.00 2.00 0.21 0.50 0.78 0.59 French/Civil
Peru 27.66 27.50 2.63 0.05 4.53 7.75 2.72 58.96 1.00 2.00 0.41 0.33 −0.32 0.34 French/Civil
Poland 40.29 13.01 2.63 0.02 4.00 44.91 12.25 64.99 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.85 German/Civil
Romania 39.32 39.16 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.41 2.00 0.57 French/Civil
Singapore 0.83 0.42 0.01 0.89 91.12 129.77 264.09 0.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.51 English/Common
South Africa 44.62 32.81 33.89 0.03 4.35 57.12 103.31 354.79 1.00 4.00 0.81 0.83 0.04 0.72 English/Common
Spain 0.31 0.17 3.59 0.02 4.92 162.44 134.29 234.54 0.00 2.00 0.37 0.50 1.39 0.55 French/Civil
Sweden 46.50 17.83 2.77 0.01 5.07 120.00 121.49 208.52 0.00 2.00 0.34 0.58 0.71 0.69 Scand./Civil
Switzerland 55.42 53.39 3.19 0.05 12.60 91.01 197.91 374.03 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.67 1.34 0.42 German/Civil
UAE 27.14 27.98 0.10 5.75 0.00 0.00 English/Common
U.K. 36.60 34.57 5.51 0.04 7.30 153.76 178.94 292.87 0.00 4.00 0.93 0.83 −0.55 0.57 English/Common
U.S. 74.07 79.43 4.52 0.00 14.35 192.22 224.52 295.96 0.00 5.00 0.65 1.00 −2.07 0.38 English/Common
Zambia 24.20 27.04 0.10 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.39 English/Common
Sample average 43.37 43.34 4.50 0.04 10.51 111.33 145.60 267.32 0.10 2.81 0.57 0.74 −0.12 0.48
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Table 3.3 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Correlation coefficients of mean-differenced firm and market characteristics
Variable
Dollar
vol
ratio
Share
vol
ratio
Info
factor
dif
Trading
cost
dif
Firm
age
Stk mkt
turnover
Stk mkt
value
Fin devlp
dif
Econ devlp
dif
Time zone
dif
Anti-dir
-rights dif
Anti-self
-dealing dif
Disclosure
index dif
Market
correlation
Share volume ratio 0.949
Info factor dif 0.129 0.026
Trading cost dif −0.292 −0.277 0.002
Firm age dif 0.440 0.483 0.053 −0.106
Stk mkt turnover dif 0.385 0.401 −0.155 −0.194 0.302
Stk mkt value dif 0.524 0.566 −0.065 −0.139 0.327 0.636
Fin development dif 0.454 0.483 0.093 −0.056 0.227 0.232 0.768
Econ development dif −0.159 −0.184 0.345 0.056 −0.245 −0.414 −0.371 −0.386
Time zone dif −0.261 −0.262 0.006 0.120 −0.236 −0.458 −0.115 0.275 −0.089
Anti-dir-rights dif 0.492 0.547 0.025 −0.216 0.343 0.575 0.507 0.327 −0.060 −0.541
Anti-self-dealing dif 0.183 0.244 0.061 −0.129 0.089 0.037 0.107 0.142 −0.048 0.127 0.399
Disclosure dif 0.537 0.587 0.013 −0.252 0.315 0.596 0.622 0.548 −0.319 −0.345 0.858 0.331
Market corr −0.098 −0.115 0.067 0.132 −0.122 −0.104 −0.025 0.049 −0.125 0.189 −0.144 −0.015 −0.083
Common law 0.355 0.399 0.045 −0.144 0.208 0.306 0.326 0.256 −0.116 −0.229 0.565 0.482 0.569 −0.093
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The country-level characteristics summary shows that the U.S., the U.K., Canada,
Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore and South Africa offer a higher-than-average degree
of legal protection for shareholders, as shown by the higher anti-director rights and
anti-director dealing indices. Similarly, the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Hong Kong,
France, Singapore and South Africa provide better information disclosure, as shown
by a higher-than-average disclosure index. We measure distance between host and
home markets as their time zone difference divided by 3. Canada (−3.33), Japan
(2.54), Namibia (−2.45), the U.S. (−2.07) and Romania (2.00) tend to attract foreign
firms from time zones far away. However, many countries, such as Chile, Colombia,
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Singapore, United Arab Emirates
and Zambia, have an average time zone difference of 0, which means they attract
mainly foreign firms from neighbouring time zones. The average market correlation,
measured as the correlation coefficient between daily market index returns of the
home market and the counterpart host market, is 0.48, indicating a relatively high
diversification benefits achieved from the cross-listings. We observe that Botswana
and Colombia are negatively correlated with the cross-listed firms’ home markets,
−0.06 and −1, respectively. Namibia (0.94) has the highest positive correlation with
its counterpart domestic countries. Finland (0.85), Mexico (0.86), Poland (0.85) and
South Africa (0.72) have a higher-than-average positive correlation as well. On the
other hand, Chile (0.24), Peru (0.34), Japan (0.36), the U.S. (0.38), Hong Kong (0.38)
and Zambia (0.39) have a lower-than-average positive correlation with counterpart
home countries. Among the 29 host countries, there are 11 developing countries and
18 developed countries. Among them, 12 countries have English common law origin
and others are civil law countries.9
In terms of financial market development proxied by the sum of stock market
9French civil-law countries include Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Italy, Mexico,
Netherland, Peru, Romania and Spain. German civil law countries include Hungary, Japan, Poland
and Switzerland. Scandinavian civil law countries include Finland and Sweden.
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capitalization and private credit as a ratio of GDP, Hong Kong has the highest level of
financial development at 556.90, followed by Switzerland (374.03). The U.S., the U.K.,
Japan and Singapore also have higher-than-average level of financial development,
at 295.96, 292.87, 269.55 and 264.09, respectively. It is worth noticing that South
Africa is the only developing country with a higher-than-average level of financial
development at 354.79. Among the countries with valid data to calculate financial
development, Ghana (24.22) has the lowest level of financial development. Other less-
developed financial markets include Brazil (52.55), Mexico (57.25), Namibia (53.41)
and Peru (58.96). Consistent with financial market development, we observe that
in most cases, more-developed financial markets are more liquid. Our two proxies of
stock market liquidity (stock market turnover and stock market value) reveal a similar
pattern. On average, the sample stock market turnover is 111.33 and the stock value
is 145.60. The U.S. (192.22, 224.52), the U.K. (153.76, 178.94), Sweden (120.00,
121.49) and Spain (162.44, 134.29) have higher-than-average liquidity in terms of
both measurements. On the other hand, Botswana (3.48, 0.80), Ghana (5.18, 0.36),
Namibia (3.11, 0.21) and Peru (7.75, 2.72) have the lowest market liquidity.
In our regression analysis, we use the mean-differenced series to measure the rel-
ative level of information factor, trading cost, firm age, stock market liquidity, fi-
nancial/economics development, shareholder protection and disclosure. More specifi-
cally, we calculate the difference between the value of each host market to the average
value of its rival host markets, which is Xi − X¯, where Xi is the market factor for
host country i, and X¯ is the mean value of X across all rival host markets. The
estimated correlation coefficients of mean-differenced series are reported in Panel B
of Table 3.3. As we have expected, two measures of volume ratio are highly corre-
lated (95%). Information factor, firm age, stock market liquidity proxies, shareholder
protection proxies, disclosure index differences and English common law origin are
positively correlated with volume ratio. Time zone and trading cost differences as
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well as market correlation are negatively correlated with volume ratio. High linear
correlation (over 50%) exists among anti-director rights index, disclosure index, stock
market turnover and stock market value. Financial development is highly correlated
with stock market value (76.8%) and disclosure index (54.8%). Common law origin is
highly correlated with shareholder protection proxies and disclosure index, which is
consistent with the findings from the previous literature that common law countries
tend to have better legal protection than civil law countries (Djankov et al., 2008).
The correlation coefficients for other market level explanatory variables are below
50%.
3.3 Regression analysis
We utilize panel regression to examine the impact of various firm- and market-
level characteristics on volume distribution among rival host markets. The dependent
variable is the logistically transformed volume ratio VolHT,i/
∑n
k=1 VolHTk , which is
the trading volume in one host market divided by the total foreign trading volume of
a firm.10 Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report the regression results, where Panels A (B) report
the results estimated using dollar (share) volume ratio as the dependent variable.
The information factor is estimated using Equation 4.10. Other market characteris-
tics are calculated as mean-differential series XHT,i − X¯HT , where XHT,i is a market
characteristic in host country i and X¯HT is the average of that market characteristic
across all applicable host markets of each sample cross-listed firm. We winsorize the
top and bottom 1% for information factor and trading cost.
10Because volume ratio is a [0,1] bounded variable which violates OLS assumption, we apply the
logistically transformation Y=log(Volume ratio/(1-Volume ratio)) to reflect the bounded value to
the entire range of real numbers.
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3.3.1 Univariate regression analysis
To examine the impact of each firm- and market-level variable on trading volume
distribution, we run a regression analysis for each explanatory variable against the
logistically transformed dollar (share) volume ratio and report the results in Panel
A (B) of Table 3.4. The standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are
adjusted for clustering by firm and by year. Because the results in Panel A and Panel
B are very close, we focus our discussion on the results based on the models using
logistically transformed dollar volume ratio as the dependent variable (in Panel A).
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Table 3.4: Determinants of competitiveness in attracting trading volume – univariate regression analysis.
The table reports the univariate regression results by including only one independent variable in each regression model. The dependent variable is the logistic transformed
trading volume ratio. Panel A (B) reports the results of dollar (share) volume ratio as the dependent variable. All characteristic variables are mean-differenced series, which
are the difference between the value of each host market to the average value of its rival host markets, which is Xi − X¯, where Xi is the market factor for host country i, and
X¯ is the mean value of X across all rival host markets. Each column reports panel regression results across firm-years. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and
are adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and by year. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. * denotes statistical significance level at 1% or lower, ** denotes statistical
significance level between 1% and 5%, and *** denotes statistical significance level between 5% and 10%.
Panel A: Logistic transformed dollar volume ratio as the dependent variable
Info
factor
Trading
cost diff
Firm
age
diff
Mkt
Corr
Time
zone
diff
Anti-dir
-rights
diff
Anti-self
-dealing
diff
Disclose
diff
Fin
devlp
Econ
devlp
Mkt
turnover
Mkt Trd
value
English
Common
law
French
Civil
law
German
Civil
law
Scand.
Civil
law
Estimates 0.168∗ −50.264∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ −1.735∗∗ −1.318∗∗∗ 1.547∗∗∗ 4.622∗∗ 12.646∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ −1.567∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 2.553∗∗∗ −2.879∗∗∗ 0.240 −2.023
t-statistics (1.749) (−5.083) (7.420) (−2.515) (−3.458) (7.175) (2.651) (7.748) (5.994) (−2.218) (5.875) (7.651) (4.880) (−5.956) (0.493) (−0.987)
Obs 1,144 1,528 2,055 2,001 2,079 2,020 2,051 2,020 1,689 2,079 1,761 1,761 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079
Adj. R2 (%) 1.51 14.64 27.74 1.86 11.68 29.87 3.59 30.35 15.62 1.57 19.31 26.36 11.97 13.38 0.06 0.55
Panel B: Logistic transformed share volume ratio as the dependent variable
Info
factor
Trading
cost diff
Firm
age
diff
Mkt
Corr
Time
zone
diff
Anti-dir
-rights
diff
Anti-self
-dealing
diff
Disclose
diff
Fin
devlp
Econ
devlp
Mkt
turnover
Mkt Trd
value
English
Common
law
French
Civil
law
German
Civil
law
Scand.
Civil
law
Estimates 0.177 −60.549∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ −2.354∗∗ −1.694∗∗∗ 2.210∗∗∗ 7.785∗∗∗ 17.474∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ −1.810∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 3.640∗∗∗ −3.637∗∗∗ −0.235 −4.331∗
t-statistics (1.330) (−4.804) (9.189) (−2.739) (−3.008) (8.950) (3.440) (8.869) (5.910) (−3.025) (5.947) (8.808) (5.388) (−5.909) (−0.370) (−1.842)
Obs 1,144 1,528 2,055 2,001 2,079 2,020 2,051 2,020 1,689 2,079 1,761 1,761 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079
Adj. R2 (%) 1.02 13.59 33.86 2.18 12.43 38.51 6.54 36.64 17.32 1.35 20.22 29.88 15.67 13.75 0.03 1.63
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In line with our initial predictions, results show that additional price-relevant in-
formation contributed by a host market, which is measured by the information factor,
increases the share of trading volume executed on that host market. A host market
with a higher relative trading cost is shown to significantly decrease its proportion of
global trading volume. Higher market correlation between host and home market will
reduce the cross-listed trading in that host market compared to rival host markets.
Consistent with the arbitrage theory, investors prefer to trade shares in a market that
is less correlated with the domestic market in order to maximize the hedging benefit.
Geographic proximity, measured by host-home market time zone difference, can influ-
ence information flow between the host market and the home market and thus impact
the share of global volume executed on the host market. As expected, we observe
that farther distance in time zone between the host market and the home market
than irval host markets will reduce the volume retio of the host market. Better legal
protection for investors in a host market relative to rival host markets increases the
share of global trading volume in that host market, as evident from the highly sig-
nificant positive coefficients on anti-director rights index, anti-self-dealing index and
disclosure index. A more developed foreign market tend to attract more trading than
the less developed competing host market, evident from the positive coefficients on
financial development and negative coefficients on the developing economy dummy.
As we expected, a host market with more market depth and breadth is more com-
petitive in attracting foreign order flow, shown as the significant positive coefficients
of market turnover and market traded value.
Four legal origin indicators reveal some interesting findings as well. More shares
of foreign order flows traded on English common law host countries. Civil law host
countries are less competitive. The significant negative coefficient of French civil-law
shows that less foreign trading occurs in French civil-law countries. The estimated
coefficients on the German and Scandinavian civil law countries indicator show lack of
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statistical significance. Among all of the statistically significant variables, it is shown
that disclosure index (Adj. R2 30.35%), anti-director rights index (Adj. R2 29.87%),
firm age (Adj. R2 27.74%), market liquidity proxies (market turnover with Adj. R2
19.31% and market traded value with Adj. R2 26.36%), financial development (Adj.
R2 15.62%) and trading cost (Adj. R2 14.64%) have higher explanatory power in
determining the volume ratio. On the other hand, information factor, market corre-
lation, economic development and anti-self-dealing index have less power (Adj. R2
less than 5%) in explaining the volume distribution among competing host markets.
3.3.2 Multivariate regression analysis
We next examine the relative importance of market- and firm-level characteristics
in determining the distribution of trading volume by performing a series of panel
regressions. Table 3.5 presents the estimated coefficients from the two sets of pooled
OLS regressions. Models (1)-(4) present the baseline results from pooled OLS re-
gressions. The standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are adjusted for
clustering by firm and by year. Models (5)-(8) apply pooled OLS with firm and
year two way cluster and home country fixed effects, allowing for the possibility of
time-invariant differences in investment levels among domestic countries.
To avoid the issue of multicollinearity, we first group independent variables into
categories, such as legal protection and stock market liquidity, and then we include
highly correlated independent variables, identified in Panel B of Table 3.3, from each
category one at a time. Except for market correlation and legal origin indicators,
all independent variables are mean-differenced by subtracting the mean across all
applicable host markets from the respective market characteristic variable in each
host market (i.e., XHT,i−X¯HT , where X is a market characteristic). The information
factor, trading cost, stock market turnover, stock market traded value and financial
development are lagged by one period to control for any potential correlation between
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those variables and volume ratios in the same year (See, for example, Baruch et al.,
2007; Halling et al., 2008). The number of observations in each model varies due to
data availability. Panels A and B report the regression results using two measures
of volume ratio. For the purpose of brevity, our discussion will focus on the results
reported in Panel A, which is based on the dollar volume ratio.
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Table 3.5: Determinants of trading volume distribution among rival host markets.
This table reports the regression results on the impacts of firm and market characteristics in determining the trading volume distribution among rival host markets. The dependent
variable is the logistic transformed trading volume ratio. Panel A (B) reports the regression estimation results when the dependent variable is the logistic transformation of
dollar (share) volume ratio. Information factor and trading cost are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. All market characteristic variables are mean-differenced series. The
information factor, trading cost, stock market turnover, stock market traded value and financial development are lagged by one period. Each column reports panel regression
results across firm-years with/ without domestic county fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are adjusted for clustering by firm and by year. R2
is adjusted for degrees of freedom. * denotes statistical significance level at 1% or lower, ** denotes statistical significance level between 1% and 5%, and *** denotes statistical
significance level between 5% and 10%.
Panel A: Logistic transformation of dollar volume ratio as the dependent variable
OLS Fixed Effects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm level characteristics
Info factor dif (T-1) 0.019 −0.023 0.012 −0.027 0.045 0.028 0.033 0.001
(0.204) (−0.214) (0.187) (−0.378) (0.526) (0.301) (0.570) (0.024)
Trading cost dif (T-1) −19.702∗∗ −20.767∗∗ −21.852∗∗ −19.708∗∗ −16.712∗∗ −17.975∗∗ −20.707∗∗ −17.204∗
(−2.380) (−2.627) (−2.680) (−2.323) (−2.312) (−2.308) (−2.674) (−2.092)
Firm age dif 0.228∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(3.630) (3.234) (3.644) (3.096) (4.103) (4.118) (4.596) (4.193)
Legal protection
Anti-director-rights index dif 0.893∗∗ 1.035∗∗∗
(2.790) (3.628)
Anti-self-dealing index dif 5.695∗∗∗ 5.712∗∗
(3.148) (2.885)
Disclosure index dif 11.978∗∗∗ 12.477∗∗∗
(5.039) (5.890)
Stock market liquidity
Stk mkt turnover dif (T-1) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(4.132) (3.712)
Stk mkt traded value dif (T-1) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(4.385) (4.092)
Host country development
Fin development dif (T-1) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(4.730) (4.781) (5.884) (4.898)
Econ development (HT) 0.393 1.309 1.156 1.898
(0.289) (1.064) (0.935) (1.440)
Distance and correlation
Market corr (HM vs HT) −1.247 −0.642 −1.249 −0.252
(−1.308) (−0.724) (−1.512) (−0.338)
Time zone dif (HM vs HT) −0.777 −0.226 −0.477 −0.033
(−1.545) (−0.453) (−1.275) (−0.089)
Legal orgin
English common law origin 2.201∗∗∗ 3.304∗∗∗
(4.009) (3.352)
French civil law origin −2.365∗∗∗ −2.300∗∗∗
(−3.709) (−2.979)
Intercept −0.741 −0.331 0.719∗ −0.411∗∗ −0.291 −0.310 0.803 −0.377∗∗
(−1.103) (−1.591) (2.028) (−2.124) (−0.557) (−1.609) (1.378) (−2.269)
Home country fixed-effects? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of company years 699 695 736 817 699 695 736 817
Adj. R2 53.09 53.95 56.51 53.10 61.20 60.02 62.14 59.98
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Table 3.5 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Logistic transformation of share volume ratio as the dependent variable
OLS Fixed Effects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm level characteristics
Info factor dif (T-1) −0.063 −0.096 −0.030 −0.090 −0.037 −0.038 −0.009 −0.059
(−0.853) (−1.326) (−0.435) (−1.488) (−0.503) (−0.551) (−0.146) (−1.170)
Trading cost dif (T-1) −20.548∗∗ −20.348∗∗ −21.968∗∗ −18.846∗∗ −17.312∗∗ −16.963∗ −21.139∗∗ −15.761∗
(−2.295) (−2.412) (−2.525) (−2.141) (−2.207) (−2.007) (−2.514) (−1.835)
Firm age dif 0.374∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
(4.997) (4.475) (4.621) (4.271) (5.843) (5.643) (5.694) (5.603)
Legal protection
Anti-director-rights index dif 1.344∗∗∗ 1.526∗∗∗
(3.079) (4.098)
Anti-self-dealing index dif 8.418∗∗∗ 8.294∗∗∗
(4.058) (3.637)
Disclosure index dif 16.239∗∗∗ 16.890∗∗∗
(5.110) (6.033)
Stock market liquidity
Stk mkt turnover dif (T-1) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(3.796) (3.244)
Stk mkt traded value dif (T-1) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(7.513) (6.688)
Host country development
Fin development dif (T-1) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(4.589) (4.526) (5.220) (4.668)
Econ development (HT) 0.190 1.214 1.290 1.982∗
(0.204) (1.407) (1.321) (1.872)
Distance and correlation
Market corr (HM vs HT) −0.876 −0.509 −0.754 0.295
(−0.774) (−0.529) (−0.757) (0.386)
Time zone dif (HM vs HT) −0.587 0.036 −0.217 0.263
(−0.735) (0.046) (−0.363) (0.417)
Legal origin
English common law origin 2.901∗∗∗ 4.482∗∗∗
(4.526) (4.079)
French civil law origin −2.239∗∗ −2.033∗∗
(−2.880) (−2.181)
Intercept −1.241 −0.326 0.591 −0.427∗ −0.679 −0.248 0.441 −0.369∗
(−1.527) (−1.437) (1.376) (−1.932) (−1.077) (−1.256) (0.618) (−2.047)
Home country fixed-effects? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of company years 699 695 736 817 699 695 736 817
Adj. R2 59.87 60.82 62.99 58.57 68.12 66.86 68.32 64.78
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The regression results show that two firm-level variables and four categories of
market-level variables have a robust impact on the competitiveness of a host mar-
ket in attracting trading volume from rival host market(s): trading cost, firm age,
legal protection, stock market liquidity, financial development and legal origin. The
estimated coefficients on trading cost are all negative and statistically significant at
conventional levels, which indicates that higher trading cost in a host market than its
competing host markets drives down its relative trading volume ratio. Our findings
are qualitatively similar to the negative impact of trading costs on trading volume
documented in Barclay et al. (1998), Pagano et al. (2001), and Wang and Zhou
(2014), although in a different setting.
Firm age proxies for firm visibility. Investors are more confident in trading shares
of a more visible firm. Wang and Zhou (2014) documents that firms with higher
visibility in the host market account for greater proportion of trading executed in the
host market. We find similar evidence to support the firm visibility theory. A host
market in which a firm has a longer listing history tends to account for a higher trading
volume ratio of all trading executed outside of the home market. Taking Model (5) as
an example, if a cross-listed firm has one year longer history on the host market than
the average of rival host markets, the volume ratio of that host market will increase
from 50% (= exp(0)/(exp(0) + 1)) to 55.6% (= exp(0.227)/(exp(0.227) + 1)).
Legal protection for investors is crucial to their decision on trading location. The
estimated coefficients on difference in anti-director rights index, anti-self-dealing index
and disclosure index are all positive and statistically significant at conventional levels.
Investors are more likely to trade in a host market that offers a higher degree of legal
protection. The impact of mean-differenced legal protection variables is sizable, too.
Using Models (6)-(8) as examples, holding other factors constant, one unit higher
in anti-director rights index of the host market than the average value of all host
markets increases the trading volume ratio of the host market volume from 50%
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(= exp(0)/(exp(0) + 1) to 73.8% (= exp(1.035)/(exp(1.035) + 1)). One unit higher in
anti-self dealing index and disclosure index than the average across all host markets
results in a 50 percentage point increase in the trading volume ratio.
The estimated coefficients on stock market liquidity are consistently positive and
statistically significant at 1%, which suggests that host markets that provide more
liquidity attract a higher trading volume than rival host markets. Investors prefer to
place orders in a market with depth and breadth. Using the coefficient estimates in
Models (5) and (7) as examples, if the market turnover (or market traded value) of
a host market is one unit higher than the average values across all host markets, its
trading volume ratio increases from 50% to 50.3% (= exp(0.011)/(exp(0.011) + 1)).
Consistent with the findings reported in Table 3.4, legal origin also has signifi-
cant impact on trading volume ratio. English common law host countries attract a
significantly higher volume ratio than rival host markets, and French civil-law host
countries are less competitive.
The estimated coefficients on the information factor, time zone difference, market
correlation and economic development exhibit the expected signs but are generally
statistically insignificant. These findings are different than those reported in Wang
and Zhou (2014), which shows that the four variables are important in explaining the
domestic versus foreign market trading volume distribution. Information factor, time
zone and market correlation can be classified as information-based variables, which
affect information flow between the host market and the home market. Our results
show that although information-based explanation is critical in explaining the host
market volume ratio competing with the counterpart domestic market, it has limited
power in determining the competitiveness among the competing host markets.
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3.4 Robustness checks
3.4.1 Alternative dependent variables transformation
We use logarithm transformation of trading volume ratio as a dependent variable
to re-run the analysis of volume distribution among rival host markets. The regression
results are reported in Table 3.6. Models (1)-(8) utilize the same model specification
and variable construction as in Table 3.5.
Estimation results continue to provide strong evidence of the importance of firm-
and market-level characteristics in determining the distribution of order flows across
host markets. Most results confirm what we found previously in Table 3.5. Host mar-
kets with lower trading cost attract more volume from competing host markets. Firm
age, legal protection, liquidity variables and financial development are statistically
significant, which confirms that more developed financial markets where firms have a
longer listing history, better legal protection and higher liquidity attract higher vol-
ume ratio than rival host markets. The market correlation coefficients are negative
and statistically significant, which confirms the arbitrage hypothesis that investors
prefer to trade in a market that is less correlated with the home market in order to
reap a higher hedging benefit.
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Table 3.6: Determinants of trading volume distribution among rival host markets – logarithm transformation.
To check the robustness of the regression results reported in Table 3.5, we re-estimate the regression models using logarithm transformed volume ratio as the dependent
variables. Model specification and variable construction are similar to those in Table 3.5. Panel A (B) reports the estimation results when logarithm transformed dollar (share)
volume ratio. * denotes statistical significance level at 1% or lower, ** denotes statistical significance level between 1% and 5%, and *** denotes statistical significance level
between 5% and 10%.
Panel A: Logarithm transformed dollar volume ratio as the dependent variable
OLS Fixed Effects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm level characteristics
Info factor dif (T-1) 0.024 −0.023 0.014 −0.021 0.038 0.018 0.017 −0.002
(0.518) (−0.442) (0.415) (−0.555) (0.891) (0.406) (0.442) (−0.053)
Trading cost dif (T-1) −10.657∗ −11.374∗ −10.939∗ −12.355∗ −9.320∗ −10.474∗ −11.257∗∗ −10.835∗
(−1.910) (−1.927) (−1.980) (−1.842) (−2.021) (−2.085) (−2.311) (−1.954)
Firm age dif 0.123∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(2.941) (2.665) (2.905) (2.513) (4.072) (3.967) (4.503) (3.950)
Legal protection
Anti-director-rights index dif 0.450∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗
(2.431) (3.695)
Anti-self-dealing index dif 2.650∗∗ 2.490∗∗
(2.878) (2.519)
Disclosure index dif 6.435∗∗∗ 6.462∗∗∗
(5.043) (6.698)
Stock market liquidity
Stk mkt turnover dif (T-1) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(3.732) (3.576)
Stk mkt traded value dif (T-1) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(3.153) (2.995)
Host country development
Fin development dif (T-1) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(4.690) (4.556) (6.137) (5.271)
Econ development (HT) 0.385 0.744 1.074 1.461
(0.493) (0.959) (1.309) (1.678)
Distance and correlation
Market corr (HM vs HT) −2.470∗∗∗ −2.090∗∗∗ −1.449∗∗ −0.981
(−4.497) (−3.625) (−2.327) (−1.443)
Time zone dif (HM vs HT) −0.438 −0.082 −0.297 −0.014
(−1.424) (−0.287) (−1.611) (−0.078)
Legal orgin
English common law origin 0.648∗ 1.301∗∗
(1.769) (2.336)
French civil law origin −1.137∗∗ −1.194∗∗
(−2.422) (−2.193)
Intercept −0.871∗ −1.798∗∗∗ −0.353 −1.846∗∗∗ −0.931∗∗ −1.401∗∗∗ −0.384 −1.449∗∗∗
(−2.041) (−8.095) (−1.331) (−8.722) (−2.616) (−6.315) (−1.072) (−6.831)
Home country fixed-effects? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of company years 699 695 736 817 699 695 736 817
Adj. R2 42.99 41.18 47.16 40.51 57.72 57.74 59.94 57.40
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Table 3.6 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Logarithm transformed share volume ratio as the dependent variable
OLS Fixed Effects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm level characteristics
Info factor dif (T-1) 0.005 −0.043 0.003 −0.047 0.020 0.010 0.007 −0.022
(0.099) (−0.920) (0.058) (−1.245) (0.398) (0.220) (0.131) (−0.513)
Trading cost dif (T-1) −11.902∗ −11.443 −10.753 −12.813 −9.455∗ −9.662 −10.825∗ −10.047
(−1.760) (−1.605) (−1.684) (−1.603) (−1.750) (−1.698) (−1.985) (−1.607)
Firm age dif 0.194∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(3.729) (3.541) (3.545) (3.425) (5.921) (5.520) (5.945) (5.433)
Legal protection
Anti-director-rights index dif 0.609∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗
(2.451) (3.982)
Anti-self-dealing index dif 3.867∗∗∗ 3.600∗∗∗
(3.698) (3.214)
Disclosure index dif 8.069∗∗∗ 8.228∗∗∗
(4.787) (6.505)
Stock market liquidity
Stk mkt turnover dif (T-1) 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(3.341) (3.063)
Stk mkt traded value dif (T-1) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(5.033) (4.631)
Host country development
Fin development dif (T-1) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(4.364) (4.296) (5.312) (4.870)
Econ development (HT) 0.979 1.174 1.880∗∗ 2.088∗∗
(1.453) (1.710) (2.618) (2.788)
Distance and correlation
Market corr (HM vs HT) −2.589∗∗∗ −2.439∗∗∗ −1.381 −0.867
(−3.703) (−3.780) (−1.650) (−1.063)
Time zone dif (HM vs HT) −0.381 0.022 −0.178 0.115
(−0.811) (0.050) (−0.584) (0.367)
Legal origin
English common law origin 0.635 1.784∗∗∗
(1.363) (2.928)
French civil law origin −0.769 −0.937
(−1.413) (−1.495)
Intercept −1.188∗ −2.158∗∗∗ −0.699∗ −2.245∗∗∗ −1.184∗∗ −1.541∗∗∗ −0.718 −1.632∗∗∗
(−2.081) (−7.773) (−1.913) (−8.397) (−2.515) (−5.563) (−1.586) (−5.820)
Home country fixed-effects? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of company years 699 695 736 817 699 695 736 817
Adj. R2 42.87 43.59 48.24 42.93 60.10 60.85 62.98 59.57
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Similar to Table 3.5, the estimated coefficients on information factor, economic
development and time zone continue to be statistically insignificant across all model
specifications. However, the coefficients on market correlation are all negative and
mostly statistically significant.
3.4.2 Excluding firms cross-listed in the U.S.
Based on the summary statistics reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the U.S. leads
other host markets in attracting order flows from foreign firms and accounts for about
27% of global cross-listings. When a firm simultaneously lists in the U.S. and another
host market, the Unite States on average attracts about 70.48% of a firm’s total
foreign trading volume. One potential concern is that the results presented in Tables
3.5 and 3.6 are dominated by firms that cross-list in the U.S. To alleviate this concern,
we test the robustness of our main results by excluding firms that cross-listed in the
U.S. and reestimate the regression models reported in Table 3.5. The estimated
coefficients are reported in Table 3.7. Again, we report results on two measures of
volume ratio (dollar volume ratio and number of shares volume ratio) separately in
Panels A and B. We also apply logistic transformation to the volume ratio.
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Table 3.7: Determinants of trading volume distribution among rival host markets – subsample analysis.
As a cross-listing destination, the U.S. accounts for 27% of the sample of cross-listings with multiple host markets. To check the robustness of the results reported in Table 3.5, we
re-estimate the regression models by excluding firms that cross-list in the U.S. Model specification and variable construction are consistent with Table 3.5. Panel A (B) reports
the results of logistic transformed dollar (share) volume ratio. Each column reports panel regression results across firm-years with and without home county fixed effects. Standard
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are adjusted for clustering by firm and by year. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. * denotes statistical significance level at 1%
or lower, ** denotes statistical significance level between 1% and 5%, and *** denotes statistical significance level between 5% and 10%.
Panel A: Logistic transformation of dollar volume ratio as the dependent variable
OLS Fixed Effects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm level characteristics
Info factor dif (T-1) 0.104 0.029 0.074 0.028 0.166∗∗ 0.124 0.097 0.102∗
(1.250) (0.282) (1.202) (0.449) (2.246) (1.354) (1.520) (2.077)
Trading cost dif (T-1) −12.286∗ −17.851∗∗ −14.131∗∗ −17.304∗ −9.242∗ −14.782∗∗ −11.859∗∗ −13.857∗
(−2.013) (−2.360) (−2.418) (−2.070) (−2.026) (−2.256) (−2.439) (−2.092)
Firm age dif 0.200∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(3.204) (3.378) (2.794) (2.890) (3.866) (4.200) (3.656) (3.673)
Legal protection
Anti-director-rights index dif 0.743∗∗ 0.465∗∗
(2.431) (2.791)
Anti-self-dealing index dif 3.452∗∗ 0.813
(2.218) (0.498)
Disclosure index dif 10.145∗∗∗ 6.674∗∗∗
(5.108) (6.239)
Stock market liquidity
Stk mkt turnover dif (T-1) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(4.025) (5.433)
Stk mkt traded value dif (T-1) 0.008∗∗ 0.005∗
(2.376) (1.823)
Host country development
Fin development dif (T-1) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(2.992) (4.419) (2.737) (4.050)
Econ development (HT) 0.617 1.010 1.591 1.422
(0.474) (0.852) (1.188) (0.998)
Distance and correlation
Market corr (HM vs HT) −3.764∗∗∗ −2.689∗∗∗ −1.907∗∗ −1.473∗
(−4.435) (−3.185) (−2.244) (−1.918)
Time zone dif (HM vs HT) −0.783 −0.300 −1.288∗∗∗ −1.242∗∗∗
(−1.304) (−0.499) (−4.180) (−4.188)
Legal origin
English common law origin 1.930∗∗∗ 1.271
(3.421) (1.574)
French civil law origin −1.859∗∗ −1.565∗∗
(−2.555) (−2.192)
Intercept 0.613 −0.500∗ 1.178∗∗ −0.583∗∗ 0.316 −0.261 0.854 −0.304
(1.320) (−2.065) (2.400) (−2.368) (0.723) (−1.304) (1.558) (−1.634)
Home country fixed-effects? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of company years 574 570 611 662 574 570 611 662
Adj. R2 46.12 39.14 47.87 36.49 67.62 66.90 66.29 66.87
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Table 3.7 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Logistic transformation of number of shares volume ratio as the dependent variable
OLS Fixed Effects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm level characteristics
Info factor dif (T-1) 0.037 −0.035 0.041 −0.023 0.146∗∗ 0.099 0.095 0.080∗
(0.582) (−0.489) (0.669) (−0.437) (2.337) (1.345) (1.462) (1.968)
Trading cost dif (T-1) −12.355∗ −17.333∗∗ −13.385∗ −17.115∗ −8.820 −15.357∗∗ −11.734∗ −14.560∗
(−1.844) (−2.155) (−2.092) (−1.861) (−1.694) (−2.164) (−2.045) (−1.954)
Firm age dif 0.316∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
(3.907) (4.335) (3.357) (3.713) (4.142) (4.670) (3.780) (4.277)
Legal protection
Anti-director-rights index dif 1.017∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(2.557) (3.644)
Anti-self-dealing index dif 5.830∗∗∗ 1.667
(3.203) (0.904)
Disclosure index dif 12.659∗∗∗ 7.627∗∗∗
(4.862) (6.583)
Stock market liquidity
Stk mkt turnover dif (T-1) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(3.096) (6.653)
Stk mkt traded value dif (T-1) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(4.136) (2.619)
Host country development
Fin development dif (T-1) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(3.635) (4.395) (2.587) (4.148)
Econ development (HT) 0.612 0.962 1.855∗ 1.425
(0.745) (1.166) (1.844) (1.222)
Distance and correlation
Market corr (HM vs HT) −4.199∗∗∗ −2.883∗∗∗ −1.830∗ −1.366
(−4.195) (−2.976) (−1.916) (−1.649)
Time zone dif (HM vs HT) −0.597 −0.063 −1.856∗∗∗ −1.944∗∗∗
(−0.641) (−0.067) (−5.688) (−5.568)
Legal origin
English common law origin 2.377∗∗∗ 1.653∗∗
(3.685) (2.174)
French civil law origin −1.520∗ −1.183
(−1.761) (−1.547)
Intercept 0.470 −0.709∗∗ 0.943 −0.825∗∗ 0.138 −0.240 0.484 −0.287
(0.799) (−2.575) (1.406) (−2.785) (0.286) (−1.106) (0.779) (−1.398)
Home country fixed-effects? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of company years 574 570 611 662 574 570 611 662
Adj. R2 49.29 43.63 51.38 39.69 75.37 77.48 72.85 77.34
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Overall, the results are consistent with our previous findings that host markets
with lower trading cost, stronger investor protection, higher market liquidity and less
correlation with their domestic market grab a greater proportion of trading volume
from their rival host markets. In addition, the English common law host market with
better developed financial market, where the foreign firms listed for a longer history
have greater proportion of foreign trading. However, we also document some results
that were not present in Table 3.5. The positive estimated coefficients from Models
(5) and (8) on the information factor indicate that a host market that provides price
information attracts a greater proportion of foreign trading. Estimated coefficients on
time zone difference are negative and significant in Models (6) and (8), which supports
the information flow hypothesis that a host market attracts more order flows if it is
located closer to the home market. Market correlation coefficients are consistently
negative and significant in three out of four models. Economic development is positive
and statistically significant in Model (6). These two variables together provide the
support for the arbitrage theory that investors prefer to place orders in developing
markets and markets with less correlation to firm origination in order to diversify
their global portfolio.
3.5 Conclusion
In this study, we attempt to fill the gap in the literature by examining the distri-
bution of order flow among rival host markets for multi-market cross-listed shares and
evaluating the relative importance of firm- and market-level characteristic variables
in determining such distribution. We construct a comprehensive dataset of global
cross-listed stocks directly from Datastream, which consists of 1, 118 global cross-
listings from 61 home (domestic) countries, listed in 50 host (foreign) countries over
the period 1990-2012. Among 1, 118 sample cross-listings, there are 304 listings with
multiple host markets.
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We present the cross-sectional and chronological distribution of global cross-listings
and trading volume. We document that the U.S. is not only the largest host market
in attracting foreign listings but is also the most competitive market in attracting
trading volume from other foreign markets. The U.S. market continues to lead all
global markets during and after the 2002 dot-com bubble crisis and the 2008 financial
crisis. Several host markets, such as the U.K. and Hong Kong, also developed as
popular trading venues for foreign firms.
We provide robust evidence that host markets are more successful in attracting
trading volume from competing markets when they have lower bid-ask spreads, better
legal protection, more market liquidity, a higher level of financial development and
firms with a longer listing history. Interestingly, we consistently find that host coun-
tries with English common law origins are able to attract trading volume while French
civil-law origin host countries attract less trading activity. Additionally, companies
prefer to trade in a host market that provides more stock price information, less
stock price correlation with its home market and closer proximity in time zone to its
home market; however, these factors become secondary in importance in determining
market competitiveness.
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CHAPTER IV
Essay III. Price discovery process in the
multi-market trading
International cross-listings activities provide a natural laboratory to study the law
of one price (Lamont and Thaler , 2003). It is common to observe that the price of
cross-listed share differs from the price of its domestic share. Many previous studies
documented the significant amount of price disparity. For example, Froot and Dabora
(1999) found a large deviation from arbitrage parity by investigating the pricing of
two dual-listed companies, Royal Dutch & Shell, and Unilever N.V. & Unilever PLC.
Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) quantified sizable price deviations from the arbitrage-free
pricing between ADRs and their underlying assets. Suarez (2005) revealed that large
deviation from the law of one price is in presence in French ADR-underlying pairs.
Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) documented the arbitrage opportunities by comparing the
intraday prices and quotes of ADRs in the U.S. markets with synchronous prices of
their home market shares. Because the cross-listed firms’ shares in different markets
claim on the same underlying cash flows, we can expect that the stock prices of one
firm in different markets have some comovement trends and possibly achieve certain
equilibrium level in long run. This study is to examine the price discovery process of
non-U.S. cross-listings from 36 different origination countries and traded on the U.S.
stock exchanges.
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Considering the existence of the price disparity, the topic - “where the price discov-
ery takes place?” - has been widely discussed in previous literature since 1986, when
Schreiber and Schwartz (1986) claimed “Price discovery as the search for an equilib-
rium price is a key function of a stock exchange.”, but findings have never reached
the consistency. Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) suggested that price discovery should
mostly take place in the home market. Harris et al. (1995) applied synchronous trans-
actions data for IBM in the error correction model to investigate how each exchange
contributing to the price discovery process. They found that error-correcting price
adjustment took place on all three exchanges - the New York, Pacific and Midwest
Stock Exchanges. Hasbrouck (1995) developed an econometric approach based on
an implicit unobservable efficient price common to all markets based on a sample of
U.S. stocks in NYSE and regional exchanges. He found that price discovery occurred
primarily on the NYSE. Similar findings were revealed in Lee (1993) and Blume and
Goldstein (1991). Therefore, the New York Stock Exchange has been characterized as
information dominant and plays an important role in the price discovery process. Eun
and Sabherwal (2003) used 6 months intraday trading data to construct the linear
error correction model and studied the price discovery for 62 Canadian shares cross-
listed in the NYSE. They found that the stock prices on TSE and U.S. exchanges for
the same firm were mutually adjusting but the U.S. share of price discovery are sig-
nificantly larger than the Canada portion. The U.S. share are directly related to the
U.S. share of trading, informative trades and the bid-ask spreads. Similarly, Koumkwa
and Susmel (2008) investigated the convergence between the prices of ADRs and the
associated Mexican traded shares using non-linear convergence and arbitrage models
a sample of 21 dually listed shares. Grammig et al. (2005) used three German firms
and the intraday data in 6 months and found a significant feedback from the NYSE
to Frankfurt that the majority of the price discovery happened at home (Germany)
market.
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Most aforementioned studies used synchronous stock prices of a small number of
firms during a short time period to test the price discovery process so that their results
have some limitations. First, the results are regional and limited to certain economic
condition. Second, they are unable to test the market-/country- level determinant
factors of price discovery if their samples are listed to one country. Third, their
results are constrained by the degree of freedom when they explore the determinants
of price discovery. In this study, we examine 497 non-U.S. cross-listed common shares
from 36 different home countries listed in the U.S. markets of the NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ. We collect daily trading data from 1994 to 2011. In order to overcome the
obstacles of non-synchronous trading and time zone differences issues among global
markets, we collect stock exchanges trading hours, domestic stock market location
and time zone. We use the U.S. intraday mid-point of bid-ask prices to match with
the closing price of the same company’s stock in its domestic market. The long
term sample period enable us to capture the annual/quarterly firm-, market- and
country- level characteristics change. Accordingly, this study enable us not only to
observe where the price discovery occur globally, but also to test the determinants
of the price discovery process. To my knowledge, this is the first study to use long
term intraday data to examine the dynamic price discovery process in cross-listing
literature.
The objective of this study is first to document where the price discovery takes
place - domestic market versus the U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ).
To quantify the price discovery process, we construct error correction models for each
cross-listed firm in every quarter and document the “speed of adjustment” coefficients
for both the domestic and the U.S. share price. In order to construct the error
correction model, we first conduct the unit root test and the cointegration test for
the domestic share price, the U.S. share price, the associated home and U.S. stock
market index prices of every cross-listed firm. Within every quarter, we require that
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four price series of every sample firm are non-stationary and they are cointegrated
at order 1, which ensures the error correction representation. We further construct
the error correction model and extract the error correction term parameters alpha,
the speed of adjustment, to quantify the speed of price adjusting to the long run
equilibrium. We summarize the style fact of the price discovery by home market
and reveal where the error-correcting price adjustment takes place. We find that
when there is a price deviation from the equilibrium, the domestic and the U.S.
prices will mutually adjust to restore the equality. For most of our sample home
countries, the majority of the price discovery happened in the domestic markets.
On average, U.S. share price adjust toward the domestic prices significantly with
the speed of adjustment 0.700. On the other hand, we also observe a statistically
significant amount of price adjustment from domestic side to the U.S. share prices,
with the speed of adjustment −0.280, which confirms our expectation that as a host
market, U.S. markets also play an important role in price discovery mechanism.
The second objective of this study is to analyze the determining factors for the
U.S. relative contribution to the price discovery. We measure the U.S. relative con-
tribution to the price discovery as the domestic proportion of speed of adjustment,∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣ / (∣∣αUSi,t ∣∣+ ∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣). The idea is that if the U.S. trading has strong effect, the
U.S. price will be dominant and the domestic share price will adjust toward the U.S.
prices. Therefore, larger ratio of
∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣ / (∣∣αUSi,t ∣∣+ ∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣) indicates more contribu-
tion from the U.S. market in price discovery process. We utilize the panel regression
method to investigate the determining factors and we find that a cross-listed firm
with a larger U.S. proportion of its total trading volume, more informative share
price provided in the U.S. market, longer listing history in the U.S. market, more liq-
uidity in the U.S. market than the domestic market, the domestic price adjust more
toward the U.S. price and the U.S. market contribute more in the price discovery.
In addition, comparing the counterpart domestic market, if the U.S. market provides
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more market depth and breath, better shareholder protection and financial informa-
tion disclosure enforcement, it will contribute more in the price discovery and the
proportion of domestic price adjustment will be higher. We also observe that larger
capitalization foreign firm from a lower economic growth home country usually has
higher domestic price adjustment toward the U.S. price.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.1 describes the sam-
pling process and documents the distribution of U.S. cross-listed foreign shares by
home markets and by year. Section 4.2 details the error correction model and docu-
ments the magnitude of price discovery across home and the U.S. markets. Section
4.3 explains the variable construction and their associated hypotheses about price
discovery process. Section 4.4 summaries the sample statistics of the variables in the
empirical analysis. Sections 4.5 discusses the regression method and our empirical
findings. Section 4.6 presents results on robustness checks. Section 4.7 concludes our
study.
4.1 Data and Sample
We start with the list of foreign stocks listed in the U.S. stock markets as of
November 2011. We identify American Depository Receipts (SHRCD=30 and 31)
and U.S. listed foreign firms (SHRCD=12) from the CRSP database. We also include
those companies shown as U.S. firm in CRSP (SHRCD of 10 or 11) but recorded as
incorporating in a foreign country in Compustat database (state=99). The original
list includes 917 foreign firms listed in the U.S. markets. Because this study focuses
on the exchange-listed ordinary shares, we excluded preferred shares, funds, warrants,
derivatives, indices due to the specific characteristics. For ADRs, we keep exchange
listed Level II and Level III ADRs while exclude the OTC issued level I ADRs, SEC
Regulation S shares and SEC Rule 144a issues. We also exclude firms originated from
tax havens, such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Jersey, or the Netherlands Antilles
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because those firms do not have operation in those registered “domestic” locations.
We collect the domestic daily stock price, daily volume, daily market index price1
and daily market capitalization from Datasteam and accordingly the sample stocks
without home market information in datastream are dropped from our sample. We
obtain the ADR bundle ratios from Worldscope and fill the missing ratios using the
ADR lists from Citi bank, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank and Bank of New York. We adjust
the domestic price by multiplying the ADR bundle ratio for those ADRs in our sample.
The U.S. markets trading data are collected from the NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ)
database, which includes cross-listings’ U.S. market intraday bid-ask price, intraday
bid-ask volume and bid-ask quotes for SP500 Depository Receipts (ticker: SPY) as
U.S. market index price. Following the sample construction method in Gagnon and
Karolyi (2010), when the home and the U.S. market are close at the same time, e.g.
Canada, we will use both the U.S. and home daily closing prices/volume series. When
home and the U.S. market are not synchronous, we use the midpoint of bid and ask
prices in the U.S. market for each cross-listed share observed at its domestic stock
exchange close time. When the price at that matched point of time is not available, we
take the first available midpoint quote in the U.S. market within 10 minutes after the
home market close. For those foreign markets which have completely non-overlapping
trading hours with the U.S. market, e.g. Hong Kong, we employ the first available
bid-ask quotes after the U.S. market open at the same date. We discard issues with
missing or invalid price, volume or market capitalization data over the sample period.
We filter the prices with errors, missing and zeros. Further more, we exclude closing
quotes flagged as odd lots, pre-open, or halted in Datastream and exclude the intraday
quotes flagged as closing quotes, trading halts, non-firm quotes, and pre-opening
indications in TAQ. Following the Eun and Sabherwal (2003)’s method, we require
sample cross-listings have non-zero trading volume in both the home and the U.S.
1We use datatype “LI” as associated local market price index for a given stock from Datastream
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markets on two consecutive days and we exclude those thinly traded stocks with
fewer than 2,000 trades in 6 months on either the home market or the U.S. market.
Because the U.S. high frequency data from TAQ starts from the beginning of 1993
and the records of SPY initiate from February 1, 1993. Our sample covers the U.S.
cross-listing historical data from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2011. After the
filtering process, our initial sample include 537 U.S. cross-listed foreign companies.
As we detailed later in Section 4.2, the purpose of this study is investigate the price
discovery process. We will require the pairs cross-listed stock home and U.S. price
series with valid “speed of adjustment” estimates from the U.S. and/or domestic
side(s). Our final model includes 497 U.S. cross-listed foreign companies with with
valid trading data in both domestic and the U.S. market as well as significant U.S.
and domestic “speed of adjustment” coefficients estimates.
Table 4.1 reports the sample description by home country (Panel A) and by year
(Panel B). The final sample includes 497 foreign common shares listed in the U.S.
markets from 36 domestic countries. 59 companies (11.87%) are domiciled in 11
developing countries and 438 (88.13%) are from 25 developed countries. Canada is
the largest issuer with 211 commons shares listed in the U.S. markets, which counts
for 42.45% of the sample. The U.K. and Israel is the second largest domestic country
with 35 cross-listings in the U.S. markets (7.04%), respectively, followed by Japan
(29), France (21). Panel B summarizes the number of U.S. cross-listings over time as
well as the annual growth rate from 1994 to 2011. With the enhanced globalization of
financial markets, the number of non-U.S. firms cross-listed in the U.S. markets had
been substantially increased over the sample period expect 2007-2009. Our sample
starts with 13 cross-listings in 1993 and keeps increasing to 326 in 2006. The peak
of the growth rate happened in the year of 1997 (72.22%) and kept at a high level
during 1998-2000 (1998: 41.94%, 1999: 47.73%, 2000: 58.46%). In 2001, the foreign
cross-listing programs still increased but the growth rate was down to 6.80%. After
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then, the growth of cross-listing programs back to the high levels in 2002 (54.44%)
but the growth rate decreasing over years, which mostly results from the development
of other global markets. Markets like Hong Kong and London become popular cross-
listing trading venues in last decades Wang and Zhou (2014). In 2007, the number of
foreign cross-listings suffered a large drop in 2007 (-6.75%) and kept decreasing after
2007. It drops from 326 cross-listings in 2006 to 281 in 2011. The drops in/after 2001
and 2007 can be explained by the doc come crisis (2000-2002) and financial crisis
(2008-2009). In addition, recent studies have revealed that small foreign firms with
low trading volume have been exited the U.S. market, because the bonding costs of
continued U.S. registration outweigh the benefits, especially after the passage of SOX
in 2007. (See, for example, Fernandes et al., 2010; Marosi and Massoud , 2008; Doidge
et al., 2010).
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Table 4.1: Distribution of U.S. cross-listings sample by domestic country and by year
In this table we present the distribution of 605 U.S. listed firms from 39 home markets. Panel A reports the cross sectional distribution of cross-listings
by home countries. Panel B reports distribution of sample U.S. cross-listings by year, grouped by year.
Panel A: By country Panel B: By year
Domestic Country Number Percent Year Number % Change
Argentina 7 1.41% 1994 13
Australia 13 2.62% 1995 13 0.00%
Austria 1 0.20% 1996 18 38.46%
Belgium 3 0.60% 1997 31 72.22%
Brazil 5 1.01% 1998 44 41.94%
Canada 211 42.45% 1999 65 47.73%
Chile 7 1.41% 2000 103 58.46%
China 10 2.01% 2001 110 6.80%
Denmark 1 0.20% 2002 170 54.55%
Finland 4 0.80% 2003 221 30.00%
France 21 4.23% 2004 271 22.62%
Germany 12 2.41% 2005 301 11.07%
Greece 3 0.60% 2006 326 8.31%
Hong Kong 6 1.21% 2007 304 −6.75%
Hungary 1 0.20% 2008 285 −6.25%
India 8 1.61% 2009 281 −1.40%
Indonesia 2 0.40% 2010 293 4.27%
Ireland 6 1.21% 2011 297 1.37%
Israel 35 7.04%
Italy 3 0.60%
Japan 29 5.84%
Korea 9 1.81%
Mexico 6 1.21%
Netherlands 14 2.82%
Norway 2 0.40%
Portugal 2 0.40%
Russia 5 1.01%
Singapore 2 0.40%
South Africa 7 1.41%
Spain 7 1.41%
Sweden 2 0.40%
Switzerland 10 2.01%
Taiwan 6 1.21%
Turkey 1 0.20%
United Kingdom 35 7.04%
Venezuela 1 0.20%
Total 497 100.00%
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4.2 Error correction and price discovery
Price discovery is the process by which stock markets attempt to identify perma-
nent changes in equilibrium transaction prices. In this section, we apply methods
of Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Johansen (1988) to construct the error correction
model using the cross-listed firm’s domestic share price, home market index, synchro-
nized U.S. share price and synchronized U.S. market index prices. Those four price
series of the same cross-listed company are matched at the same trading time fol-
lowing the method we described in Section 4.1. We retrieve the speed of adjustment
coefficients of the error correction models as the magnitude of price convergency. The
error correction equation is established for every cross-listed firm within each quarter
under two conditions: first, four price series associated with every cross-listed firm in
every quarter are integrated of order one, i.e. I(1), (see Section 4.2.1). Second, price
series of the same cross-listed firm are cointegrated, (see Section 4.2.2).
4.2.1 Unit root test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller test)
In this section, we determine the order of integration and the optimal lag length
for the equations of the trading price series. We perform the Dickey-Fuller unique root
test to check if the price series of the same firm are integrated of order one, denoted
as I(1), (see, Dickey and Fuller (1979)). More specifically, the domestic share price,
U.S. share price, domestic market index price and the U.S. market index price of the
same cross-listed firm are non-stationary but their changes are stationary. For every
price series xt within every sample quarter, we run the time series stationary test and
confirm that the level of price series is non-stationary. Then, we apply Augmented
Dickey-Fuller Test to construct the three regressions as below (see, equation 4.1,
equation 4.2 and equation 4.3), which test if the first difference of each price series
∆xt is concerned with the presence of a drift term and/or a linear time trend. We
expect that the null hypothesis of the absence of unit root cannot be rejected in all
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three equations, which means the first difference of the price series are stationary. We
use minimum Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz (1978)) to determine
the optimal p, which is the number of lag to be included in the model.
∆xt = δxt−1 +
p∑
i=1
φi∆xt−i + et (4.1)
∆xt = C0 + δxt−1 +
p∑
i=1
φi∆xt−i + et (4.2)
∆xt = C0 − δxt−1 + C1t+
p∑
i=1
φi∆xt−i + et (4.3)
We run equation 4.1 - 4.3 within every sample firm-quarter on four synchronized
series: the domestic price, the U.S. price, the domestic market index price and the
U.S. market index price. At 5% confident interval level, the null hypothesis of I(1)
cannot be rejected for 97% of the sample, which confirms that 524 (out of 537) sample
companies with 10,627 firm-quarter observations meet the requirement that all four
price series associated with each sample firm - the domestic and the U.S. share price as
well as the domestic and U.S. market index prices - are I(1) in that sample quarter.
One or two lags are indicated by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) in the
estimation of the VARs for different stocks.
4.2.2 Cointegration test
Within every firm-quarter, we test if four price series as a vector, P i,t =
(
PHMi,t , P
US
i,t , P
LI
i,t , P
SPY
i,t
)
of the same cross-listed firm i within quarter t are cointegrated with single cointegrat-
ing vector. They are cointegrated if we can find a vector βi,t =
(
βHMi,t , β
US
i,t , β
LI
i,t , β
SPY
i,t
)
such that β′i,t ∗ P i,t is stationary, I(0), on condition of that
(
PHMi,t , P
US
i,t , P
LI
i,t , P
SPY
i,t
)
are I(1). If we can find one vector βi,t to meet this requirement, then four prices
of each sample stock are cointegrated with single cointegrating vector, denoted as
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rank=1. If we find more than one cointegrating vectors βi,t, i.e. rank > 1, theoret-
ically we need to construct different vector autoregressive models and include all of
them as error correction terms in the error correction model for the same cross-listed
company. However, few firms in our sample cointegrate with rank higher than 1. We
will not address this issue in this study and simply exclude those special cases with
rank higher than 1.
Within every sample firm-quarter, we run Johansen cointegration test (See more
details at Johansen, 1988) on the four price series with the optimal lags p determined
by minimized Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). To determine the number of
cointegrating vectors, we conduct the trace test of equation 4.4 and equation 4.5.
The null hypothesis is that the number of cointegrating vectors is at most r and the
alternative is that the maximum number of vectors is (r + 1). We expect to reject
null hypothesis when r=0 and fail to reject null hypothesis when r=1. Using the
critical value of Johansen and Juselius (1990) at 5% confident interval level, we find
that 95.23% (499 out of 524) sample cross-listed companies having four price series
cointegrated within a quarter with a single cointegrating vector, resulting in 8,685
firm-quarters observations.
λtrace(r) = −T
n∑
i=t+1
ln(1 + λˆt) (4.4)
λtrace(r, r + 1) = −T ln(1− λt+1) (4.5)
4.2.3 Error correction model
Using the sample of 499 cross-listed stocks which meet the requirement that one
cointegrating vector can be found for the four price series of the same cross-listing firm
by quarter, we establish the error correction model by firm-quarter and obtain the
long-run price equilibrium term and the speed of adjustment for every firm - quarter.
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Our method is in line with Harris et al. (1995), Harris et al. (2002) and Eun and
Sabherwal (2003). For each sample stock i in every quarter, we estimate the Error
Correction Models of equation 4.6 and equation 4.7. The optimal lag p is determined
by lowest BIC as one or two for our sample firms and set uniformly across equation 4.6
and equation 4.7. As we describe in section 4.2.2, we use Johansen methodology to es-
timate the cointegrating vector βi,t =
(
βHMi,t , β
US
i,t , β
LI
i,t , β
SPY
i,t
)
for each sample firm by
quarter. We normalize the estimates by setting βHM equals to 1 and the cointegrating
vector in the Error Correction Model is βi,t =
(
1, βUSi,t , β
LI
i,t , β
SPY
i,t
)
. Accordingly, the
long run equilibrium can be calculated by
(
PHMt−1 + β
USPUSt−1 + β
LIPLIt−1 + β
SPY P SPYt−1
)
.
The focuses of this study are coefficients αHMi,t and α
US
i,t , representing the extent to
which the price series respond to the deviation from the equilibrium relationship. We
document the “speed of adjustment” from both the domestic side (αHMi,t ) and the
U.S. side of trading (αUSi,t ) respectively. The summary of the error correction model
estimates are shown in Table 4.2.
∆PHMi,t = a
HM
i,t + α
HM
i,t
(
PHMt−1 + β
USPUSt−1 + β
LIPLIt−1 + β
SPY P SPYt−1
)
+
p∑
j=1
γj∆P
HM
t−j +
p∑
j=1
δj∆P
US
t−j +
p∑
j=1
νj∆P
LI
t−j +
p∑
j=1
ζj∆P
SPY
t−j + 
HM
i,t (4.6)
∆PUSi,t = a
US
i,t + α
US
i,t
(
PHMt−1 + β
USPUSt−1 + β
LIPLIt−1 + β
SPY P SPYt−1
)
+
p∑
j=1
γj∆P
HM
t−j +
p∑
j=1
δj∆P
US
t−j +
p∑
j=1
νj∆P
LI
t−j +
p∑
j=1
ζj∆P
SPY
t−j + 
US
i,t (4.7)
Our main interests of price discovery proxies are αUSi,t and α
HM
i,t . Domestic market
is the foreign firms’ origination, we expect the U.S. share price adjust to the domes-
tic share price. On the other hand, as claimed in many previous studies, the U.S.
market is the information dominant, the largest global trading venue and leading
financial center. We can also expect that the domestic share prices of cross-listed
firms to response to the U.S. share price. Our hypothesis is that both the firm’s
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domestic share price PHMi,t and its U.S. share price P
US
i,t response to the short-term
departure from the price equilibrium and the gap of domestic and U.S. prices could
reduce quickly, which is the price discovery process. Both domestic stock markets
and the U.S. markets will contribute to the price discovery process. In most cases,
αUSi,t and α
HM
i,t have opposite signs. For one cross-listed stock, if the domestic price
is higher than the U.S. price at time t-1, we expect to observe that PHMi,t decrease
while PUSi,t increases to adjust toward the equilibrium. Accordingly, we expect α
HM
i,t
to be negative and αHMi,t to be positive. If its domestic share price is cheaper than the
U.S. price at time t, the relationship would be opposite. A less likely possibility is
that both PUSi,t and P
HM
i,t increase (decrease) but one increases (decreases) much more
than the other share price till they achieve the equilibrium. The larger of the absolute
value of α is, the faster that share price would adjust to the equilibrium. It takes
(Departure from price equality(D))/|α| days2 for the respective share price to con-
verge to the long run equilibrium. Accordingly,
∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣ proxies the speed of domestic
price adjusts to the U.S. price and
∣∣αUSi,t ∣∣ proxies the U.S. share price converge toward
the domestic share price. To put it another way, after one day of price movement,
the domestic share price will adjust to the U.S. share price by
∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣ dollar amount
and the U.S. share price will move toward the domestic share price by
∣∣αUSi,t ∣∣ dollar
amount.
2We use daily data to run the Error Correct Models, so the unit is “day”.
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Table 4.2: Error correction models: estimated values of α
We estimate the error correction model (Equations 4.6 and 4.7) for each cross-listing firm within every quarter. This table reports the mean of the
estimated |αHMi,t | and |αUSi,t | by home country.
All Sample firms NYSE/AMEX NASDQA
No. of firms Firm-quarter Obs. αUS αHM αUS αHM αUS αHM
Argentina 7 131 0.594 −0.322 0.608 −0.334 0.551 −0.340
Australia 13 159 0.559 −0.324 0.609 −0.328 0.563 −0.315
Austria 1 11 0.871 −0.086 0.871 −0.086
Belgium 3 42 0.784 −0.194 0.795 −0.175 1.186 0.063
Brazil 5 25 0.349 −0.515 0.266 −0.543
Canada 211 3466 0.735 −0.293 0.703 −0.336 0.678 −0.349
Chile 7 103 0.525 −0.400 0.530 −0.400
China 10 44 0.319 −0.074 0.333 −0.071
Denmark 1 12 0.367 −0.660 0.367 −0.660
Finland 4 77 0.727 −0.332 0.708 −0.334 1.076 −0.303
France 21 336 0.761 −0.198 0.748 −0.222 0.811 −0.108
Germany 12 260 0.483 −0.486 0.507 −0.470 0.252 −0.687
Greece 3 68 0.808 −0.101 0.808 −0.101
Hong Kong 6 150 0.661 −0.295 0.684 −0.296 0.575 −0.290
Hungary 1 30 0.697 −0.219 0.697 −0.219
India 8 96 0.688 −0.118 0.699 −0.094
Indonesia 2 51 0.616 −0.288 0.616 −0.288
Ireland 6 64 0.409 −0.559 0.568 −0.468 0.124 −0.720
Israel 35 542 0.894 −0.042 1.081 −0.022 0.884 −0.037
Italy 3 66 0.736 −0.251 0.736 −0.251
Japan 29 571 0.672 −0.276 0.679 −0.270 0.656 −0.291
Korea 9 190 0.679 −0.175 0.689 −0.176 0.180 −0.133
Mexico 6 120 0.684 −0.315 0.680 −0.326
Netherlands 14 256 0.430 −0.540 0.493 −0.475 0.352 −0.622
Norway 2 35 0.530 −0.482 0.510 −0.498 0.742 −0.310
Portugal 2 45 0.564 −0.350 0.564 −0.350
Russia 5 53 0.796 −0.096 0.857 −0.085
Singapore 2 43 0.924 −0.177 0.924 −0.177
South Africa 7 131 0.511 −0.470 0.488 −0.506 0.762 −0.074
Spain 7 138 0.744 −0.190 0.763 −0.169 0.529 −0.431
Sweden 2 18 0.622 −0.397 0.622 −0.397
Switzerland 10 149 0.684 −0.295 0.668 −0.313 0.832 −0.135
Taiwan 6 98 0.776 −0.203 0.785 −0.225 0.754 −0.146
Turkey 1 18 0.821 −0.181 0.821 −0.181
United Kingdom 35 734 0.719 −0.261 0.751 −0.242 0.583 −0.345
Venezuela 1 12 0.288 −0.733 0.288 −0.733
Total 497 8344 0.700 −0.280 0.681 −0.301 0.689 −0.282
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The results in Table 4.2 summarizes the coefficients estimates of speed of adjust-
ment (SOA). As we expected,
∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣ and ∣∣αUSi,t ∣∣ have opposite signs. In most cases
across 36 domestic countries, the estimated values of
∣∣αHMi ∣∣ are negative and ∣∣αUSi ∣∣
are positive3. We exclude 2 firms with insignificant ECM model estimates and in-
flated SOA coefficients. The sample of 497 cross-listed firms with 8,360 firm-quarter
observations are statistically significant. This reveals that the U.S. share price re-
sponds to deviations from the cross-listed firms’ domestic share price. On the other
hand, the domestic market provides some feedback and adjusts to the U.S. share
price as well. This finding is consistent with the evidence from Eun and Sabherwal
(2003) that both Canadian (home) and U.S. markets contribute to the price discovery
process and share prices from both sides respond to the departure from equality. The
untabulated results show that αSPYi,t and α
LI
i,t are either close to zero or statistically
insignificant, which makes sense, because there is no reason to expect that any market
index price response to the individual stock price.
Comparing the price adjustment from the U.S. and domestic sides, on average,
the U.S. share price responses to the domestic share price by 0.700 while the domestic
share price will response to U.S. share price by 0.280. Comparing the averages (mean)
of
∣∣αHM ∣∣ and ∣∣αUS∣∣ by home countries, majority of the home countries (32 out of
36) have the absolute value of αUS larger than the absolute value of αHM . The
expectations are found for Brazil, Ireland and Venezuela, where domestic share prices
adjust fasters than the U.S. share prices. The evidence indicates that for most of
our sample home countries, domestic markets are dominant for the cross-listing firms
and U.S. share price adjust toward to the domestic share prices significantly. On
the other hand, we also observe a statistically significant amount of price adjustment
from domestic side to the U.S. share prices, which confirms our expectation that as a
host market, U.S. markets also play an important role in price discovery mechanism.
3Using USD as a common currency of measurement, the home shares are more expensive than
the U.S. shares in most cases
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The speed of price adjustment varies considerably across different domestic mar-
kets. It depends on the interaction between the domestic and the U.S. market. One
likely way in which the gap between the two prices could reduce is that, on average,
the U.S share prices response to the departure and adjust toward the domestic price
quickly while the domestic share adjust to U.S. price slowly. Some evidences can
be found in Singapore (U.S. 0.924; home -0.177), Israel (U.S. 0.894; home -0.042),
Austria (U.S. 0.871; home -0.086), Turkey (U.S. 0.821; home -0.181), Greece (U.S.
0.808; home -0.101), and Russia (U.S. 0.796; home -0.096). Other less likely possibil-
ities include (a) the U.S. share response slowly to domestic markets like Venezuela -
the U.S. share price adjust to the price departure by 0.288 while the domestic share
adjust to the price departure by -0.733. Denmark (U.S. 0.367; home -0.660), Brazil
(U.S. 0.349; home -0.515) and Netherlands (U.S. 0.349; home -0.515) are other ex-
amples that domestic share price responses faster toward the U.S. listed share prices.
(b) The price discovery processes slowly from both side. China is an example that
the U.S. listed Chinese share price adjust by 0.319 and the Chinese domestic share
price adjust by -0.074 to the equilibrium. (c) The U.S. side speed of adjustment and
the domestic side are comparable. For example, Germany (U.S. 0.483; home -0.486),
Norway (U.S. 0.53; home -0.482) and South Africa (U.S. 0.511; home -0.47) domestic
shares and U.S. shares response to the price departure at similar speeds toward to
the equilibrium prices.
We also split the sample by foreign cross-listed firms in NYSE/AMEX versus
NASDQA. On average, NYSE/AMEX listed share prices response to the price de-
parture by 0.681 and their domestic share prices response by -0.301. NASDAQ listed
foreign share prices response by 0.689 while their domestic share prices response to-
ward the U.S. prices by -0.282. The proportion of domestic speed of adjustment for
NYSE/AMEX listed firms are slightly higher than those in NASDQA. Hasbrouck
(1995) used a sample of U.S. stocks trading on the NYSE and regional exchanges
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to show that price discovery occurs primarily on the NYSE. Similar findings are re-
vealed in Lee (1993) and Blume and Goldstein (1991). Therefore, the NYSE has
been characterized as information dominant. The findings in Table 4.2 are in line
with the findings in previous literature that NYSE, as information dominant, con-
tributes more in the price discovery than NASDQA. The foreign share prices will
adjust toward NYSE more than NASDAQ.
4.3 Determinants of the price discovery
As per the above discussion, the contribution of price discovery and speed of
price converge varies a lot across different domestic markets. The U.S. markets plays
different roles in this process according to the counterpart home market of the cross-
listing firms. We will analyze the determinants of this variation using regression
analysis. In this section, we first discuss the variables construction and the associated
hypothesis.
4.3.1 U.S. market relative contribution
We use the U.S. market relative contribution to price discovery as the dependent
variable in the regression analysis in Section 4.5, which is proxied by the domestic
portion of total speed of adjustment. Following the method from Eun and Sabher-
wal (2003), for each sample firm in every quarter, the proportion of the total price
adjustment that occurs in the domestic market can be considered as the measure of
price discovery that takes price due to the trading of the shares in the U.S. markets
for the same firm. Accordingly,
∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣ / (∣∣αUSi,t ∣∣+ ∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣) proxies the U.S. market
impact on the process discovery mechanism. If U.S. trading has no effect at all, it
is no need that the domestic share prices adjusts toward the U.S. prices, so that the∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣ = 0 and ∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣ / (∣∣αUSi,t ∣∣+ ∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣) = 0. On the other hand, if the domestic
market is unable to affect price adjustment and has no effect on the price discovery,
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the U.S. shares will not response;
∣∣αUSi,t ∣∣ = 0 and ∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣ / (∣∣αUSi,t ∣∣+ ∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣) = 1.
4.3.2 U.S. share of trading volume
Hasbrouck (1995) finds that NYSE’s contribution to price discovery is positively
correlated the NYSE market share by trading volume relative to the other U.S. re-
gional exchanges. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) confirms this finding using U.S. - Cana-
dian cross-listed stocks that the cross-listed stocks with more trading volume propor-
tion in the U.S. market, its Canadian share price will adjust more toward the U.S.
share price. According, the relative trading volume of the cross-listing stocks is a
determination of price discovery process. The larger the U.S. trading volume of the
cross-listed stock, the more informative of the U.S. trading; the more efficient of the
U.S. market trading; the domestic market makers for the cross-listing stock would
care more about the U.S. share price. Accordingly, if U.S. proportion of trading
volume is larger, the domestic share price will response to the price disparity faster
toward to the U.S. share price. The U.S. market will contribute more in the price
discovery process.
We calculate the U.S. share of trading volume as the ratio of trading volume in
the U.S. market i to the total of trading volume in both domestic market and the U.S.
market, (VolUS/(VolUS + VolHM)). We first obtain the daily share of trading volume
(VO) for each cross-listed share from DataStream and CRSP databases. We download
the American Depository receipt (DR) exchange ratio from WorldScope database. To
further verify the ADR bundle ratio, we collect ADR bundle ratios from WorldScope,
Citi bank, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank and Bank of New York. Then we adjust the
number of shares trading volume in the host market by multiplying the bundle ratio
for those ADRs in our sample. We also measure the U.S. dollar denominated value
trading volume (VA) calculated as the daily number of shares trading volume times
the daily close price as a robustness check. The value based volume ratio avoids the
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inaccuracy measurement caused by missing/error ADR bundle ratio.
4.3.3 Information factor
One of the prevalent findings from previous price discovery literature is that in-
formation trading contributes to the discovery of one price by the other price in a
cointegrated time-series system of prices. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) uses the medium-
size trades as a proxy of informed trading and finds that the ratio of shares traded
in the U.S. and in Canada in medium sized lots is positively correlated with the U.S.
relative contribution to the price discovery. Many previous papers characterize NYSE
(comparing to other stock exchanges in the U.S.) or primary exchanges (comparing
other regional stock exchanges in a country) as information dominant. For example,
Hasbrouck (1995) uses a sample of U.S. stocks trading on the NYSE and regional
exchanges and find that price discovery occurs primarily on the NYSE because the
trading on the NYSE is more informative. Similar findings are revealed in Lee (1993)
and Blume and Goldstein (1991).
Baruch et al. (2007) proposes a theoretical model to explain the variations in
volume shares of internationally cross-listed stocks (henceforth, the BKL informa-
tion factor). The BKL information factor is estimated by the correlation between
cross-listed asset returns and the returns of other assets traded on that market. It
represents the incremental information generated from the host (U.S.) market in ad-
dition to that from its home market. Using the sample of foreign firms that cross-list
in U.S. markets, Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) document evidences
to support the prediction of the BKL model that proportionally more volume takes
place in the U.S. than its counterpart home market if the cross-listed asset has a
higher information factor. In this paper, we adopt the BKL information factor to
measure the incremental information provided by the U.S. market in addition to that
provided by its domestic home market for each stock. For every cross-listed stock
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in our sample, we first regress daily domestic market returns of stock i on the daily
index return in the domestic market and obtain the R-square, R2r , in the restricted
model.
Ri,t = αi,t + β
′home
i,t R
home
m,t + i,t, (4.8)
where βhomei,t is a 3 × 1 vector of asset i’s loading on index returns of the home
market, and Rhomem,t is a 3 × 1 vector of index returns (Rm) of the home market. We
estimate the equation at every day t within a three-day window, from the previous day
(t− 1) to the next day (t+ 1); that is, β′homei,t =
(
βhomei,t−1 , β
home
i,t , β
home
i,t+1
) ′ and Rhomem,t =(
Rhomem,t−1, R
home
m,t , R
home
m,t+1
) ′, to account for non-synchronous trading across markets in
different time zones.
We next estimate the unrestricted model by adding daily index returns of a host
market as additional regressors, and obtain the new R-square, R2ur, in the unrestricted
model:
Ri,t = αi,t + β
′home
i,t R
home
m,t + β
′host
i,t R
host
m,t + ξi,t, (4.9)
where βhosti,t is a 3× 1 vector of asset i’s loadings on index returns of the host market,
and Rhostm,t is a 3 × 1 vector of index returns of the host market from t − 1 to t + 1,
with βhosti,t =
(
βhosti,t−1, β
host
i,t , β
host
i,t+1
) ′ and Rhostm,t = (Rhostm,t−1, Rhostm,t , Rhostm,t+1) ′.
We calculate the incremental information provided by the host market j regarding
the price of stock i in year T as the following:
Information factori,j,T =
(
R2ur −R2r
)
/3(
1−R2ur
)
/
(
n− 6) (4.10)
where n is the number of daily returns used in both restricted and unrestricted models.
As we detailed in Section 4.1, we obtain the domestic market daily stock prices for
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each cross-listed share and daily market index prices from Datastream and the U.S.
daily trading data4 from TAQ and CRSP. All data series are converted to the U.S.
dollar as a common currency. We adjust the host market share price by dividing the
DR bundle ratio for those DRs (ADR, GDR, etc.) in our sample. For each stock, we
first calculate daily stock returns and corresponding market index returns. We run
a pair of time series regressions simultaneously for each cross-listing in every sample
year based on data from the past 48 months of every observation. If the available data
is less than 36 months, we drop that firm-year observation to avoid biased estimates.
We expect a positive correlation between the information factor and the U.S.
market relative contribution in price discovery. The more price information the U.S.
market providing, the more information trading will execute in the U.S. market com-
paring to the counterpart home market Wang and Zhou (2014), and accordingly,
the more U.S. stock exchange will contribute in stock price discovery relative to the
counterpart domestic market.
4.3.4 Domestic country distance to U.S.
The geographic distance of the home market to the U.S. market may affect in-
formation flow between the markets and thus sway the trading activities. When a
home market is located further away from the U.S. market, the information flow is
hindered. Investors in the U.S. host markets far away to the home country are at
an information disadvantage too and thus shy away from trading based on the stale
information. Less (informed) trading will be executed in the U.S. host market. If
a domestic market locate closer to the U.S. market, more trading are expected, like
Canada which treats U.S. stock market as a “satellite” trading venue. We expect that
the U.S. market contributes less in price discovery for those cross-listed firms from a
4We use SPY as the U.S. market index in the information factor calculation. As a robustness,
we also calculate the information factor using SP500 as the U.S. market index. The two measures
of information factor are very close. (see Section 4.5)
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domestic country far away.
We construct two proxies for the distance: the time zone distance and the mileage
distance between domestic major stock exchange location and the New York. For the
time zone distance, we obtain the standard time zone for each stock exchange from
WorldClock’s website5. For example, Frankfurt is located in time zone “UTC/GMT+1”
and is recorded as “+1”; New York is located in time zone “UTC/GMT−5” and is
recorded as “−5”. For the mileage distance, we measure the natural logarithm of
the mileage distance between two cities on Google Map.
4.3.5 Listing duration
Firms with longer presence in the U.S. market usually are better known to the
U.S. investors and thus have more U.S. trading activities. Eun and Sabherwal (2003)
shows a positive association between the years listed in the U.S. and the foreign share
of total adjustment in price. The longer the firms listed in the U.S. market, the U.S.
share price will be more influential and the foreign share price will adjust more toward
the U.S. share price. We measure the duration that a foreign firm listed in the U.S.
market using the “Begin of Stock Data” in CRSP and count the number of days since
the begin date. We us the natural logarithm of number of days since the share listed
in the regression analysis.
4.3.6 Liquidity
(i) Amihud illiquidity
Previous research (e.g. Amihud (2002), Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya
and Pedersen (2005)) demonstrate that illiquidity is a source of risk which is priced by
the market. Liquid market associate with higher trading efficiency, lower trading cost.
We can expect that cross-listed stock accesses the higher level of liquidity in the U.S.
5The URL is www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/.
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market relative to its domestic market, its U.S. market price to be more influential
in the price discovery process and the domestic share of total prices adjustment in
repones to the price deviations to be higher.
Using the method from Amihud (2002), we measure illiquidity as the average ratio
of the daily absolute return to the dollar value of trading volume on that day. We
compute separately for the domestic traded shares and the U.S. traded shares and
calculate the ratio of U.S. illiquidity to the domestic illiquidity for the same cross-
listed stock. We expect that the higher illiquidity ratio, the lower domestic share
of total price adjustment, the less contribution from the U.S. market in the price
discovery process.
(ii) Market depth
Koumkwa and Susmel (2008) shows that the market average daily volume, market
capitalization, and float are positively and significantly correlated to the speed of
transition between regimes. Similar findings are reported in Rabinovitch et al. (2003)
where low market volume is associated with higher transaction costs. We collect
stock market turnover data from Beck et al. (2009), which was updated in 2012 and
is available on the World Bank website. We construct the ratio of stock market
turnover of U.S. market to domestic market turnover. It proxies the relative market
depth and breath. We expect that higher the U.S. to domestic stock market turnover
ratio; the more domestic share price adjusts toward the U.S. share price; the more
U.S. relative contribution to the price discovery.
4.3.7 Financial market legal protection
Many previous studies find that the market/country legal environment and regula-
tion soundness influence the trading activities a lot. Previous studies have shown that
the foreign stocks’ trading in the U.S. is high due to the benefit of better legal protec-
tion for shareholders in the U.S. (Halling et al., 2008; Pulatkonak and Sofianos , 1999).
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Investors prefer to become shareholders of a company in a country where stronger
legal investor protection is provided. Melvin (2003) and Auguste et al. (2005) finds
that capital movement restrictions can seriously affect the cross-listing price dispar-
ity, especially during economic and currency crisis. Claessens et al. (2002) finds that
countries with higher income per capita, better macro policies, more efficient legal
systems, better shareholder protection, and more open financial markets tend to at-
tract more trading activity. As we discussed in essay 1 (Wang and Zhou (2014)) and
essay 2, better legal protection and financial market development can better facilitate
trading activities. In this research, we measure three legal protection proxies below
as the difference between the U.S. index to the domestic market index. The higher
legal protection difference indicates the lower level of legal protection of the domestic
market relative to the level of U.S.; in this case, we expect the more trading will flow
to the U.S. market and domestic share price will adjust toward U.S. share price too.
Therefore there is a positive relation between the legal protection ratio of U.S. to
home markets and the domestic share of price adjustment.
(i) Financial disclosure
Following the method from La Porta et al. (2006), Disclosure index is estimated
from the arithmetic mean of six variables of information disclosure. Information
disclosure index is measured from six perspectives: prospectus, compensation, share-
holders, inside ownership, contracts irregular and transactions for each country (La
Porta et al., 2006). A higher index indicates higher quality of financial disclosure.
(ii) Shareholder protection
We use the anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. (1998), which has been
widely used in numerous articles as a measure of shareholder protection. The index is
the sum of six anti-director rights scores ranging from 0 (e.g., Belgium in our sample)
to 5 (e.g. Canada and the U.S. in our sample). A higher index indicates better
legal protection for minority shareholders. Djankov et al. (2008) revise the La Porta
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anti-director rights index. We test this revised anti-director rights index as one of the
proxies of the shareholder protection in this study as well.
(iii) Anti-self-dealing index
Djankov et al. (2008) present another measure of legal protection of minority
shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index.
It is the average of the ex ante and ex post control of self-dealing for each country.The
principal components of “control of self-dealing” measurement include (1) approval
by disinterested shareholders; (2) disclosures by buyer; (3) disclosures by Mr. James;
(4) independent review; (5) each of the elements in the index of disclosure in periodic
filings; (6) standing to sue; (7) rescission; (8) ease of holding Mr. James liable; (9)
ease of holding the approving body liable; and (10) access to evidence (Djankov et al.,
2008).
4.3.8 Control variables
To ensure that our results are not driven by any possible effects from firm size,
home country region and industries effect, we measure control variables as below.
(i) Firm size: We measure the natural logarithm of each cross-listed firm’s domes-
tic market capitalization as a proxy of firm size.
(ii) Home market economic development: We obtain the gross domestic product
growth from Datasteam. We use annual percentage growth rate of gross GDP as
an indicator of the level of domestic economic development to control the impacts
from the domestic country economic development. We expect a negative relationship
between domestic GDP growth and the domestic share of price adjustment. If the
cross-listed stock from a less developed home country, then more trading activities of
the stock will be executed in the U.S. market. The domestic share price will converge
toward U.S. share price.
(iii) Region dummy: We construct six domestic regional dummies - Europe and
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Israel; Canada and the U.S.; South America and Mexico; Asia, Australia and New
Zealand - for home markets in order to control for variation clustered by region.
(iv) Industry dummy: Some domestic country may have superior access to infor-
mation for firms in a particular industry. We control for the industry effect through
four industry dummies categorized by SIC code, mining (1000 ≤ SIC < 1500), man-
ufacturing (2000 <= SIC < 4000), utilities (4000 <= SIC < 5000) and financial
services (6000 <= SIC < 7000).
4.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.3 Panel A reports the sample summary statistics for variables we dis-
cussed in Section 4.3. The speed of adjustment, trading volume and information
factor variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. Overall, the sample includes
497 foreign firms cross-listed in U.S. markets. Canada is the largest domestic country
with 211 firms cross-listed in U.S., followed by the U.K. (35), Israel (35) and Japan
(29). Some sample home countries share a small slice of the sample. For example,
Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Turkey and Venezuela only have one cross-listing in the
U.S. from each of them. SOA (HM/TOT) is the domestic portion of the total speed
of adjustment representing the U.S. market relative contribution to price discovery.
Consistent with the finding in Table 4.2, majority of the sample firms’ domestic share
prices adjust slowly and U.S. share prices adjust faster toward the domestic prices.
On average, 31.51% of the total speed of adjustment is for domestic share prices con-
verging to the U.S. prices, which indicate the U.S. market relative contribution to the
price discovery. Although the domestic markets still play a major role (68.49%) in
the price discovery process. the U.S. market as a host market also has a significant
amount of contribution in the price discovery. Three out of 36 home countries have
firms listed in U.S. with larger U.S. relative contribution in the price discovery, which
are Brazil (56.388%) Ireland (56.45%) and Venezuela (71.225%). In those three coun-
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tries, the domestic share prices adjust toward U.S. prices more than the other way
around. In some home countries like South Africa (49,164%) and Norway (46.773%),
the domestic and the U.S. sides of contribution are similar to the price discovery.
The U.S. proportion of trading volume are estimated in two ways - the share volume
measure (VO) and the U.S. dollar volume measure (VA). The two measurements are
very close to each other. Because the value based measure of trading volume is more
robust and avoid the inaccuracy caused by missing/errorance ADR ratio, We focus on
the VA measured trading volume ratio in our discussion in this section. On average,
96.613% of the cross-listed trading volume are executed in the U.S. market. 29 out of
36 domestic markets firms have over 90% trading volume shares executed in the U.S.
markets. Chinese firms have the lowest trading volume portion in the U.S. market,
which is 69.685%. For robustness check purpose, we estimate the information factor
in two ways - one is estimated using the synchronized SPY as the U.S. market index
and the other one is estimated using the daily SP500 index close price as the U.S.
market index in the regression model. Both measurements provide similar results.
We will focus our discussion on the synchronized SPY measured information factor.
On average, the U.S market provides additional price information as 7.356 across all
sample firms. It provides more than average information to the shares from Austria
(info factor: 56.728), Germany (info factor: 17.582), Norway (15.898) and Switzerland
(13.063) as well as China, Finland, Italy, Mexico, Netherland and South Africa. On
the other extreme, the U.S. market provide minimal additional information to shares
from Turkey (1.233) and Belgium (1.226). Duration is a indicator of foreign firms
history and visibility in the U.S. market. It measures how many days the firm has
been listed in the U.S. market. On average, the sample firms listed in the U.S. market
for 4,422 days which is about 12 years. It ranges from the shortest listing duration
for one Austrian firm (1599 days, about 4.4 years) to the longest listing duration
for the Swedish firms (11,430 days, about 31.3 years). The average sample firm size
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is 16.73 million measured by domestic market capitalization. Large firms are from
Norway (51.794), Switzerland (49.432) and Hong Kong (47.299), while smaller firms
are from Venezuela (1.116), Singapore (1.843), Mexico (2.519) and Israel (2.024).
Overall, the illiquid ratio indicate that U.S. shares are more liquid (less than 1 in
illiquid ratio) than its domestic shares. On average, for the same cross-listed firm,
its U.S. share is more liquid than the domestic share in 25 out of 36 home countries,
shown by a liquidity ratio of U.S. to Home Amihud illiquid measurement less than
1. Looking at the market liquidity measured by market turnover, the U.S. market is
3 times as liquid as the counterpart home market on average. Especially, the U.S.
market has market turnover 45.375 times of the market turnover in Venezuela, and
24.506 times of the market turnover in Argentina. We measure the counterpart home
market GDP growth rate as an indicator of the cross-listed firms’ origination country
economic development. China has a highest GDP growth as 10.739% per year on
average while Denmark has the lowest GDP annual growth as -0.628% on average.
The anti-director rights index (ADRI), anti-self-dealing index (ASDI), disclosure in-
dex show that the U.S. market on average is better in legal protection and financial
disclosure enforcement than the counterpart domestic market. However, the revised
anti-director rights index (RADRI) shows that the U.S. shareholder protection is 1
level less than the counterpart domestic market on sample average. It is mainly
driven by the increased RADRI in European countries and some Asian countries
(Japan, Korean, Hong Kong and Singapore). The countries like Venezuela and China
still remain a low level of shareholder protection. We measure the distance from the
counterpart domestic market to New York for both geographic distance and the time
zone distance. The geographically farthest home country is Indonesia - 10,057 miles
away. The farther country in time zone is Australia which is 15 hours ahead of New
York time. Canada is the closet country in both geography (343 miles) and time zone
(0 hour difference).
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The estimated correlation coefficients, reported in Panel B of Table 4.3. As we
expected, two measures of U.S. trading volume ratio are highly correlated (65%); two
measures of information factor are highly correlated (89%); Geographical distance
and time zone distance are highly correlated (94%). Higher linear correlation among
four proxies of legal protection - anti-director rights index, revised anti-director rights
index, anti-self-dealing index and disclosure index. We will try to avoid those highly
correlated variables included in the same regression model in the analysis.
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics on sample of U.S. cross-listings by home country
The table reports summary statistics for firm and market characteristics in this study. The sample includes all U.S. cross-listed companies
from 35 host markets. We measure domestic share of price adjustment as the ratio of the absolute value of domestic speed of adjustment
to the total of the absolute value of domestic and U.S. speed of adjustment in response to the price deviation from the equilibrium. U.S.
share of total trading volume for each stock are measured by dollar volume (VA) and share volume (VO). The information factor is
estimated using Equation 4.10. The information factor are measure by SPY as U.S.market index (FSPY ) and SP500 as U.S. market
index (FSP500) for robustness check. Other firm and market level variables are measured as we stated in Section refsec:var. Panel A
summarizes cross sectional mean values of firm and market characteristics for each home market as well as the overall sample. Mean
values are calculated by averaging the variables over time for each cross-listing, and then by averaging firm means within each host
country. Panel B presents the correlation coefficients of the all characteristic variables used in the regression analysis.
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Panel A: Firm and market characteristics
Home
No of
firms
SOA
(HM/TOT)
(%)
VO
(US/TOT)
(%)
VA
(US/TOT)
(%)
Info
factor
(SPY)
Info
factor
(SP500)
Duration
(days)
MV
HM
(mil)
Illiquid
(US/HM)
Turnover
(US/HM)
GDPchg
(HM)
ADRI
(US-HM)
RADRI
(US-HM)
ASDI
(US-HM)
Discl Ind
(US-HM)
DtoNY
(miles)
TZ
(HM-US)
Argentina 7 31.434 99.948 99.601 2.957 2.884 3364 3.389 0.111 24.506 6.851 1 1 0.313 19 5305 2
Australia 13 39.392 97.803 91.413 3.175 3.317 4978 20.432 0.925 2.350 3.297 1 −1 −0.103 20 9946 15
Austria 1 15.014 84.810 74.180 56.728 50.704 1599 9.042 1.828 4.508 2.530 3 1 0.442 15 4228 6
Belgium 3 26.688 98.771 98.767 1.226 0.960 2253 19.619 0.027 4.400 1.689 5 0 0.110 20 3660 6
Brazil 5 54.388 99.894 99.862 4.233 4.486 2372 19.953 0.006 3.233 4.196 2 −2 0.381 25 4794 2
Canada 211 30.728 99.582 99.561 8.284 8.974 4082 4.349 0.072 2.674 2.353 0 −1 0.013 20 343 0
Chile 7 44.074 99.765 89.966 6.774 7.126 4328 6.097 7.398 16.553 4.439 2 −1 0.029 20 5136 1
China 10 21.290 98.562 69.585 9.658 8.522 3960 24.632 3.840 1.886 10.739 2 −0.108 20 7383 13
Denmark 1 46.004 99.371 99.121 3.261 3.193 10258 37.228 0.037 3.632 −0.628 3 −1 0.192 17 3847 6
Finland 4 42.272 98.236 98.187 10.727 9.237 2880 44.548 0.132 1.741 2.717 2 −1 0.197 23 4113 7
France 21 29.381 96.375 96.658 5.238 3.241 2949 32.153 1.350 1.886 1.562 2 −1 0.275 20 3628 6
Germany 12 45.050 99.914 99.930 17.582 8.044 2841 36.229 0.008 1.485 0.864 4 −1 0.372 20 4017 6
Greece 3 21.198 96.011 97.894 3.394 3.018 2655 11.641 0.281 4.941 1.023 3 1 0.438 15 4927 7
Hong Kong 6 31.195 98.127 84.257 4.193 5.450 2570 47.299 10.339 2.793 0 −2 −0.308 11 8059 13
Hungary 1 26.073 98.716 93.965 2.667 1.113 2836 4.165 0.474 1.867 1 0.473 22 4359 6
India 8 18.705 99.656 99.332 7.668 5.788 2448 7.093 0.168 2.454 8.277 0 −2 0.075 22 7799 11
Indonesia 2 32.348 99.720 89.815 3.104 3.799 3315 9.676 1.235 4.095 4.782 3 −1 0.001 25 10057 12
Ireland 6 56.645 98.401 94.703 5.424 3.782 4438 9.912 0.143 4.922 2.305 1 −2 −0.135 24 3179 5
Israel 35 15.551 99.630 99.670 6.083 4.813 4293 2.024 0.089 3.839 4.212 2 −1 −0.071 20 5667 7
Italy 3 32.796 98.077 96.584 9.397 7.422 5782 30.388 0.241 1.750 0.324 4 1 0.233 22 4019 6
Japan 29 30.755 93.238 89.390 5.250 5.217 8486 32.833 1.733 1.754 0.894 1 −2 0.156 15 6744 14
Korea 9 25.242 98.436 96.241 3.103 3.370 2923 16.107 2.731 1.031 3.908 3 −2 0.185 15 6872 14
Mexico 6 29.583 99.735 98.957 9.432 8.828 4181 2.519 0.296 7.541 2.138 4 0 0.482 13 2094 1
Netherlands 14 46.716 97.226 97.133 8.454 6.320 4796 19.235 0.427 1.383 1.750 3 1 0.451 25 3645 5
Norway 2 46.773 97.375 96.874 15.898 11.163 2108 51.794 0.289 1.810 1.429 1 −1 0.233 23 3676 6
Portugal 2 34.467 96.117 87.660 2.877 0.632 3734 10.443 1.142 3.260 0.578 2 1 0.210 21 3371 5
Russia 5 25.763 99.345 95.805 6.768 3.801 2441 4.320 0.636 4.253 5.426 −1 0.214 22 4668 8
Singapore 2 21.974 99.295 99.069 4.673 5.160 3067 1.843 0.744 3.221 6.406 1 −2 −0.346 22 9539 13
South Africa 7 49.164 99.084 99.042 9.703 8.239 7131 8.717 0.281 3.874 3.702 0 −2 −0.158 23 7987 7
Spain 7 27.853 94.623 93.922 3.667 2.989 5499 43.564 0.707 1.168 2.610 1 −2 0.281 22 3587 6
Sweden 2 44.440 99.514 99.503 4.970 1.544 11430 43.720 0.039 2.086 1.924 2 −1 0.321 23 3927 6
Switzerland 10 39.546 98.337 99.019 13.063 8.610 2533 49.432 0.083 2.173 2.009 3 0 0.388 20 3931 6
Taiwan 6 24.411 98.878 93.993 3.582 5.557 2598 14.099 7.674 4.474 2 0 0.090 20 7797 13
Turkey 1 23.872 99.767 99.342 1.233 2.434 3099 13.409 0.043 4.094 3 0 0.225 23 5020 7
United Kingdom 35 32.606 96.108 91.614 6.071 4.127 5681 46.488 1.181 1.493 1.783 0 −2 −0.296 18 3463 5
Venezuela 1 71.225 99.992 99.947 2.151 1.919 2487 1.116 0.001 45.375 8.124 4 2 0.563 20 2136 1
Total 497 31.510 98.275 96.613 7.356 6.728 4422 16.732 0.888 3.103 2.560 1 −1 0.055 19 3193 5
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Table 4.3 (Cont‘d)
Panel B: Correlation coefficients
Variable
SOA
(HM/TOT)
(%)
VO
(US/TOT)
(%)
VA
(US/TOT)
(%)
Info
factor
(SPY)
Info
factor
(SP500)
Duration
(days)
MV
HM
(mil)
Illiquid
(US/HM)
(%)
Turnover
(US/HM)
GDPchg
(HM)
ADRI
(US-HM)
RADRI
(US-HM)
ADSD
(US-HM)
Disclsr
(US-HM)
DtoNY
(miles)
VOUSR 0.06
VAUSR 0.03 0.65
F(SPY) 0.07 0.09 0.08
F(SP500) 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.89
Duration 0.05 −0.05 −0.09 0.03 0.07
Firm size 0.10 −0.06 −0.03 0.11 0.05 0.17
illiquidUSR −0.02 −0.25 −0.40 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.03
Mkt turnover(dif) 0.00 0.09 0.02 −0.03 −0.02 −0.03 −0.08 0.01
GDP(growth) −0.04 0.08 −0.05 −0.06 −0.05 −0.09 −0.12 0.04 −0.00
ADRI(dif)) 0.01 −0.10 −0.07 0.03 −0.13 −0.05 0.23 0.02 0.06 −0.03
Revised ADRI(dif) −0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05 −0.00 −0.12 −0.03 −0.05 0.29 0.10 0.42
ASDI(dif) 0.05 −0.18 0.03 0.07 −0.05 −0.01 0.17 −0.05 0.11 −0.17 0.64 0.51
Disclosure(dif) 0.04 0.26 0.27 0.07 0.06 −0.15 −0.22 −0.12 0.00 0.16 −0.14 0.19 −0.12
Distance −0.03 −0.27 −0.36 −0.13 −0.20 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.07 0.18 0.53 −0.06 0.11 −0.38
TZ(dif) −0.03 −0.36 −0.38 −0.12 −0.19 0.16 0.36 0.10 −0.11 0.04 0.46 −0.18 0.12 −0.50 0.94
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4.5 Regression analysis and results
We perform panel regressions using the U.S. relative contribution to price dis-
covery (domestic portion of speed of adjustment) as the dependent variable, which
is calculated as
∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣ / (∣∣αUSi,t ∣∣+ ∣∣αHMi,t ∣∣) for every cross-listed firm in every quarter.
Since the dependent variable is a ratio bounded within (0, 1), we use the logistic trans-
formation, ln(r/(r − 1)), where r is the U.S. relative contribution to price discovery
(domestic portion of speed of adjustment), as the dependent variable and report the
regression results in Panel A of Table 4.4, Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 in this section.
As the robustness check, we also conduct a nature logarithm transformation, ln(r),
and report the respective regression results in Panel B of Table 4.4, Table 4.5 and
Table 4.6. The purpose of both transformations are to map a (0, 1) dependent vari-
able onto the whole real line and ensure the predicted dependent variable lies between
(0, 1). In general, the results support our expectations stated in Section 4.3.
4.5.1 Univariate regression
Table 4.4 reports the results from univariate regressions involving only one inde-
pendent variable in every regression model. Each column reports panel regression
with one independent variable results across firm-years. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and by year. R2
is adjusted for degrees of freedom. Panel A reports the results of logistic transformed
domestic speed of adjustment proportion as dependent variable. Panel B reports
the results of natural log transformed domestic speed of adjustment proportion as
dependent variable. All independent variables are defined in Section 4.3. Trading
volume, information factor and market capitalization data are winsorized at the top
and bottom 1%. Because the results in Panel A and Panel B are very close, we
focus our discussion on the results based on the models using logistic transformed
dependent variable (in panel A). In line with our initial predictions, results show that
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higher U.S. portion of trading volume, proxied by share volume (VO) or value volume
(VA), will make the U.S. share price more influential so that the domestic portion of
speed of adjustment increases. In the other words, the U.S. market contribution is
price discovery is larger. Additional price relevant information provided by the U.S.
market, which is measured by the information factor (both the SPY measure and the
SP500 measure), increases the U.S. relative contribution (domestic portion of speed
of adjustment) in the price discovery too. A firm with a longer listing history in the
U.S. market is shown to significantly increases its domestic proportion of speed of
adjustment. The statistically negative coefficient on the illiquid ratio shows that if
the U.S. share of the cross-listed firm is more liquid (less illiquid) than its domestic
share, the U.S. share price is more influential and the domestic portion of speed of
adjustment is higher. Better legal protection for investors in U.S. relative to the coun-
terpart host markets of the cross-listed firms increases the share of domestic portion of
speed of adjustment, evident from the positive coefficients on anti-director rights in-
dex (difference), revised anti-director rights index (difference), anti-self-dealing index
(difference) and disclosure index (difference). A U.S. market tend to contribute more
in price discovery for those firms from a less developed home market, evident from
the negative coefficient on domestic GDP growth. As we expected, U.s. with more
market depth and breadth relative to the counterpart home market will increase the
domestic portion of speed of adjustment, shown as the positive coefficient of market
turnover ratio of the U.S. to home market turnover. Geographic proximity, measured
by both the geography distance and time zone difference, negatively influences the
domestic portion of speed of adjustment but statistically insignificant in the univari-
ate regression. As expected, farther distance between the domestic market and the
U.S. will reduce the U.S. relative contribution in the price discovery.
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Table 4.4: Univariate regression models
The table reports the results from univariate regressions involving only one independent variable in every regression model. Each column
reports panel regression with one independent variable results across firm-years. Panel A reports the results of logistic transformed
domestic speed of adjustment proportion as dependent variable. Panel B reports the results of natural log transformed domestic speed of
adjustment proportion as dependent variable. The domestic speed of adjustment ratio is estimated as the absolute value of domestic speed
of adjustment divided by the sum of the absolute values of the speed of adjustment of both home and U.S. markets for every cross-listed
firm. The volume ratio, information factor and other independent variables are defined in Section 4.3. Trading volume, information factor
and market capitalization data are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. All market characteristic variables are mean-differenced series,
that is, we subtract the mean across all applicable home markets from the U.S. market level of the characteristic variable. Standard errors
are robust to heteroscedasticity and are adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and by year. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. *
denotes statistical significance level at 1% or lower, ** denotes statistical significance level between 1% and 5%, and *** denotes statistical
significance level between 5% and 10%.
Panel A: Logistic transformed domestic SOA ratio as dependent variable
VORatio
(US/TOT)
VARatio
(US/TOT)
Info
factor
(SPY)
Info
factor
(SP500)
Duration
(day)
Illq.Ratio
(US/HM)
Anti-dir
rights
(US-HM)
Revised
ADRI
(US-HM)
Disclose
(US-HM)
Anti-self
dealing
(US- HM)
GDP
growth
(HM)
StkMkt
turnover
(US/HM)
Geo.
Distance
(miles)
Time
zone
(HM-US)
Firm Size
(MV,HM)
Estimates 4.735∗∗∗ 1.833∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.108 −0.663∗∗ 0.046 0.065 0.069∗∗ 0.539∗∗ −0.051∗∗ 0.009 −0.005 −0.013 0.098
t-statistics (3.650) (2.683) (3.300) (2.427) (1.698) (−2.187) (0.720) (0.835) (2.336) (2.643) (−2.245) (0.871) (−0.045) (−0.425) (1.647)
Obs 7, 916 7, 916 6, 309 6, 309 7, 916 7, 916 8, 217 8, 344 8, 344 8, 344 8, 194 7, 275 8, 344 8, 344 8, 344
Adj. R-sq (%) 0.86 0.61 0.49 0.36 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.69 0.25 0.40 0.05 0.00 0.09 1.02
Panel B: Log transformed domestic SOA ratio as dependent variable
Estimates 3.151∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.063 −0.373∗ 0.022 0.039 0.044∗∗ 0.300∗∗ −0.036∗∗ 0.005 −0.014 −0.010 0.052
t-statistics (3.080) (2.353) (3.619) (2.784) (1.542) (−1.836) (0.532) (0.768) (2.267) (2.472) (−2.281) (0.717) (−0.191) (−0.506) (1.229)
Obs 7, 916 7, 916 6, 309 6, 309 7, 916 7, 916 8, 217 8, 344 8, 344 8, 344 8, 194 7, 275 8, 344 8, 344 8, 344
Adj. R-sq (%) 0.81 0.55 0.45 0.39 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.59 0.17 0.42 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.60
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4.5.2 Multivariate regression
In this section, we perform a series of panel regressions to evaluate the relative
contribution of the U.S. market in price discovery and the firm and market level
characteristics in determining the price discovery process. Table 4.5 presents the re-
sults of a set of regressions: model (1)-(3) is the baseline regression applying pooled
OLS. Model (4) applies industry fixed effect using four industry dummies: finance,
utility, manufacture and mining. Model (5) applies home region country fixed effects
classified by 6 home region. Model (6) -(7) apply both the industry and the home
region dummies. The fixed effects dummies are constructed as we defined in Sec-
tion 4.3. The purpose of controlling for industry and home region fixed effects is to
take into account the possibility that differences in investment levels among industry
and domestic region may explain our results.
To avoid multicollinearity issue, we try to keep at least one proxy from each hy-
pothesis and avoid including the highly correlated variables (shown in Table 4.3 Panel
B) in the same models. Eventually, Models (1)-(5) are five combinations of variables
that represent different theories in explaining the U.S. relative contribution in price
discovery without causing any statistical issues. Considering that other independent
variables, like information factor, legal protection, listing duration, etc., could be ex-
plained in the way that they impact the price discovery process through influencing
the portion of trading volume in the U.S. market. In essay 1, we investigate the
determinants of host market proportion of cross-listed firm’s global trading volume
and the U.S. market is one of the host market included in our study. Information
factor, legal protection proxies, listing duration, time zone distance are shown to be
an important determinant of host market proportion of trading volume. To avoid
any possible multicollinearity between the U.S. portion of trading with any of other
independent variable, we construct regression model (6) and (7) as robustness checks.
Model (6) includes all independent variables representing different price discovery
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arguments, expect the U.S. portion of trading volume. Model (7) includes only the
U.S. trading volume ratio and industry as well as home fixed effect dummies. They
both show consistent and robust results. The significance and the coefficients size are
comparable to the results in model (1) - (5). Given that the results are similar for
the two transformation of the dependent variables, our discussion will focus on the
results generated by the logistic transformation as dependent variable in Panel A.6
In model (1), (2), (4), (5) and (7), the coefficients of U.S. portion of trading
volume, measured either by share volume (VO) or value volume (VA), are positive
and statistically significant at 1% level, implying that the greater the U.S. portion of
total trading, the more domestic share price adjusting toward U.S. side, the greater
the U.S. relative contribution in price discovery. In model (1), (2), (4), (5) and (6),
the coefficients of the information factor, measured either by synchronized SPY or
daily closing price of SP500, are positive and statistically significant at at least 5%
level, which is consistent with the hypothesis that if the U.S. market provide more
additional information of the share price, its price discovery contribution is greater.
As we stated in the legal protection hypothesis, the higher standard of the legal
protection in U.S. relative to the domestic country, the greater price adjustment by
the domestic in response to the U.S. prices. For proxies of legal protection, anti-
director-rights index (ADRI), revised ADRI, anti-self-dealing index and disclosure
index, the differences between U.S. index and home index have consistently positive
and statistically significant coefficients across model (1) - (6). The liquidity measures
play an important role in determining the price discovery too. In model 3, the negative
coefficient of illiquidity ratio of the U.S. to the home Amihud illiquid measurement is
statistically significant at 5% level, indicating that the comparing to the U.S. shares,
the more illiquid of the domestic shares of the cross-listed firm, the more influential
of the U.S. share price, resulting a larger proportion of price adjustment by domestic
6The number of observations in model (1) - (7) varies depending on the data availability.
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price toward the U.S. price. Market liquidity proxy of stock market turnover ratio of
the U.S. to the home market turnover confirms the liquidity argument that a more
liquid stock market contributes more in the price discovery process, shown by the
positive and statistically significant coefficient of the liquidity ratio in model (4). The
coefficients for the time zone difference between the home and the New York time
are negative and statistically significant in model (2), (5) and (6), which confirms
that the firms from a home country further from the U.S. in time zone, less domestic
price adjustment toward the U.S. price. Geographic distance variables confirm this
negative relationship between the home-U.S. markets distance and U.S. relative price
discovery but lack of statistic significance in model (1) and (4).
To get an idea of the impact of the main variables of interest on the relative
contributions of the U.S. market to price discovery, we use the coefficient estimates
in model (6) and model (7) in Table 4.5 Panel A, which include all types of control
variables and fixed effects in the models. If the U.S. proportion of trading volume
increase 1% from 98% (sample mean) to 99%, the domestic share of speed of adjust-
ment will increase from 97.895% (=exp(3.918*0.98)/(exp(3.918*0.98)+1)) to 97.970%
(=exp(3.918*0.99)/(exp(3.918*0.99)+1)), where 3.918 is the coefficient estimate in
model (8) from Table 4.5 Panel A. If the U.S. market provides more additional infor-
mation to the stock price by 1 unit measured by information factor, from 7 (sample
mean) to 8, the domestic share of speed of adjustment will increase from 51.225%
(=exp(0.007*7)/(exp(0.007*7)+1)) to 51.400% (=exp(0.007*8)/(exp(0.007*8)+1)),
where 0.007 is the coefficient estimate in model (5) and (7) from Table 4.5 Panel
A. If the U.S. is 1 index higher than the domestic market in terms of the anti-
director-rights index, the domestic share of speed of adjustment will increase from
50% (=exp(0.121*0)/(exp(0.121*0)+1)) to 53% (=exp(0.121*1)/(exp(0.121*1)+1)),
where 0.121 is the coefficient estimate in model (6) from Table 4.5 Panel A.
Other control variables provide interesting findings as well. A firm with longer
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listing history in the U.S. market results in a greater adjustment by the domestic
prices in response to the U.S. prices, shown by significantly positive coefficients of
“listing duration” in model (1) - (6). The coefficient for firm size are consistently
positive and significant, suggesting that ceteris paribus, price discovery in the U.S.
relative to the domestic is greater for larger firms. Those can be explained by the
firm visibility argument that large firm will be more visible to the investor in the host
market and therefore the shares of those foreign firms will be traded more active,
resulting that the U.S. share price is more influential in price discovery. Domestic
GDP growth shows a negative relationship with the domestic portion of speed of
adjustment toward the U.S. price and the coefficients are statically significant at 1%
level. A high GDP growth home country will have less price adjustment toward the
U.S. price. The domestic share price will be dominant in the price discovery and the
U.S. share price will adjust more toward the home price. More price discovery will
happen in the high economic growth home market.
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Table 4.5: Determinants of the distribution of trading volume among multiple host markets
This table summaries the results of multivariate regression with and without industry/home region fixed effects. Panel A reports the results of
regressions based on logistic transformation of the domestic proportion of total price speed of adjustment (SOA) as dependent variable. Panel B
reports the results of regressions based on natural logarithm transformation of the domestic proportion of total price speed of adjustment (SOA)
as dependent variable. * denotes statistical significance level at 1% or lower, ** denotes statistical significance level between 1% and 5%, and ***
denotes statistical significance level between 5% and 10%.
Panel A: logistic tranformation of domestic portion of SOA as the dependent variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
US portion trading Vol(share) 6.090∗∗∗ 4.569∗∗∗ 3.918∗∗∗
(7.348) (5.165) (6.479)
US portion trading Vol(value) 2.177∗∗∗ 1.939∗∗∗
(5.332) (4.908)
Info factor (SPY) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(2.755) (2.400) (2.352)
Info factor (SP500) 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(2.481) (2.140)
Anti-dir-rights index(ADRI) (US-HM) 0.055∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(2.323) (4.028)
Revised ADRI (US-HM) 0.080∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(2.163) (2.965)
Anti-self-dealing index (US-HM) 0.543∗∗∗
(3.512)
Disclosure index (US-HM) 0.110∗∗∗
(8.384)
Illiquidity Ratio (US/HM) −0.555∗∗
(−2.054)
Stk mkt turnover (US-HM) 0.015∗∗
(2.130)
Time zone (HM-US) −0.028∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗
(−4.055) (−2.636) (−1.987)
Distance to NY (miles) −0.016 −0.033
(−0.673) (−1.210)
Listing duration 0.166∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(4.116) (4.917) (2.547) (2.940) (4.316) (3.255)
Firm size 0.131∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(8.855) (9.031) (6.794) (9.166) (8.477) (10.369)
Domestic GDP growth −0.056∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗
(−5.473) (−4.343) (−4.751) (−4.951) (−4.886)
Intercept −9.448∗∗∗ −6.000∗∗∗ −2.285∗∗∗ −9.749∗∗∗ −5.217∗∗∗ −3.161∗∗∗ −4.816∗∗∗
(−10.356) (−11.354) (−10.805) (−10.045) (−9.840) (−8.164) (−7.807)
Industry fixed-effects? No Yes Yes
Home region fixed-effects? No Yes Yes
Number of firm-quarters 6028 5942 7916 5172 6028 5942 7916
Adj. R-square (%) 3.666 3.612 0.903 4.989 5.127 5.207 1.938
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Table 4.5 (Cont‘d)
Panel B: log transformation of domestic portion of SOA as the dependent variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
US portion trading Vol(share) 4.236∗∗∗ 3.234∗∗∗ 2.521∗∗∗
(7.387) (5.283) (6.077)
US portion trading Vol(value) 1.464∗∗∗ 1.309∗∗∗
(5.188) (4.772)
Info factor (SPY) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(2.704) (2.443) (2.322)
Info factor (SP500) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(2.715) (2.145)
Anti-dir-rights index(ADRI) (US-HM) 0.033∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(2.019) (3.355)
Revised ADRI (US-HM) 0.044∗ 0.054∗∗
(1.714) (2.492)
Anti-self-dealing index (US-HM) 0.265∗∗
(2.466)
Disclosure index (US-HM) 0.070∗∗∗
(7.704)
Illiquidity Ratio (US/HM) −0.316∗
(−1.705)
Stk mkt turnover (US-HM) 0.009∗
(1.744)
Time zone (HM-US) −0.018∗∗∗ −0.049∗ −0.036
(−3.817) (−1.756) (−1.245)
Distance to NY (miles) −0.010 −0.021
(−0.599) (−1.092)
Listing duration 0.119∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(4.284) (5.090) (2.392) (3.231) (4.560) (3.545)
Firm size 0.072∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(7.090) (7.257) (4.757) (7.514) (6.865) (8.736)
Domestic GDP growth −0.042∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(−5.865) (−4.921) (−5.101) (−5.246) (−5.164)
Intercept −7.446∗∗∗ −4.972∗∗∗ −2.409∗∗∗ −7.595∗∗∗ −4.513∗∗∗ −3.120∗∗∗ −4.155∗∗∗
(−11.795) (−13.610) (−16.591) (−11.308) (−12.260) (−11.628) (−9.820)
Industry fixed-effects? No Yes Yes
Home region fixed-effects? No Yes Yes
Number of firm-quarters 6028 5942 7916 5172 6028 5942 7916
Adj. R-square (%) 3.230 3.105 0.502 4.477 4.048 4.252 1.684
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4.6 Robustness checks
4.6.1 Alternative measurement of variables
To ensure the robustness in our results, we use both the logistic and logarithm
transformation of domestic proportion of price adjustment as dependent variable as
we explained in Section 4.5. The results are very similar. We construct the variables
in different manners. We measure trading volume using both the share volume and
the dollar valued based measure. We construct information factor using either the
synchronized SPY or the daily closing price of SP500 as U.S. market index. They
show similar statistics and results.
4.6.2 Alternative regression method
According to Petersen (2009), when we have panel data and the regression resid-
uals are serially correlated when we have persistent dependent and independent vari-
ables in finance/ economics research, standard errors clustered by firm provide much
more accurate results than do other methods such as the Fama-MacBeth regression.
Therefore, we re-run the regression models (1) - (7) using panel regression with 2-way
(firm and year) clustered standard error. The results of clustered panel regression
are presented in Table 4.6. The model (1) - (7) specifications are the same with the
ones in Table 4.5. The standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are ad-
justed for clustering by firm and by year in order to avoid biased t values. Clustering
by firm accounts for the possible correlation between observations of same firm over
different years and clustering by year accounts for the possible correlation between
observations on different firms in the same year. Overall, the results confirm our main
findings in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.6: Determinants of the U.S. relative contribution of price discovery
This table summaries the results of multivariate regression models estimated with 2-way (firm- and year- level) cluster standard error and with/without
industry-/home regional fixed effects. Panel A reports the results of regressions based on logistic transformation of the domestic proportion of total
price speed of adjustment (SOA) as the dependent variable. Panel B reports the results of regressions based on natural logarithm transformation of
the domestic proportion of total price speed of adjustment (SOA) as the dependent variable. * denotes statistical significance level at 1% or lower, **
denotes statistical significance level between 1% and 5%, and *** denotes statistical significance level between 5% and 10%.
Panel A: logistic tranformation of domestic portion of SOA as the dependent variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
US portion trading Vol(share) 6.090∗∗∗ 4.569∗∗∗ 3.918∗∗∗
(5.045) (3.852) (3.712)
US portion trading Vol(value) 2.177∗∗ 1.939∗∗
(2.358) (2.475)
Info factor (SPY) 0.008 0.007 0.007
(1.728) (1.564) (1.595)
Info factor (SP500) 0.008 0.008
(1.629) (1.451)
Anti-dir-rights index(ADRI) (US-HM) 0.055 0.121∗∗
(1.223) (2.320)
Revised ADRI (US-HM) 0.080 0.094
(1.161) (1.399)
Anti-self-dealing index (US-HM) 0.543∗∗
(2.772)
Disclosure index (US-HM) 0.110∗∗∗
(4.198)
Illiquidity Ratio (US/HM) −0.555∗
(−1.804)
Stk mkt turnover (US-HM) 0.015
(0.872)
Time zone (HM-US) −0.028 −0.106∗ −0.083
(−0.997) (−1.797) (−1.359)
Distance to NY (miles) −0.016 −0.033
(−0.158) (−0.337)
Listing duration 0.166∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.068 0.128∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗
(2.575) (2.977) (1.043) (1.892) (3.047) (2.295)
Firm size 0.131∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.077 0.158∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(3.351) (3.188) (1.267) (4.280) (3.505) (5.676)
Domestic GDP growth −0.056∗∗ −0.046∗ −0.053∗ −0.052∗∗ −0.053∗∗
(−2.344) (−1.967) (−1.847) (−2.378) (−2.320)
Intercept −9.448∗∗∗ −6.000∗∗∗ −2.285∗∗∗ −9.749∗∗∗ −5.217∗∗∗ −3.161∗∗∗ −4.816∗∗∗
(−5.600) (−6.311) (−3.899) (−5.517) (−5.490) (−5.457) (−3.989)
Industry fixed-effects? No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Home region fixed-effects? No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of firm-quarters 6,028 5,942 7,916 5,172 6,028 5,942 7,916
Adj. R-square (%) 3.67 3.61 0.90 4.99 5.13 5.21 1.94
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Table 4.6 (Cont‘d)
Panel B: log transformation of domestic portion of SOA as the dependent variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
US portion trading Vol(share) 4.236∗∗∗ 3.234∗∗∗ 2.521∗∗∗
(4.852) (3.764) (3.043)
US portion trading Vol(value) 1.464∗ 1.309∗
(2.008) (2.102)
Info factor (SPY) 0.005∗ 0.005∗ 0.005
(1.932) (1.791) (1.722)
Info factor (SP500) 0.006∗ 0.005
(1.996) (1.696)
Anti-dir-rights index(ADRI) (US-HM) 0.033 0.070∗
(1.065) (1.834)
Revised ADRI (US-HM) 0.044 0.054
(0.948) (1.265)
Anti-self-dealing index (US-HM) 0.265∗
(1.973)
Disclosure index (US-HM) 0.070∗∗∗
(4.178)
Illiquidity Ratio (US/HM) −0.316
(−1.528)
Stk mkt turnover (US-HM) 0.009
(0.790)
Time zone (HM-US) −0.018 −0.049 −0.036
(−0.950) (−1.341) (−0.944)
Distance to NY (miles) −0.010 −0.021
(−0.147) (−0.317)
Listing duration 0.119∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.044 0.097∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗
(2.816) (3.221) (1.010) (2.321) (3.192) (2.644)
Firm size 0.072∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.037 0.090∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(2.639) (2.444) (0.867) (3.652) (2.817) (5.099)
Domestic GDP growth −0.042∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.039∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.039∗∗
(−2.596) (−2.343) (−2.080) (−2.749) (−2.643)
Intercept −7.446∗∗∗ −4.972∗∗∗ −2.409∗∗∗ −7.595∗∗∗ −4.513∗∗∗ −3.120∗∗∗ −4.155∗∗∗
(−6.712) (−7.074) (−6.316) (−6.361) (−6.404) (−8.799) (−4.487)
Industry fixed-effects? No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Home region fixed-effects? No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of firm-quarters 6,028 5,942 7,916 5,172 6,028 5,942 7,916
Adj. R-square (%) 3.23 3.11 0.50 4.48 4.05 4.25 1.68
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4.7 Conclusion
This study documents the speed of price adjustment using a sample of 497 foreign
firms from 36 home countries cross-listed in the U.S. market. It is notable that out
study overcome the obstacles of non-synchronous trading across global markets. We
address the limitations in previous studies that concluded the findings based on a few
ADRs/GDRs or a small sample of data from one or two markets. In this study, we
are able to analyze how the U.S. contribution to price discovery varies across different
countries and generalize those determinants of the U.S./domestic price adjustment in
response to the price departure from the equilibrium in the global environment. In
addition, our sample cover the time period from 1994-2011. We estimate the speed
of price adjustment in every sample quarter for each cross-listed stock. In this way,
we are able to observe the pattern of price discovery over time and utilize the panel
regression to investigate the determinants of price discovery process.
Our empirical evidences indicate that the price adjustment in response to price
disparity happened in both the home market and the U.S. (host) market. In most of
our sample home countries, domestic prices are dominant for the price discovery and
U.S. share price adjust toward to the domestic share prices significantly. However,
we also observe a statistically significant amount of price adjustment from domestic
side to the U.S. share prices. This reveals that, as a host market, the U.S. also plays
an important role in price determination.
We further examine the determinants of the U.S. market relative contribution
in the price discovery. The regression results show that the greater the competition
offered by the U.S. market, the greater the U.S. contribution to the price discovery, the
more price adjustment from domestic side toward the U.S. price. More specifically, we
find that a cross-listed firm with a larger U.S. proportion of its total trading volume,
more informative share price provided in the U.S. market, longer listing history in
the U.S. market, more liquidity in the U.S. market than the domestic market, the
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domestic price adjust more toward the U.S. price and the U.S. market contribute more
in the price discovery. In addition, comparing the counterpart domestic market, if the
U.S. market provides more market depth and breath, better shareholder protection
and financial information disclosure enforcement, it will contribute more in the price
discovery and the proportion of domestic price adjustment will be higher. We also
observe that larger capitalization foreign firm from a lower economic growth home
country usually has higher domestic price adjustment toward the U.S. price.
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